TAX POLICY AND THE QUESTION OF PEASANT
POVERTY IN TSARIST RUSSIA
1881-1905

The relationship between industrialization, tax policy, and the impoverishment of peasants leads directly into the center of economic and social history of all developing societies. The basic situation is simple, as we can see in many countries of the so-called Third World. The government intends to follow a more or less state-sponsored program of more or less rapid industrialization by exploiting inner sources of raw materials and capital accumulation. Foreign loans and direct foreign investments are equally important elements of the country’s way to wealth — the governments’ stereotype promise to its hesitating population. But instead of attaining sudden fortune many people of those countries slip down the path of poverty. The impoverishment of a big share of the population seems to be the inevitable consequence of industrialization.

Why should consideration of modern countries in transition be given, when the historical case of tsarist Russia is to be the main object of analysis? The title of the Paris conference where this paper was given was “Economic cultures and economic policies in the Russian Empire and in the USSR, 1861-1956.”* The introductory remark wants to demonstrate that the Russian situation cannot be regarded as a singular one. One should keep in mind that Russia at the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century can be considered as a special historical case and as a model of economic development under the conditions of backwardness.1 By comparing the historical matter of Russia with more contemporary examples, we notice very similar problems of capital accumulation from internal sources.2 Taxes then start to play the major role in the development programs of governments. But if we find very similar, from time to time even the same problems and solutions: could we speak of a particular economic culture of economic backwardness? This subject deserves greater analysis and theoretical work than can be possible within the limits of this study.3 But this article might make some initiatory contributions.

First I shall concentrate on economic policies, and give some facts and analyses on the topic indicated in the title. I will not give a detailed description of taxes and tax policy here, because this was done elsewhere,4 but follow more the line of arguments.

and shape the profile of development problems. Then the results are discussed within the framework of peasant economy.

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The tense relationship of industrialization, tax policy and peasant poverty in tsarist Russia has remained a rather white spot on the map of Russia's economic and social history. The questions mentioned above concerning developing countries are valid for Russia, too. If we look for inner sources of capital accumulation, one has to consider the allocation of taxes, the government's tax policy and its impact on different population strata. Because remarkably more money flew into Russia from abroad after the introduction of the gold standard in 1897, taxes appear to be one of the most important instruments to finance the politically initiated industrialization. From Paul Gregory we learn that the foreign share of all net investment in Russia ran up to 6% before 1897, and 12% after that year.\(^5\) Internal sources played the leading role during the industrial take-off at the end of the nineteenth century.

The question who in Russia paid for the industrialization is easy to ask but difficult to answer. When one considers population shares and economic conditions one cannot avoid asking: were Russia's backward peasants, almost 80% of the population, the financiers of the industrialization?

The answer in historical research is a resounding yes. Alexander Gerschenkron has initiated this view, which has been repeated and modified by Theodore von Laue, Jürgen Nötzold, as well as others, who have studied Russia's way of development.\(^6\) Recently, Esther Kingston-Mann, Elvira Wilbur, and Stephen Wheatcroft gave a renewed version but without changing the central thrust of the argument.\(^7\)

The general argument is, who else, if not the overwhelming majority of the peasants, paid for the industrialization? Industry itself had to be protected from fiscal demands, otherwise the process of capital accumulation within the enterprises could have been damaged. Profits were urgently needed to be re-invested; investments shortened or even prevented by state intervention through taxes would endanger the process of industrial development which was even forced and accelerated by state orders and protecting custom laws. So, direct taxes lay on peasants. But indirect taxation was much more important. Excise taxes on alcohol, sugar, and tobacco, and, from 1889 on, petroleum and matches directed the peasants' incomes to the state budget from where the money was distributed by political intentions for the purposes of industrialization. Impoverishment of the peasants was the outcome of heavy tax burdens. The peasants were sacrificed on the altar of industrialization.

However, there seems to be an illogical element in this argument. Do almost starving peasants buy alcohol, tobacco, matches, petroleum, and sugar, not to speak of other goods? One has to reconsider the problem of taxes as source of capital accumulation, industrialization, and the impoverishment of the peasants.

Beside this, there are some hints that this "traditional" view needs some modernization itself. Eberhard Müller has argued against Simms's calculations and looked for paying abilities in the urban population.\(^8\) Through econometric analysis of the Russian state budget, Lyle D. Israelsen has convincingly shown that agriculture played a minor role during the era of industrialization, while the latter itself dominated state receipts.\(^9\) Israelsen, whose intention was to look behind the impoverishment thesis, concluded that the exhaustion of tax paying-ability did not occur in Russia.\(^10\)
Paul R. Gregory and Hans Rogger raised doubts about the ruin thesis, because data did not support this view. But they could not fix population shares and left the question of how the Russian state mobilized its inner sources open. Gregory contended that the answer must give an analysis of relative tax burdens.  

