

When a Military Problem Became a Social Issue

Ottoman Desertions and Deserters in World War I

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Historians usually agree that World War I can be categorized as a “total war” in terms of its intensity and extensity. This concept, which has been used to describe the changing nature of warfare in the modern era from the mid-nineteenth century onward, mainly refers to a process in which the home front and the battlefield became closely intertwined due to the need to mobilize all resources to keep up with the ever-demanding war effort. This totality resulted from a combination of various factors, which included “industrialized mass society, nationalism, chauvinism, and racism, the participation of the masses in politics, mass armies equipped and provisioned with modern weapons, industrialized economies that provided the means for large-scale destruction, and the erosion of distinctions between soldiers and civilians.”¹ Needless to say, this new quality of warfare also meant that wars would be much more catastrophic, demanding permanent manpower on vast scales from society at large.

World War I was a long and multifront war of attrition for all the belligerents, including the Ottoman Empire. Although the nature of modern warfare had already begun to transform in the nineteenth century,² the field of mobilization became much more vital for any belligerent’s war effort during World War I. In fact this was where the total character of the war was most visible, where the interconnection of the home front and the battlefield became most significant. To meet the huge and permanent demand for manpower in a prolonged war, the military and civilian spheres had to work together. The state needed to permeate deeper

levels of society with new mechanisms of governmentality to supervise its demographic resource more efficiently. Society had to be convinced to participate in this mobilization through new means of modern propaganda. Transportation and logistical infrastructures had to be mobilized to accommodate newly enlisted masses of people. The military not only had to train these enlisted men to fight but also had to inculcate them with the “virtues” of dying on the battlefield for the fatherland. Therefore, for historical research, a comprehensive analysis of manpower mobilization of a belligerent country in World War I (in our case the Ottoman Empire) has great potential to provide a great contribution to the general understanding of that country’s war experience in many respects.

The overall character of World War I was not standardized but varied in accordance with the infrastructural development level of each belligerent country. In this sense the Ottoman Empire’s total war experience did not have the same intensity as the experience of countries like Britain and Germany in respects such as mobilizing an industrial economy and provisioning the army with domestically produced modern weapons. But the Ottoman Empire did experience certain qualities of total warfare in various fields, and manpower mobilization was definitely one of them. Throughout the war the Ottoman state managed to supply enough men for combat on all the major fronts scattered across a vast geography, from the Caucasus to Mesopotamia, from the Dardanelles to Sinai-Palestine, and from Galicia to Azerbaijan. Out of its total population of some 22–23 million, the Ottoman Empire successfully mobilized a total of some 2,900,000 men.³ This ratio (total men mobilized/total population) amounts to approximately 13 percent. This is not bad at all compared to some major European powers. For example, the same ratio was 15.1 in Austria-Hungary, 15.6 in Italy, and 19.8 in Germany.⁴ In fact when compared to the failure of Ottoman mobilization during the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, during which the Ottoman war mechanism could mobilize only 290,000 men out of a population of 24 million,⁵ the Ottoman experience in World War I can even be considered a success story. Accordingly, the endurance level of the Ottoman armies increased remarkably. While given almost no chance as a worthy partner for an alliance at the beginning of the war, the Ottoman troops tenaciously remained on the battlefield until the end of the war.⁶

Of course, it was not a success story in realistic terms. In fact the Ottoman mobilization of manpower in World War I struggled with important problems. This chapter is about one such major problem: desertion.

While the Ottoman military did not experience large-scale military mutinies, such as those in France in 1917,⁷ the great number of desertions (about 17 percent of all enlisted men) constituted one of the major factors that eroded the Ottoman mobilization effort and war performance. As discussed below, the scale of the problem was so vast that it not only constituted a grave military issue but also became a social issue threatening domestic security throughout the war years.⁸

The issue of Ottoman desertion in World War I has been largely ignored in Ottoman-Turkish historiography.⁹ It has either been treated as a minor military problem or attributed, especially by nationalist-minded historians, to “non-Turkish” Ottoman subjects—Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs. In reality the numerical extent of desertion was so large and the demographic composition of deserters so diverse that it included nearly every ethnic or religious group, including Muslim Turks. In fact, given that Muslim Turks were the majority of both the Ottoman population and the enlisted men in the armed forces, their case is much more significant. Therefore this chapter mainly focuses on them. Furthermore, desertion became a major social problem, requiring measures on the part of not only the military but also the state authority on the entire home front, which in turn opened up new channels for the state to penetrate society.

