

Connected Revolutions

Local and Global Contexts

No doubt, too, the universality of revolution owed something to mere contagion: the fashion of revolution spreads. But even contagion implies receptivity: a healthy or inoculated body does not catch even a prevailing disease. Therefore, though we may observe accidents and fashions, we still have to ask a deeper question. We must ask what was the general condition of Western European society which made it, in the mid-seventeenth century, so universally vulnerable—intellectually as well as physically—to the sudden new epidemic of revolution?

Controversial British historian Hugh Trevor-Roper refers to seventeenth-century Western European revolutions as “contagion,” “epidemic,” and “fashion”; whether one agrees with these general observations or not, his plea to delve deeper into the revolutionary context is certainly welcome.¹ To explore revolutions not only with their local and regional constraints as well as freedoms in mind but to view them as part of the global context remains the most meaningful approach. This book is a study of three contiguous and overlapping revolutions, the Russian (1905), Ottoman (1908), and Iranian (1905–11), through the lens of Armenian revolutionaries whose movements within and across these frontiers contributed to connecting the struggles as well as illuminating their study. It seeks to explore the interconnectivity of the Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian revolutions in several ways that interweave global and local. First, the study advocates a novel approach to the three revolutions, previously studied in isolation and, to a lesser degree, in comparison, that draws on a “connected histories” approach to the study of world or global history, which has, over the

last decade, become influential in how historians study the past. A connected histories approach goes beyond an examination of the similarities and differences of revolutions and allows a more revealing understanding of how the revolutions are connected. It does this through an archivally grounded analysis of the circulation of revolutionaries, ideas, and print. The protagonists of our analysis are the roving Armenian revolutionaries and intellectuals who, because of their participation in all three revolutions, their border crossings within the region and beyond, their adoption and interpretation of and adaptation to such influential and global ideologies as constitutionalism, federalism, and socialism, become ideal subjects for a retelling of the complex story of the revolutions—a story of revolutionary linkages, of local and regional actors with global ties to big ideas. This brings us to another aim of this book: to view the revolutions not only within their local and regional milieus but as part of the global context. This approach takes into consideration the interplay of “facts on the ground”—that is, phenomena particular to the region—with larger historical processes, such as revolutions in communication, transportation, and ideology that had deep and wide-ranging ramifications across the world. A consideration of these global factors helps to explain the deceptively narrower world of our revolutions.

Chris Bayly’s astute observation that global philosophies, like liberalism and socialism, originating in the West “had left an indelible imprint on most human communities by 1914” certainly resonates for the Middle East and South Caucasus, where these ideas spread and indigenized according to local conditions, objectives, and aspirations. Bayly notes that often ideas and ideologies took on a discernibly distinct form as they disseminated.² In chapters 3 and 4, this kind of adaptation and appropriation becomes apparent. Several ideas or ideologies became malleable in the minds and writings of our revolutionaries and intellectuals, as they selectively applied aspects of anarchism and socialism and synthesized them into an eclectic blend that suited their reality and served their political and social interests. Revolutionaries were keenly aware of and familiar with European (including Russian) social scientific and socialist literature, as well as with leftist movements and revolutionary stirrings, not only in their backyard and in Europe but also farther afield—for example, in Cuba and China. As such, they shared much with each other but also with the world around them, which had, in the course of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, been experimenting with such ideas as constitutionalism and socialism and had witnessed constitutionalism succeed in parts of Europe and

socialism thrive in Western and Central European and Russian political movements. They drew inspiration from such activities and applied their understanding and familiarity to the Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian revolutionary environment.

It is within this larger global context that the Russian, Iranian, and Young Turk Revolutions, occurring almost simultaneously in regions bordering each other, may be understood in fresh and revealing ways. All three revolutions under discussion involved the participation of Armenian revolutionaries and intellectuals who contributed in differing ways and degrees and with varying rates of success to revolutionary preparation, process, and development. Whatever the parallels and dissimilarities among the revolutions, neither the revolutions nor the participants were isolated from each other. In fact, they were inextricably connected, a concept not yet fully explored in the study of revolutions. Activists of all three revolutions knew of and about each other and their actions; they were not operating in a vacuum. Therefore, it is essential that such contemporaneous, geographically close revolutions be considered in conjunction and with reference to the larger contemporary context.

With these concerns in mind, this introductory chapter aims to accomplish several goals. It seeks to introduce the local, regional, and global environment and lay out the methodological concerns that drive the study. It begins with the main protagonists of the study, the roving Armenian revolutionaries and their milieu. Following Roper's advice, the chapter then moves to the "general conditions," not only in terms of the wider regional and global context but also the larger methodological issues. It examines comparative, world, and related histories as well as more specifically comparative revolutions to make a case for applying a "connected histories" approach to the study of the early twentieth-century Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian Revolutions—that is, for viewing them as "connected revolutions." It then explores these revolutions on their own and compares them to each other in order to provide the necessary historical background and, thus, move to a discussion of the *fin de siècle*, 1880s and 1890s, and global transformations that smoothed the way toward revolution. The introduction ends with an overview of the sources and the structure of the book. It seeks to lay the crucial foundations for the rest of the study, which explores the finer points of the circulation of men, arms, print, and ideas that justifies a connected histories method for the study of these revolutions and of the interaction of global, regional, and local contexts that explain circulation and connections.

Before moving on to a discussion of connected histories—and given the considerable importance of Armenian activists and intellectuals in the connected history of the revolutions under discussion here—it is necessary to provide briefly some background on the communities and conditions that produced these historical actors on the move.