Starting with budget figures, Russian statistics tell us an average growth of 5.69% for 1886 to 1900, the years of rapid industrialization (in comparison to 3.50% for 1830-1885). Economic growth as it has been calculated by Gregory amounted to 3.25% for the same period. Figures by Raymond Goldsmith indicate 2.75%. We get more insights from changes of the budget structure. In 1820 taxes made up 66.9% of all state revenue, in 1900, 41.3%. In absolute figures we find an increase of 265% for the years 1860 to 1900. Other sources became more important for Russian finances, in particular the income from railways (here considered only the income side) and the alcohol monopoly introduced in 1896, and successively expanded in the Empire. That means that “entrepreneurial” sources of revenue pushed the relative weight of taxes to the side.

Within the entire tax revenue in 1900 (585.9 million rubles), direct taxes figured up to 131.8 million rubles, in 1890 to even less (89.1 million rubles). Revenue from excise taxes grew steadily from 1830, and began to play the main role from the 1880’s onward. In 1900 they amounted to 454.1 million rubles (including the alcohol monopoly 572.0 million rubles), or 26.6% (respectively 33.5%) of the entire state revenue.

The question is, did the growth of indirect taxes reflect the population’s growing ability to consume? How do we explain the increase in excise revenue? Was tax policy or consumption the reason? And what happened to direct taxes?

If we look to strategies of development during the years under consideration, we find two different types. Minister of Finance N. Kh. Bunge (1881-1886) wanted to lower direct taxation for the peasants. This kind of “liberation” of paying power ought to increase general consumption. Industry, then developing by private and public demand, could be taxed more heavily than before. Bunge knew that only economic growth and not fiscalist measures would solve the problem of Russia’s disastrous state finances. A dynamic tax system that was affected by the existing economic background was intended to cause a “natural increase of state receipts.”

It is very important to notice that Bunge did not only think about possibilities to change essentially the permanent crisis of Russian state budget, but had in mind social consequences of financial policy. He did not argue from a point of view that might be called an obsolete fiscalist one. His tax reform projected shifts in tax burdens according to the social situation of the population. The former professor of political economy promised “relief for the most burdened tax-payers” and “a better equalization in the distribution of tax money [collected] from all contributors.”  

“Justice in the distribution of taxes” became the motto of the only liberal minister appointed by the tsar after the “purges” of 1881. This meant the abolition of the annoying poll tax and of the salt tax (the latter in 1881) which should “further the upswing in national prosperity to a considerable extent and promise a growth of excise tax-revenue without burdening the tax-payers.”  It was during the Bunge years that Russian state finances began to change their face.

Bunge abolished the poll tax which by then lay only on peasants. This tax on “souls” was introduced in 1722 under Peter I. By the end of the nineteenth century it was considered as a relict of feudal times. In any case there was no legal reason to keep
up this particular estate tax for peasants after the emancipation act in 1861. All other subjects of the Empire (as far as they had been obliged to pay it) were released from it in 1863. From 1883 to 1887 this tax was successively abolished, except in Siberia where it lasted until 1897.

It was rather easy to abolish the soul tax but difficult to replace its more than 58 million rubles, the sum before the abolition. Bunge then reformed the land tax which existed since 1875. Because the level of tax was fixed by the state and then distributed among the gubernii and uezdy of the Empire, unjust distribution was inevitable. Soviet historian P. A. Khromov has calculated that the tax burdens on peasant land were much higher than those on private (noble) land.\textsuperscript{16} The reform of 1884 based the tax burdens on an average value of land in each gubernia, thus keeping in mind the very variable quality of the soil.\textsuperscript{17}

The results of the tax reform were not only a better distribution of tax burdens per desiatina, and a more appropriate administration, but also a relief for the peasant population. The land tax did not at all substitute for the poll tax. When the biggest cut was made in 1883-1884, the land tax on peasant nadel-land replaced only one-tenth of the former poll tax-amounts.\textsuperscript{18}

Much less important sources of state income were reformed, too. What has to be emphasized is the fact that the modernization of the Russian taxes during the 1880's shifted burdens to the urban and industrial sector. The tax on urban real estates, introduced in 1863 as a replacement of the meshchanin poll-tax, was reorganized in structure and norms. What is important for our purposes is the fact that Bunge increased this urban tax because it could be raised safely, due to the rising economic level of some Russian towns. A renewed evaluation of urban immovables in 1883 made this possible. Population growth, railway construction, markets, and industry had created big differences in taxation per basic unit. The reform caused a growth of income from this source of 45.9%.

In 1885 the tax on capital profits was introduced. Up to this year revenues from capital were free of taxation. Bunge had argued that there was no reason to leave out the capitalist at a time when every shopkeeper and every miller had to pay taxes.\textsuperscript{19} All interest incomes from state, commune and private interest bearing bonds were now burdened by 5%.\textsuperscript{20} It was planned to yield 10 million rubles in its first full year of existence (1886).\textsuperscript{21}

The heart of the Bunge reforms was the restructured “tax on the right of practice of trade and industry,” which was given a new basis in 1884-1885. Bunge’s aims were in line with his principles of taxation that he had laid down in his budget report to the tsar. The minister particularly criticized the fact that trade and industry by 1884 had climbed to a level where the obsolete tax structure could not follow the profit rates at all.\textsuperscript{22} He saw a gap between profits and reasonable taxation of profits, and he spoke of an evident undertaxation of industrial and trade enterprises, where turnovers, profits and taxation did not correspond to each other. An increase of 11 million rubles was assessed, again to replace the losses of the poll tax.