This chapter focuses primarily on the Muslim population of Anatolia. First, I give a general panorama of the size of the desertion problem and explore the reasons for desertion as explained by military authorities and, where possible, also by deserters themselves. The act of desertion could be seen as a form of resistance by ordinary enlisted men to an imposed duty under unbearable conditions that could not be justified anymore in their eyes. Second, neither the presumed strong Ottoman-Turkish military culture condemning desertion nor severe penal laws could prevent desertion from becoming a major problem. The scale of desertion showed the limits of the Ottoman conscription system in total war conditions. Third, elaborating on the lifestyle of deserters, this chapter explores how they survived after they deserted. While many deserters chose to hide near their own villages and received shelter from fellow villagers, many others resorted to brigandage by forming armed bands, generally along ethnic and religious lines. The proliferation of these bands of deserters turned brigands, along with other deserters who did not turn brigands but still roamed the countryside, constituted a threat to state authority as it attempted to maintain order.

THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM

Technically desertion means leaving active military service without permission, with the intent of remaining away indefinitely. Especially when numerical figures are concerned, however, Ottoman documents and even secondary sources seem to use the term in a broader sense, which also includes those who did not obey the call to service during mobilization, those who did not present themselves at recruiting offices when they reached the age for military duty (draft evaders), and those who unilaterally extended their leave. Perhaps with the intention of covering all these cases, both archival documents and secondary sources sometimes use the more general term “military fugitive” (*asker kaçağı*) instead of “deserter” (*firârî*). Therefore it should be noted that in the Ottoman context statistics on desertions necessarily include all those who “deserted” in the larger and all-inclusive sense of the term.

The existing statistical data on Ottoman desertions in World War I are still raw. The available data that can be accessed in the archives provide us with round total numbers at a very general level or with some fragmentary sets of figures in regard to specific regions during specific periods, which are usually scattered and lack a systematic character. Significant mid-level figures such as the precise and cumulative numbers of desertions for each year of the war, for each major front throughout the war, or for different ethnic-religious groups are greatly lacking (or still wait to be compiled, systematized, and cross-checked). Yet the available statistics actually suffice to show the remarkable extent and seriousness of the desertion problem in the Ottoman war experience.

The official casualty statistics of World War I, which were issued by Ottoman authorities just after the war, do not provide a specific set of figure for desertions. They are included under a more general heading of “deserters, POWs, sick, missing,” the total number of which is 1,565,000. This remarkably high number amounts to almost 70 percent of the total number of all casualties, which is 2,290,000.¹⁰ From various relevant sources, both primary and secondary, we are able to estimate that the number of desertions occupied a considerable place in this figure. The problem of desertion in the Ottoman army intensified remarkably in the second half of the war. For example, İsmet İnönü, a staff officer during World War I (and the second president of the Republic of Turkey), estimated that the number of deserters in 1918 alone was about 300,000. In his words, “this was a very high number that had no other equivalent in our history.”¹¹ The

chief of the German military mission in the Ottoman Empire during the war, Otto Liman von Sanders, said in a report entitled "Condition of the Turkish Army Today" in December 1917 that desertions from the Ottoman army had exceeded all bounds and the army had more than 300,000 desertions at that time.¹² According to journalist-scholar Ahmed Emin Yalman, who claimed that he had access to the official military sources related to the Ottoman casualties during World War I, desertions reached 300,000 at the beginning of 1917, and the aggregate number of deserters amounted to more than 500,000 by the summer of 1918.¹³ Historian Edward J. Erickson cross-checked all the available information in the Turkish General Staff's official military history of World War I and relevant sources and confirms the estimated total number of Ottoman desertions as 500,000.¹⁴ Historian Erik J. Zürcher not only agrees with this number but also compares the Ottoman desertion figures to those of the German army, which suffered 130,000–150,000 desertions during the war. Considering that around 13.5 million men were drafted in Germany during World War I, the proportion of deserters to the total number of drafted men was only about 1 percent.¹⁵ The same proportion was slightly higher than 1 percent in the British armed forces.¹⁶ In terms of actual numbers of desertions, rather than proportions, the Russian case is comparable to that of the Ottomans: 500,000 soldiers deserted during the first year of war.¹⁷ The Italian army represents a similar case. In the Battle of Caporetto in 1917 more than 350,000 men deserted from the Italian army and roamed the countryside.¹⁸ While there are comparable cases, however, it is evident that the extent of the problem in the Ottoman army was quite wide and remarkable. Given the total number of enlisted men in the Ottoman military throughout the war (2,850,000), the total number of deserters (500,000) amounts to more than one-sixth, over 17 percent of all the men enlisted during the war.¹⁹