So the Russian Minister of Finance did argue in a way that later historians did not acknowledge or recognize. It was by outspoken intention of the master of Russian state finances that peasants should not suffer from industrialization, and that industry was able to pay higher taxes without taxing it to ruins. Or, to make use of a familiar metaphor, there was no danger that the “industrial cow” would be “milked to death.”
The political battle at the backstage of this reform in particular, which intended to begin with a taxation of personal incomes, is a very interesting field of investigation, but it is irrelevant to our question of peasant poverty. I tried to explain the main measures of tax reform to show that financial policy was not made without knowledge of the peasant problem, and, far more important, acted in a way that gave tax relief to peasants while the urban and industrial sector, the relatively new branch of Russia's national economy, was taxed more heavily.

Before looking to the results of the reforms, one should add that Bunge strongly refused to raise excise taxes. As we have seen, the Russian Minister of Finance was not only thinking about social consequences of tax policy, but also of the state deficit. The latter began to dictate more and more Bunge's actions. In 1885 he had to raise the tax on alcohol. However, he did not leave his way of development program. None of the other measures in the field of tax policy were aimed at making up the state budget in the short term.

The results of the reforms were ambivalent: state revenue did not increase. What had grown, however, was the budget deficit. The profile of the budget structure changed deeply under Bunge. It became an "industrial" budget. But still we have a preponderance of excise taxes.

The major outcome of the reforms has to be analyzed in the field of tax allocation and per capita burdens. It seems that all measures of the 1880's tried to follow that line of relief policy for peasants, but some doubts might remain, in particular, when we hear the loud discussion on peasant poverty some years later. Could it be possible that all good-hearted statements of Bunge were contradicted by Russian reality?

After the reforms, the overall per capita tax burden fell more heavily on the industrial regions. As Table 1 indicates, the urban-industrial sector became the heart of Russia's tax system, and the aim of the reform had partly been fulfilled. What is of most interest is the consumption of taxed goods. Here we notice that the population of Moscow and Petersburg gubernii bought goods for 7.63 "tax"-rubles, i.e. the share of taxes when buying products on which excises are levied. In comparison people of the northern regions spent much less (1.73 "tax"-rubles). The second level in consumption of taxed goods encompasses the Baltic areas, where the population bought goods to the value of 3.15 "tax"-rubles. Generally speaking, the top position of the population of Petersburg and Moscow gubernii is worth noting. This exceptional range is caused by direct tax loads as well as by excise payments. It should be kept in mind that revenue from direct taxes are in this case provided mainly by the industrial and commercial sector.

If we try to draw some conclusions from the data delivered by Russian statistics and as they were calculated here, we must say that obviously higher per capita tax revenue, capacity for paying and non agrarian economies correspond to each other. State income from direct, as well as from indirect taxes was highest in the capitals. In those places where one found industry and trade, that is, towns and cities, the per capita payment was highest. This does not mean that the ability to pay taxes was low or minimal in agrarian areas. But the structure behind the data seems to be similar: it was not agriculture but the industrial processing of agricultural products that caused higher revenue. And if taxed goods were produced, state revenue increased by rising consumption. In regards to our main question, data suggest that agrarian regions actually were relieved from tax burdens.
Table 1

*Development of per capita-tax burdens, 1881-1885*\(^1\)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gubernii</th>
<th>1881 (in rbl.)</th>
<th>1885 (in rbl.)</th>
<th>Direct taxes 1881 = 100</th>
<th>Excise taxes 1881 = 100</th>
<th>Dir. + Exc. taxes 1881 = 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dir. *</td>
<td>Exc.**</td>
<td>in sum</td>
<td>Dir. *</td>
<td>Exc.**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow,</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>9.23</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>7.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petersburg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial gub.</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central black soil gub.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Russia</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic gub.</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>3.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwestern</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwestern</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>3.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>2.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Land tax, tax on urban immovables, taxes on trade and industry. The tax on capital profits, being in force from 1 July 1885, provided 3.75 million rubles for the second half of this year. It is not included in the table.

** Excise taxes on sugar, tobacco and alcoholic beverages.

Bunge's tax reforms, one of the Great Reforms, the enactment of which was delayed, were executed at the beginning of rapid industrialization in Russia. One might ask, did the reforms reflect the country's economic development, or did they play a role as an accelerator for economic growth? Was the beginning of rapid industrialization and the profound change of the tax system coincidental, or is there a mutual relationship, industrialization partly caused by the tax reforms? It would be a worthwhile task to do some further research in this field which has to remain a white spot yet. But one must see the possibilities of interchangeable influences.

Although Bunge had to leave because of the growing deficit, it should be noted that he laid the basis for what could be done and what happened in the field of financial and tax policy during the 1890's. Speaking of rapid industrialization means to omit Bunge and mention Ministers of Finance I. A. Vyshnegradskii (1887-1892), and, in particular, S. Iu. Witte (1892-1903). Although Witte appears to be the pilot for Russia's industrial take-off, his ancestor had already created front lines of public opinion about the question of peasant poverty. It is strange to notice that Vyshnegradskii and Witte became the targets of harsh critics, while Bunge was not accused of slaughtering the peasants on the altar of industrialization. Did his successors act completely differently, and did they change the Russian tax system again in the sense that peasants suffered heavily after they had been relieved under Bunge? If they did not introduce fundamental changes, why then were they "victims" of a public debate and judgments of later historians on taxes?

First there was a discussion, then there were the facts. This is very important to understand the development and interpretations by historians.

Witte's taxation concept can be described as a financial circuit. The state would collect money for industrial tasks. Capital accumulation thus was no fiscalism, because all revenue had to be spent productively. The state would take money without economic effects for the payer. On the other side the results of the payer's financing the industrialization should bring back money to him: the state-controlled development of productive powers of the country and economic growth would bring not only the advantages of industrialization back to the "creditor," but also wealth during the development process. Witte declared that the main target of financial policy was "to look for means to fulfill those productive tasks that strengthen the development of economic life and consequently the payment abilities of the population as well."24 A "certain stressing of the ability to pay" could give back positive effects to the payer only in the event that his payments generated economic progress. So, taxes were bound into the overall economic strategy. They had to work for the duration of the boom. In terms of economic strategy one might speak of an economization of taxes. In this respect, Witte actually argued differently from Bunge.

However, Witte continued Bunge's way. His first attempt to open new sources of state income proved to be unsuccessful: he tried to introduce a general tax on personal income. This, of course, aimed mainly at entrepreneurs, merchants, employees and urban dwellers, not at peasants. As Bunge before him, Witte was stopped by a strange coalition of conservative and liberal bureaucrats. The Minister of Finance substituted his project by an urban habitation tax. In terms of state revenue it turned out to be negligible (2.8 million rubles in 1894, two thirds provided by St. Petersburg and Moscow). A newspaper note expressed the political outcome of this event: the project of an income tax "was postponed indefinitely and hence there followed an increase of taxes on particular consumer goods."26
This laconic comment hid many insights in Russia's history of taxes. It was a history of losses. Direct taxes, the experiment of an income tax had proved it, were ineffective. They needed administration, which again cost a lot of money. They had to be raised by coercion, and the population tried to circumvent payments. Tax arrears grew from year to year. Excise taxes, as Witte saw it, were effective which was proved by budget figures. They seemed to solve the problem of contradictory interests of the state and of the population. They were paid not by coercion, but, again in Witte's view, voluntarily according to the economic situation of the payer who was given the chance not to pay, if he could not. Because the sums were rather small and paid when a taxed product was bought, Witte regarded this sort of unperceptibility as a main advantage of excise taxes. All this, he thought, made people willing to pay. Witte concluded that this kind of payments through indirect taxation was socially suitable. At least it helped to avoid repeated income losses as it usually happened with direct taxes. For a Russian Minister of Finance this argument was of some importance, in particular when he was ambitious to industrialize the country mainly by internal capital accumulation.

The social thought in Witte's tax policy was expressed when he stated that tax policy should

"on the one hand abolish or diminish the most unequal and most burdening contributions for the poorest classes of the population, and on the other hand raise and introduce new taxes which are to be levied on hitherto unburdened but taxable sources, or which are levied on goods which are hardly if at all consumed by the poorest classes of the population." 27

No wonder that Witte preferred excise taxes.

Beside their advantages in comparison to direct taxes they were much more flexible as to population growth. Between 1885 and 1897 it amounted to 18%. Because there were no personal taxes, the new generations were left completely untaxed unless they owned urban immovables or had interest incomes or paid for the right to execute industrial, commercial or craft enterprises or owned some land. Witte's logic was simple: more consumers — more revenue.

As was mentioned before there was the discussion about taxes and impoverishment before the participants of the debate knew the facts. So one must not believe in Witte's social argument which sounded rather progressively, but could be the politician's masquerade for an excessive accumulation policy. The main reason to doubt Witte's words is the unlucky beginning of his term of office. In 1891-1892 crop failure and famine shook large parts of the Empire. Public opinion quickly found the scapegoat — Vyshnegradskii, Bunge's successor as Minister of Finance. Although Vyshnegradskii was dismissed by the tsar, public opinion did not calm down. It made tax policy one of the main issues during the 1890’s, strongly connected with wrathful debates on the consequences of Russia's modernization. After 1891-1892 financial policy was regarded, almost controlled by public opinion. It meant that any tax policy which might ruin or did not evidently help the peasants, was vigorously rejected. Because of this, the peasants became the crux of any tax policy. Tax policy itself became a field of publicly debated social policy. Quite naturally, after hunger, diseases, deaths, public indignation about financial policy and removal of the responsible minister, the newcomer would not blow the horn for attack on peasants.

But Witte had no intentions to soothe the public. Right in the beginning he ordered drastic increases in tax rates both for direct and excise taxes, this just after the famine.
Even Vyshnegradskii, the supposed hardheaded industrialist, warned Witte by declaring such steps as “extremely dangerous,” although he did not say for whom or what.28

Trying to shape the profile and major arguments of the heated discussion during the 1890’s, one must follow the line of arguments of Witte and his mighty opposition of nobles, liberals, zemstvo-people and narodniki, all against him, with very different arguments in detail and political direction, but with one general aim: to protect the peasants against impoverishment by state-theft.