Detailed and categorized Ottoman statistical data are greatly lacking for specific years and fronts of the Ottoman war experience. But various significant specific examples may be used not only to confirm the gravity of the extent of the problem but also to make some specific comments to help us explore more about the evolution of the problem than the total numbers could imply. For example, the German consul in Erzurum reported in a telegram on June 2, 1915, that one-third of the troops gathered in the camps of the Third Army in Eastern Anatolia had fallen sick and that "another one-third had deserted on the march to the army."²⁰ On the Caucasus front, after the Ottoman forces were defeated by the Russian forces, the Ottoman Third Army alone had about 50,000 deserters by

the winter of 1916.²¹ Desertions in the Third Army zone (which covered roughly eastern-northeastern Anatolia) were at such a high level that even the Ottoman Interior Ministry complained about the proliferation of desertion cases (*kesretle firâr vakalari*) in this zone. The Interior Ministry warned its local administrators and officials in the region on May 18, 1915, that both lack of security measures and carelessness on their part in providing good camping and resting conditions for the troops could contribute to desertions.²² According to a British military intelligence report dated October 29, 1917, in the mountainous areas of the Hizan district alone (located east of Bitlis in eastern Anatolia), about 30,000 had deserted by that date. They were mostly ethnic Kurds, who had fought as irregular units in the Ottoman army on the eastern front.²³ In the last year of the war Liman von Sanders complained in a telegram to German ambassador Count Johann von Bernstorff in Istanbul about poor provisions and logistics in the Ottoman armed forces and said that “the number of Turkish deserters was higher today than that of men under arms.”²⁴

WHOSE PROBLEM?

The Ottoman Empire was still a multiethnic and multireligious entity during World War I. Nearly every ethnic or religious group in the empire is represented among the deserters. For example, cases of Armenian desertions seem to have been widespread in the early phase of the war.²⁵ This situation constituted a reason for Ottoman authorities to label Armenians as “unreliable” and to employ them in the disarmed labor battalions.²⁶ Desertions among Ottoman Greeks were not a rare phenomenon either; Greeks even coined a specific term for their deserters, “the attic battalions,” to describe those who hid in the attics of their buildings to avoid Ottoman recruitment authorities.²⁷ This reluctance in regard to compulsory military service was not much different for Ottoman Jews. Among various methods to avoid service, obtaining a false medical report declaring an individual unfit for military service was apparently quite popular among them.²⁸ Similarly, desertions of Ottoman Arab soldiers were also frequent, especially in the second half of the war.²⁹ The most significant share of desertions belonged to “Anatolian Muslims.” This term means mainly Turks (as a majority), Kurds, and to a lesser extent Circassian and Laz elements. These groups constituted not only the majority of the Ottoman population but also the bulk of the enlisted men in the Ottoman army. Although the available statistics do not provide us with detailed and accurate information about the exact proportions

of different ethnic-religious groups in the Ottoman army, we can still make some significant projections. For example, Hüseyin Hüsni Emir (Erkilet), who was a deputy chief of staff in the Yıldırım Army Group formed in the last year of the war, noted in a report on the ethnic composition of infantry divisions that 66 percent of the troops were Turkish, 26 percent were Arab, and 8 percent were others.³⁰ A more general projection can be made in this respect by assuming that every ethnic or religious group was represented in the armed forces according to its proportion in the general population of the empire. Out of a total of about 23 million people in early 1914, the approximate ratios of major groups in the Ottoman armed forces would be as follows: 47 percent Turks and Anatolian Muslims, 37 percent Arabs, 8 percent Ottoman Greeks, 7 percent Armenians, and 1 percent Jews.³¹ Moreover, the available desertion statistics already reveal the significant share of Anatolian Muslims. For example, a report on deserters in the province of Aydın, covering the period from the beginning of mobilization (August 2, 1914) to June 1916, shows that Muslims constituted the majority of deserters (28,950 out of a total of 49,228).³²