Witte claimed to notice a process of social differentiation in the villages. On one side there were the ruined peasant households, but on the other were those peasants who profited from the bad luck of their colleagues. Their income rose due to the higher prices on agricultural products because of the famine. Higher income, Witte thought, would lead to investments and then again to an above average productivity by these “lucky” farmers. A social differentiation within the peasantry was the effect. The fact that Witte discovered islands of development in agriculture, became his main argument for his policy of excise taxation. He thought there existed a stratum of paying ability in the countryside.

Witte’s opponents, of course, thought the contrary. They fought the minister’s thesis that higher revenue from excise taxes reflected more consumption, and opposed the notion that rising revenue from excise taxes meant growing national wealth. Rejecting the views of the Minister of Finance, the opposition group did not connect the budget data to a higher living standard of the population. One typical statement of the time was: “The growth of state receipts from indirect taxation is not explained by the growth of national consumption but by the increase of tax rates on a large scale."29 Witte’s tax policy was thought to be disastrous for the peasantry: “the successes of Russian finances are based on the impoverishment of the masses.”30 Several explanations in the same vein were to be found at that time. They all identified those peasants who were the victims of 1892 famine with the whole Russian peasantry.31 They did not take differentiation into consideration as Witte did.

A main argument of the opposition consisted in the evaluation of whether the taxed goods were absolutely necessary or not. Did sugar, tobacco, alcohol, petroleum, and matches belong to the urgently needed day-to-day consumption of the peasant masses? And was the state, which took some money at every stage of purchase, a secret thief, since the Russian subject paid the tax unconsciously “as though under chloroform”?32 Witte, contrary to his adversaries, emphasized that absolutely necessary goods included “for example bread, salt, etc.”33 which were not taxed in Russia. Witte again declared the willingness of consumption, an argument which could not easily be pushed aside. If there was a burden on the poorer peasants in comparison to the wealthier ones, it was a higher contribution in proportion to their income. But the opposition could not answer Witte’s question as to whether a peasant who was not able to purchase could grow poor by voluntarily paid taxes; either no excise taxes at all, as was required,34 or the peasant masses were not impoverished by taxation.

The opposition expressed disquiet on the question of alcohol taxes. The data on per capita consumption, indicating less drinking, were interpreted as a fall in the level of national wealth. This case demonstrates clearly unhomogenous arguments. Russians were to drink more to give proof of their standard of living.35

One has to add the important fact that the peasant’s direct tax load was again relieved in the 1890’s. In 1896, redemption dues were postponed because of the
coronation of Nicholas II. The land tax was lowered to an insignificant amount by the manifesto of 14 May 1896. In 1893 the tax on urban real estates was raised by 12%, while the famine regions got a relief of 10 to 14%. Through this, Witte argued, only redemption dues and local taxes were left for the peasants. But they made up "an extremely small share of peasant expenditures." The Minister even wrote of an improvement in rural life. This once again freed the peasants of financial burdens, so that they could spend more money on consumption. Witte went so far as to attack his opponents by declaring that the agricultural sector was developing quite well because of his financial policy. Direct contributions could not be made responsible for the so-called impoverishment of the rural population.

Another argument that spoke pro Witte, or at least did not support his opponents, was the extent of tax arrears accumulated by the peasants, although at first glance it looked like a heavy blow to the Minister's optimistic view. During the poll tax era huge sums were unpaid, and the state had few administrative means to squeeze out the missing money. N. Brzheshkii, the expert on this field, calculated that tax arrears amounted to 22.3% of the average tax income from direct contributions to be paid to the state for the period 1871-1875. After that time the government relieved the peasants step by step from tax burdens. In general the period from 1881 to 1896 was one of continuing reduction of direct taxation for peasants.

What happened to tax arrears under these circumstances? One might suppose they would diminish or even disappear. From 1881 to 1885 tax arrears made up 29.7% of the income of direct state taxes, from 1886 to 1890 as much as 41.9%, and from 1891 to 1895 even 95.2%. But these figures show accumulated arrears which surmount the yearly projected or real income. Insofar it is a more political argument than a trustworthy financial one. However, tax arrears did not disappear. We do not know yet what were the reasons behind the accumulation of arrears — be it administrative chaos, a bad economic situation, or a particular tax paying mentality. But before arguing for the second reason mentioned here, one has to give proof about the worsening of peasant economies.

Anyway, the controversy did not deal as much with direct taxation as with excise taxes. Here Witte found himself in difficult position concerning his own arguments. He had no proof for his thesis: higher state revenue from indirect taxation means a growing population wealth. If he had no proof, he at least had an answer to this problem. As we have seen, he pointed out that some peasant farms were getting richer by selling their surplus and thus bringing money to the rural areas. The expansion of a money economy did not escape the eyes of Witte. He tried to find the reason in an intensive exchange process between town and country. This conception was an integral part of his industrialization strategy. Beside the abstract town-country-relations, Witte noticed a "personal" connection. The influx of money from the village came from outside, in non-agricultural ways. Witte had in mind "factory workers, small scale traders, craftsmen, employees, delivery workers, artel' members, household servants, porters and carriers," who did not disrupt their close connections to their home villages and brought money back to their families and households.

The Minister believed, and this is important, that the urban centers of industry, labor and wages were able to supply the rural areas by this (certainly unplanned) transfer of money. By a recently published article we learn that 70-72% of those peasants, who worked in factories not more than 40 verst away from their village, sent money home (about 30% of those working farther than 40 verst). To calculate the
extent of this transfer was impossible for Witte, so he did not offer any figures for it. But it seemed a reasonable building block for him to explain his observation.

At this point it might be useful to give a provisional answer to our main question. It seems that peasants could not be victims of the state’s financial and tax policy. Following all the arguments made by Witte and his opponents, one must at least conclude that there was no intention to burden the peasants or to make them financiers of industrialization. On the contrary, it was more than mere rhetoric when Ministers of Finance emphasized a social background of their policy. Impoverishment was — by logic of taxation — not possible. It is hard to follow the argument of the Minister’s opponents. The case of alcohol incomes in connection with consumption demonstrated the lingering logic of their thoughts.

Apparently, historians dealing with these problems have mostly bound themselves to one side of the discussion being nearer to the Witte’s critics. It seems that the debate during the 1890’s was, beside all arguments against taxes and tax policy, a substitute rhetorical war against Russia’s way to capitalism. There is no need to stress the point that many of the Witte’s opponents were, by different colors, anticapitalists. But it is astonishing how strongly their arguments were transported in later historical research. Gerschenkron had constructed his thesis on relative backwardness and his substitution model (beside other factors) on the peculiar features of forcing savings from the peasants by means of tax policy. Nötzold had assumed that disproportionately heavy tax burdens were laid on the “peasant and sub-peasant masses.” Indeed, at first sight, there are good arguments that speak for the impoverishment thesis, in particular after the 1891-1892 famine. But obviously, the debate in the 1890’s and historians mingled two phenomena: tax policy that did not lead to poverty, and impoverishment of peasants. Insofar as I have argued from the standpoint of taxes and tax policy as it was formulated theoretically, the question seems to be solved. But again: it is a different question, whether there was peasant poverty and impoverishment.

But then, who else paid the sums needed, if not the peasants? Witte’s defence of, and his adversaries’ laments about tax policy and its impacts had one strange point in common. Complaints or indications about the tax load for town dwellers were seldom heard. Obviously, no one really doubted the ability of this part of the population to purchase taxed goods to a large extent. Witte’s opponents did not look beyond their agrarian boundaries. Low-income strata in towns and cities belonging to “the weakest classes of the population in an economical sense” were not the clientele of the opposition. Be it as it may, they deemed “the town” solvent, although this was an unusual viewpoint for the rural orientated opposition which rejected urbanization as a symbol of modern capitalism in general. Perhaps there was no defender of the urban lower stratum, and, therefore, the solvency of those people was out of question. Within the Ministry of Finance, the town was considered as the main consumer of taxed goods as had been proved since the 1880’s.

The provisional answer given above thus has to be expanded by another argument, which is missing in historical research. As neither Vyshnegradskii nor Witte changed the structure of the tax system created under Bunge, it would be hard to argue that suddenly peasants should pay the lion’s share. Actually, excise taxes on kerosene and matches were introduced under Vyshnegradskii, but were they bought mainly by the rural population, kustarniki, peasants in need of light for their winter work? Or did this particular excise tax again burden mainly town dwellers, shopkeepers, entrepreneurs, craftsmen, etc.? Obviously things became complicated. Witte, eventually, reorganized
the “tax on the right of practice of trade and industry” in 1898, once again an attempt to shift tax burdens to the urban-industrial sector. These reforms were no structural changes, but rather supplements or corrections according to the economic development.

If we consider the trend of the Bunge’s reforms as correct, then there is some reason to suppose that town dwellers bought most of the taxed goods in the 1890’s, too. Some voices at that time expressed a similar opinion. The liberal economist I. Kh. Ozerov put forward one of the few perspectives on it. His argument was that “the growth of towns and of industrial Russia and the development of the railway network” defined the level of consumption. This means that the towns are to be considered as centers of a relative strong internal market with a large proportion of production and, further, that the industrial sector helped people earn money which was invested in consumption and that the improving infrastructure created a growing horizontal expansion of demand.

Anyhow, figures to support the thesis of little rural or wide urban consumption and henceforth rising state revenue through excise taxes were not given. What has to be done is to evaluate the dynamic force of excise tax revenue on the basis of our material, and to calculate a distribution of excise tax burdens of the population. One must distinguish the shares of the agrarian population from the urban.

The question still remained open who was right and who was not. When calculating per capita tax burdens for the 1890’s, as it was possible for the years of the Bunge reforms, one must have enough data to find an answer. To calculate the shares is very difficult, and in some cases impossible. The main problem is Russian statistics, which creates a lot of methodological problems for historians. Several elements have to be separated to find per capita burdens: rate increases, which were not equal for all excise taxes, not even for one. Tobacco, for example, was not just tobacco in terms of tax norms, but was divided into several classes of quality with different tax rates and different increases of rates. Statistics do not offer consumption figures, but production. The intra-Russian transfer of sugar from production places to those of consumption, for example, has to be calculated, before knowing, how many rubles the population of St. Petersburg spent for this sweet product. Otherwise, statistics tell us that there was almost no sugar consumption in the capital. Export to abroad, subsidies, partly abolitions of taxes, re-introduction make counting difficult.