REASONS

Neither the presumed strong Ottoman/Turkish military culture condemning desertion nor severe penal laws or references to the Islamic injunctions against avoiding military service could prevent desertion from becoming a major problem. The reasons for desertion varied. The most common ones, mentioned in the interrogation reports of deserters captured by Ottoman authorities, and of those captured by the British in Iraq and Palestine, include physical and mental exhaustion stemming from dire conditions at the front, despair and frustration resulting from the prolongation of the war, abuse at the hands of officers, the impossibility of obtaining home leaves, and reactions to the almost unlimited extension of the term of service.³³ Although almost all captured deserters expressed regret about what they did, they also implicitly or explicitly explained that they did it as a last resort, when the conditions became unbearable and intolerable. Although conscription was an obligatory form of military service, the enlisted men could still see a tacit contractual aspect in it. An individual potential draftee was legally obliged to enlist, but this obligation was accepted as long as certain basic expectations of the draftee (such as provision of basic daily needs, fair treatment,

reasonable term of service, continuation of his belief in the legitimacy of the service, and providing for his family while he was away) were met by the authorities.

Thousands of deserters, of course, could not be caught for a long time. Many of them turned into brigands to survive, forming armed bands, ranging in size from about a dozen to a few hundred people. Such armed bands, which were usually based on common ethnic and religious ties, presented a major security threat across Anatolia. The troubles that they caused reached an intolerable level in the later phase of the war. A telegram sent by interior minister Talat Paşa to all local administrative units on June 1, 1918, complained that murders committed by bands of deserter-brigands were occurring in almost every corner of the country.³⁴ In addition to murder, the more routine crimes included pillaging and robbing people in villages and towns.³⁵

PUNISHMENT, PREVENTIVE MEASURES, AND ATTEMPTS TO REMOBILIZE

This turned desertion into a much larger issue of public security, which required the state to reorganize its gendarmerie to cope with the problem. But some examples show that roaming deserters in the Ottoman countryside were not treated as complete outcasts by local populations. On the contrary, quite a few of them could easily hide in the vicinity of their own villages and were provided with shelter and food.³⁶ Ottoman military authorities often note the support of the local populations and lament that this encouraged further desertions.³⁷

It is even difficult to argue that deserters were treated as complete outcasts by the state. When the need for military labor was so pressing and the number of deserters was so high, Ottoman authorities always looked for a way of restoring deserters to service during World War I. Although military law required the death penalty for deserters, authorities typically reserved it for repeat offenders and those who committed serious crimes during their absence. Milder forms of punishment such as beating or imprisonment were usually applied to those who were caught during or after their first attempt.³⁸ More importantly, three general amnesties were issued for all deserters on behalf of the sultan. The first one of these came as early as the declaration of mobilization (August 6, 1914), the second on June 28, 1915, and the third in the last year of the war (July 15, 1918).³⁹ These promised pardon for deserters who would surrender to the

authorities within a specified time. The objective of all three amnesties was basically to put the deserted members of the military back in service, which would also help decrease the security problem in the countryside.

Other measures were designed to recover the deserters, which were implemented in the absence of an amnesty. For example, the Interior Ministry circulated an announcement to all local administrative units on September 21, 1918, stating that deserters surrendering of their own will could be enlisted as gendarmes if they met the necessary criteria for eligibility.⁴⁰ Such surrendered deserters were usually employed in pursuit squads formed by the Ottoman gendarmerie to capture deserters and fight armed bands in the Anatolian provinces.

Such measures were not entirely ineffective, but Ottoman authorities continued to struggle with the problem of desertion until the end of the war. It remained a major factor that eroded the Ottoman performance on the battlefield and challenged state authority on the home front. According to the official Ottoman statistics, the number of enlisted men under arms was 560,000 when the Mudros Armistice was signed on October 30, 1918.⁴¹ The total number of desertions had reached almost the same level by that time.