The results can be described as follows: an increase in general consumption of taxed goods took place, except for alcohol. Consumption of vodka and minor taxed alcoholic beverages decreased slightly. A growing consumption of tobacco, kerosene, and matches can be calculated. Several hints from the sources suggest that these goods were mainly bought in urban-industrial centers. So one may conclude that these “urban” excise taxes reflect a particularly high increase of consumption in these areas. Although rates were raised more rapidly for these “urban” taxes, the rate increase-production-revenue-ratio still indicates consumption growth. One might ask, why especially these excises were raised higher than the general tax on alcohol. Was it because the Ministry of Finance knew about the exact level of paying abilities in towns, and therefore increased in particular these taxes? But the sources do not answer this question.

Considering regional levels of excise tax-paying, one can again discover a bigger weight of “urban” gubernii over rural ones. Table 2 shows the distribution of urban and rural consumption of taxed goods in 1901.
Table 2

*Distribution of urban and rural consumption of taxed goods in 1901*¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>rural (million rubles)</th>
<th>urban-industrial (million rubles)</th>
<th>in comp. to rural (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>alcohol</td>
<td>140.2</td>
<td>243.8</td>
<td>+ 73.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sugar</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>+ 74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tobacco</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>+ 156.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>petroleum</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>+ 158.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matches</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>+ 159.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ For details see S. Plaggenborg, “Staatsfinanzen...,” art. cit.: 224-235.

This result tells us that in 1901 35% of the entire excise tax revenue (538.1 million rubles) were furnished by the population — one must express it negatively — not working and living in the urban-industrial sector. In contrast to this there was 65% for this minority of Russia’s population.

If we include direct contributions to our calculation, we receive the following results: for the peasantry there were 5.8 million rubles left, levied by the land tax. The urban and industrial sector paid 68.8 million rubles industrial taxes, 3.7 million rubles tax on urban immovables, another 3.7 million rubles of the habitation tax plus 17 million rubles capital rent tax. To sum it up: the urban and industrial sector furnished around 68% of the entire tax receipts.

Not only on theoretical level, but also in reality Russian tax policy did not cause peasant poverty. By the structure of taxes peasants did not suffer either from direct or from excise taxation. It was an error of Witte’s opponents and of later historians, as well, that a traditional agrarian society is reflected by a fiscal system of similar origin. Considering these results one has to look to the urban masses who suffered from Russia’s way to western European economic standards.

*

The question of impoverishment of the peasants would not be fully answered without a view on their economic situation in general. It became clear that the above given data and results have no particular peasant in mind. So, my approach to the subject is nowadays a rather unpopular one. Whereas I looked at the peasants “from above,” and, to be more precise, I did not even look at peasants, most historians today are in search of the “real” peasant life by regarding “from below” or “from inside.”²⁵¹ I am fully aware of the dangers of such a quantifying approach used here, which might lead one to forget about the individual peasant. That is one more reason to have a complementary look on peasant life from a different view.

Mainly two problems arise from my description; first, the question of economic progress in rural areas, and, second, the terms “urban masses” and “urban-industrial centers.”

Whether Russian agriculture developed or stagnated during industrialization is a question that remains to be answered. Probably there will be no final answers, but several ways of interpreting the well-known facts. Land-hunger, redemption dues,
rent, prices of grain, technical backwardness, social differentiation in the villages, and production rates are the key words. Several "schools" have treated these problems and made different conclusions. Questions of capitalistic development, and what kind of capitalistic development, or no capitalistic development are problems that still find the historian's interest.

It seems to me that recent studies have a more optimistic view than, for example, the influencing books of Gerold T. Robinson or Teodor Shanin. There is no sense to repeat old arguments. It is noteworthy that the results indicated above fit well into this optimistic view. In particular Heinz-Dietrich Löwe has argued that Russia's peasantry did not suffer from industrialization. Surpluses, changes in agricultural products, market behavior, rising incomes, intensified agriculture as to cattle and crop allowed better nourishment and a growing living standard in general. Löwe's study, based on rich zemstvo-materials which had not been investigated before, and which did not equalize regional differences, indicates clearly more than the bare survival of peasants. It seems that Löwe's results in the field of peasant wealth and living standard are repeated and supported by Elvira Wilbur, Stephen Wheatcroft or Esther Kingston-Mann, who by no obvious reasons ignored the fundamental study of Löwe. As a result, one could speak of endangered relative wealth, because backfalls into poverty were always possible. The economic development did not (or could not) ensure permanent, stable and growing riches to the peasants, but it would be a mistake not to see improvements by the turn of the century.

Of course, regional differences have to be acknowledged. The elements mentioned above were not distributed all over Russia in the same beneficial way. In addition, migration figures, earnings outside the village or by crafts differed a great deal. That is the reason why this article does not conclude that there was no peasant poverty, although life did become better and taxes did not hurt.