CONCLUSION:

THE END OF WORLD WAR I AND AFTERWARD

But it should also be noted that the gendarmerie (and other recruitment control mechanisms), reorganized in this process, played a key role in this struggle. The state was never completely successful in tackling the issue, although it was able to establish a reinforced basis for internal security in Anatolia. This internal security mechanism helped the remobilization effort during the Turkish National Struggle of 1919–22, which resulted in the creation of the Turkish nation-state.

The cumulative experience resulting from the struggle with the problem of desertion seems to have contributed to the success of the Ankara government's remobilization effort during the National Struggle period. Some important facts support this observation. For example, the number of troops in the Turkish standing army was raised to 78,000 within twenty-eight days of the Battle of Sakarya (August 23–September 13, 1921); that number had been only 23,000 in previous months. Moreover, whereas the number of deserters in the Western Front zone (namely the Aegean region) was 30,809 in June 1921, it was reduced to as low as 4,400 in August of the same year.⁴² Furthermore, between August and

September 1921 alone, more than 12,000 deserters were caught in central Anatolia (the zone of the Central Army) and transferred to the Western Front during the National Struggle.⁴³

Hence studying Ottoman desertions in World War I is particularly significant in terms of revealing important continuities in the field of manpower mobilization from the end of the war through the Turkish National Struggle of 1919–22.

NOTES

1. Stig Förster, "Introduction," 4.
2. See, for example, Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler, eds., *On the Road to Total War*.
3. The total number of men mobilized in the Ottoman Empire during World War I is given with slight variations in various primary and secondary sources. The official Ottoman statistics give the number 2,850,000. Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı/Turkish General Staff Military History Archives, Ankara (hereafter ATASE), BDH, Klasör 62, Dosya 309A, Fihrist 005. Ahmed Emin Yalman's *Turkey in the World War*, 252, which was published in 1930, gives a higher number: 2,998,321. Edward J. Erickson's more recent estimate in *Ordered to Die*, 243, is 2,873,000.
4. *The New Encyclopedia Britannica*, 29:987.
5. The intended total number of men to be mobilized was 812,663. For an analysis of the Ottoman mobilization in the Balkan Wars, see Mehmet Beşikçi, "Balkan Harbi'nde Osmanlı Seferberliği ve Redif Teşkilatının İflası."
6. For a study emphasizing this increased endurance of the Ottoman army in World War I, see Edward J. Erickson, *Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War I*.
7. See Leonard V. Smith, *Between Mutiny and Obedience*.
8. For a comprehensive analysis of the Ottoman mobilization effort in World War I, see Mehmet Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War*.
9. Ottoman-Turkish historiography on World War I, including the official military history of the war published by the Turkish General Staff, has almost always remained silent on this issue and has not produced an in-depth investigation on it. Perhaps the only critical intervention into this silence has come from Erik J. Zürcher, whose pioneering essays have drawn attention to this highly significant issue. See, for example, Erik J. Zürcher, "Between Death and Desertion" and "Refusing to Serve by Other Means."
10. ATASE, BDH, Klasör 62, Dosya 309A, Fihrist 005.
11. İsmet İnönü, *Hatıralar*, 126–27.
12. Otto Liman von Sanders, *Five Years in Turkey*, 190.
13. Yalman, *Turkey in the World War*, 261–62.
14. Erickson, *Ordered to Die*, 243. According to Erickson's estimates, the number of desertions is higher than the number of soldiers who died of disease (466,759) and the number of combat dead and missing (305,085). It is also higher than the total number of Ottoman prisoners of war (around 250,000 according to Yücel Yanıkdağ's estimate). Yücel Yanıkdağ, *Healing the Nation*, 20.