Beside this, the statement that the urban-industrial population paid for the industrialization should be discussed. Population figures for tsarist Russia are not exact. The fact that big shares of the urban population were peasants is important. According to the census of 1897, 6.5 million inhabitants out of 16.8 million town dwellers were peasants by estate. Many factories, in particular the textile industry, employed peasants or peasant women. Between 1891 and 1900 more than 6.2 million passports were issued for peasants to leave the commune. In St. Petersburg gubernia 28.9% of the local peasant population got passports, in Moscow gubernia 29.9%. In general, more peasants left to work outside the commune in the industrialized gubernii. Much has been said about the proletarian between field and factory and close connections to the village.

From these figures one might conclude that at the end it was the peasants who paid for the industrialization. But does this conclusion help to understand the problem? Obviously not, because those people were peasants by estate, not by temporary occupation. It is more than a sophisticated differentiation to say that they earned their money outside the agricultural sector; it is the fundamental difference. Those who might argue, they were peasants, ought to define exactly, when the peasant they are speaking of, ceases to be a peasant, and becomes a proletarian or whatever. Their particular countryman could remain a peasant by mentality, dress, consciousness, and habits, but economically he was no peasant as long as he worked and earned money in the city and industry. Because we are talking of economic categories, and not of
juridical and estate affiliation, it is right to maintain the term urban-industrial population, if we keep in mind that this population was in no way homogenous and urban by origin. But, again, one has to add tax burdens to the misery of the lower strata living in the urban centers of the later revolution.

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3. There are several problems with this term and therefore with the conference title. “Economic cultures in Russia and the Soviet Union” suggests to be understood as economic cultures of Russia and the Soviet Union, or just Russian economic cultures. But how do we know what Russian/Soviet economic cultures mean if we miss categories to ascertain what cultures are in economy? And how many cultures are there? Or does “economic cultures” hide the search for the economic culture which presumably designates what was going on between 1861 and 1956 in this particular country under investigation? At last one should — needless to specify — be aware of what is “really” in mind: do we look for structures of economic development but, say, economic cultures? It seems that looking for cases of comparison might be one way to find at least an approach, if not a solution, to these problems. For a discussion of some problems and authors (Bourdieu, Godelier, Habermas) see Dieter Groh, Anthropologische Dimensionen der Geschichte (Frankfurt/M, 1992).
10. *ibid*.: 122.
14. *ibid*.
17. For each _gubernia_ there was an average value calculated per _desiatina_ which was taxed by 0.18%. By this the absolute figures could vary from a quarter of a kopek (Arkhangelsk and Onelons _gub._) to 17 kopeks (Kursk _gub._). The most extreme relation was 1:68.
18. The mistakes of the 1875 law were not eradicated completely. The tax rates turned out to be too inflexible. After several years the first reform had to be reformed. But the economic conditions (and therefore the value of the land) were never in accordance with the tax.
20. In comparison to other European countries this rate was quite low: Austria 20%, Italy 13.2%, England 10%, _VF_; 23 (1885): 641. The fiscal effects of this tax could have been bigger if attractive state loans had been included.
23. The increases in the sugar rates had economic reasons. They were introduced from 1881 on in several steps. The excise tax on tobacco got a new statute in 1882, _Ministerstvo finansov_ (Spb, 1902), I: 534; II: 303; _Obzor deiatel’nosti Ministerstva finansov..., op. cit._: 413; _EMF_; 17 (1885): 58, 62.
25. _Ministerstvo finansov, op. cit., II_: 316.
26. _Birzhevye vedomosti_ (22 May/3 June 1893).
27. _VF_; 1 (1885): 11.
28. _VF_; 1 (1892), _osoboie pribavlenie_.
32. P.Kh. Shvanebach, _op. cit._: 46; I. Nikolaev, _op. cit._
33. _EMF_; (vyp. 1902): 71.
34. They were supposed to be replaced by an income tax which was not realized; for details see S. Plaggenborg, "Staatssanzen...," _art. cit._
35. I.Kh. Ozerov, _Ocherki ekonomicheskoi i finansovoi zhizni Rossii i zapada. Sbornik statei_ (Moscow, 1904): 421, and authors in footnote 31.
36. _VF_; 1 (1897).
37. _Ministerstvo finansov, op. cit., I_: 137.
38. _EMF_; 21 (1899): 80.
39. _VF_; 1 (1897); _EMF_; 21 (1899): 80.
40. *ibid*.: 80-82.

The following figures (*ibid.*) for the modernization of the financial administration see Erik Amburger,

42. EMF, 21 (1899): 79-81.


44. J. Nötzold, op. cit.: 134.

45. Ibid.; similar I.P. Taburno, op. cit.: 132; A. Stakhovich, art. cit.: 3.

46. VF, 47 (1892).

47. In detail and the consequences for enterprises and economy see S. Plaggenborg, "Staatsfinanzen...", art. cit.: 235-278.


49. For more detailed information to this point see my "Staatsfinanzen...", art. cit.: 224-235.


57. B. Bonwetsch, op. cit.: 14.