15. Zürcher, "Between Death and Desertion," 257. Desertions in the German army proportionally increased in the last year of the war, however, and specific percentages were remarkably high for particular units on certain fronts. For example, the spring offensive of 1918 brought the German soldiers to the limits of their endurance: "Up to 10 percent of men deserted in the preparatory stages en route from the eastern front." David Englander, "Mutinies and Military Morale," 198.
16. *Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War (1914–1920)*, 741.
17. The Russian case was much lower in terms of proportion, considering that 14.4 million Russians were called to service from 1914 to 1916. Mark von Hagen, "The First World War, 1914–1918," 96–97. According to another source, the total number of Russian desertions increased considerably in 1917 and reached as high as 2,000,000: Nicholas N. Golovine, *The Russian Army in the World War*, 121, 125.
18. Holger H. Herwig, "The German Victories, 1917–1918," 258.
19. A British military intelligence report claimed as early as July 1915 that the number of deserters from the Ottoman army was up to 20 percent of the total troops. Great Britain, National Archives (formerly the Public Record Office), London (hereafter NA/PRO), WO 157/693, July 1915.
20. Von Sanders, *Five Years in Turkey*, 50.
21. Joseph Pomianowski, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Çöküşü*, 201.
22. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi/Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive in Istanbul (hereafter BOA), DH.EUM.KLU., 15/37.
23. TNA/PRO WO 106/63.
24. The telegram is dated June 20, 1918. Von Sanders, *Five Years in Turkey*, 243.
25. Stanford J. Shaw, *Ottoman Empire in World War I*, 1:93–105.
26. This tendency was not entirely new. The experience of the Balkan defeat, during which a considerable number of Ottoman non-Muslims (especially Ottoman Greeks and Bulgarians) deserted to their ethnic armies, must have contributed to this distrust. Fikret Adanır, "Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Army and the Ottoman Defeat in the Balkan War of 1912–1913," 113–25.
27. Haris Spataris, "Biz İstanbullular Böyleyiz," 148.
28. See, for example, Alexander Aaronsohn, *Türk Ordusuyla Filistin'de* 45. Feigning illness and malingering were also common among Muslim enlisted men. See, for example, Metin Özata, *Bir Doktorun Harp ve Memleket Anıları (Dr. Mehmet Derviş Kuntman)*, 72–73.
29. See, for example, BOA, DH.EUM.KLH., 5/56, December 22, 1915. The issue of frequent Arab desertions is also commonly mentioned in the memoirs of German officers who served in the Ottoman Empire. See, for example, Hans Guhr, *Anadolu'dan Filistin'e Türklerle Omuz Omuza*, 144, 211.
30. Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir Erkilet, *Yıldırım*, 346; also cited in Erickson, *Ottoman Army Effectiveness*, 129.
31. It should be remembered, however, that no consensus exists on the demographic statistics of the non-Muslim groups in the late Ottoman Empire. Moreover, depending on the infrastructural development level, the Ottoman conscription system worked better in some regions than in others, regardless of the demographic characteristic of those regions. For more details on the demographic statistical

- data, see Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population (1830–1914)*, 188–89; Vedat Eldem, *Harp ve Mütareke Yıllarında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Ekonomisi*, 4.
32. BOA, DH.EUM.6.ŞB., 9/8, September 6, 1916. The Province of Aydın included at this time the subprovinces of İzmir (center of the province), Aydın, Denizli, and Saruhan (Manisa).
 33. For various examples of such reports, see ATASE, BDH, 2322/71/1-1; ATASE, BDH, 2322/71/1-7. For some examples from the British intelligence, see TNA/PRO WO 157/703, March–April 1916; TNA/PRO WO 157/800, June 1917; TNA/PRO WO 157-727, May 1918.
 34. BOA, DH.ŞFR., 88/3, June 1, 1918.
 35. BOA, DH.ŞFR., 79/17, August 2, 1917.
 36. Zürcher says that local people often sympathized with deserters, which is one of the main aspects that differentiate the Ottoman case from Western European countries. Zürcher, “Refusing to Serve by Other Means,” 50.
 37. See, for example, ATASE, BDH, 2880/323/3. Report sent from the commander of the 37th Caucasus Division to the 2nd Caucasus Corps on June 20, 1917.
 38. This was also observed as early as May 1916 by the Dutch embassy, which reported that “the army has replaced prison sentences with corporal punishment in the field in order not to deplete the strength of the army further.” Erik J. Zürcher, “Little Mehmet in the Desert,” 234.
 39. For the texts of these amnesties, respectively, see *Düstûr* (Ottoman Statute Book), series II, vol. 6, p. 981; *Düstûr*, series II, vol. 7, pp. 630; *Düstûr*, series II, vol. 10, p. 553.
 40. BOA, DH.UMVM., 124/182, September 21, 1918.
 41. ATASE, BDH, 62/309A/005.
 42. Ergün Aybars, *İstiklal Mahkemeleri*, 33, 147.
 43. Mustafa Balcıoğlu, *Belgelerle Milli Mücadele Sırasında Anadolu'da Ayaklanmalar ve Merkez Ordusu*, 204.