ARMENIANS AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

At the turn of the twentieth century, Armenians constituted a minority in three empires: the Ottoman, the Russian, and the Iranian. The largest number of Armenians lived in Asia Minor, or Eastern Anatolia, in the six Ottoman provinces of Van, Bitlis, Erzurum, Diyarbakır, Van, and Harput, with a smaller, commercially and intellectually developed minority in the urban hubs of Istanbul/Constantinople and Izmir/Smyrna. It is an impossible task to establish the exact number of Ottoman Armenians at the turn of the twentieth century, partly because the demographic issue has been closely tied to the politics of the “Armenian question,” but according to the Armenian Patriarchate’s census of 1913, the number of Armenians was slightly under two million.³ A smaller Armenian community existed in the Araxes valley and Ararat plain, as well as the South Caucasus—specifically Tiflis/Tbilisi, Yerevan, Kars, Elisavetpol, Batumi, and others—and hovered above one million.⁴ Relative to the number of Ottoman and Russian Armenians, a rather minuscule population of about seventy thousand Armenians resided in the provinces of Azerbaijan and Isfahan in Iran.⁵

The latter half of the nineteenth century was a particularly transformative period for the region and for all three communities of Armenians but was notably more so in the case of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, where most Armenians lived. The period was punctuated by advances in and greater access to education, a journalistic and literary revival, and a changing political landscape at home and abroad, which simultaneously included reforms as well as persecution.⁶ Women in both the Ottoman and Iranian Armenian communities were instrumental in the spread of education, especially but not exclusively of girls, starting in the second half of the nineteenth century. Women formed charitable organizations; helped to establish kindergartens, primary schools, and secondary schools; and often provided students with tuition, clothing, and school supplies. One of the key driving forces behind the opening of secular Armenian schools starting in the late nineteenth century was the cam-



MAP 1. Connected empires. Map created by Bill Nelson.

paign to offset the influence of missionaries and curb the opportunities of assimilation.⁷ In the early twentieth century and in particular during the revolutionary early twentieth century in Iran and the Ottoman Empire, Armenian women of the uppermiddle and upper classes expanded their activism to the women's movement in an attempt to bring women's issues to the attention of women themselves and to raise their consciousness. Their organizations tried to educate women in politics and in Ottoman and Iranian constitutionalism, as well as inheritance rights, hygiene, and so forth.⁸ Especially significant were women writers Srpuhi Dussap, Sibyl (Zabel Asatur), and Zabel Yesayan, whose writings promoted justice and equity for women in the public and private spheres and educational and employment opportunities.⁹ Beginning in the late nineteenth century and early in the twentieth century, women's journals began to appear in Istanbul, Cairo, and Beirut. For example, journals such as Marie Beylerian's *Artemis*, which appeared in Cairo in 1901–3, and Hayganush Topuzian-Toshigian's *Dzagbig Ganants* (Women's flower), published in Istanbul in 1905–7, focused on women's issues. They encouraged girls' education and women's full participation in public life as a crucial part of national development.¹⁰

The changes taking place among women and women's increased participation in public life were taking place in conjunction with other trends, especially in the Ottoman Armenian communities. In the mid-nineteenth century, a younger generation of Ottoman Armenians, mainly from Istanbul, returned from Europe, where they had pursued their education inspired and motivated by the French revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The struggle they waged along with guild members (*esnaf*) against the power of the Armenian Apostolic Church and the class of magnates (*amiras*) for control over the affairs of the community resulted in the adoption of the Armenian National Constitution in 1860.¹¹

The internal cultural and political awakening of the Armenian communities paralleled the Ottoman Empire's administrative, financial, and military breakdown and subsequent attempts to revitalize and preserve the Ottoman state. The Tanzimat (Reorganization) reforms, promulgated during the reigns of Ottoman sultans Abdülmecid I and Abdülaziz between 1839 and 1876 in an effort to safeguard the integrity of the empire and win over the loyalty of its subjects, promised among many other things that subjects would have equal obligations and opportunities regardless of religion. The reforms culminated in the promulgation of a short-lived Ottoman Constitution in 1876.¹² However, the disparity between expectation and actual implementation and even increasing mistreatment and violence against the empire's Armenian population, most evident in the 1894–96 massacres of Armenians, led some Armenian leaders, like their Greek and Bulgarian counterparts, to seek assistance from Western European powers as well as from Russia.¹³ In fact, the Bulgarian case proved to be quite inspirational for Armenian activists despite the obvious differences in their situations. The majority of the Armenian population was dispersed between two empires, where Armenians remained a minority.

The internationalization of the Armenian question achieved by the Berlin Congress of 1878 did not bring about the implementation of reforms requested by the Armenians—that is, local self-government, civil courts of law, mixed Christian and Muslim militias, voting privileges for adult men, and the allocation of a large portion of local taxes for local improvement projects. Instead, the European powers—Great Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany—entrusted the Ottoman sultan to carry out reforms and report the empire's progress to the European states at the same time that they forced Russia out of the equation.¹⁴ Starting in the 1880s, Armenians no longer fully entrusted

their fate to Europe, although hopes and efforts continued. They began to look outward for inspiration to their Bulgarian and Greek neighbors, who had been successful in carrying out revolutionary movements against the Ottoman Empire, and inward to themselves for the solution to the Armenian question. They began by organizing small self-defense groups (for example, in Van and Erzurum) and soon after coalesced around revolutionary political parties with the purpose of achieving reforms and local autonomy for Ottoman Armenians.

It was the South Caucasus, however, that produced the two most important and long-lasting Armenian political parties. Caucasian Armenian youth, unlike their counterparts in the Ottoman Empire who studied in France, pursued their education in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Dorpat/Tartu, Leipzig, and Berlin. Also, unlike their fellow Ottoman Armenians—the majority of whom, with the exception of residents of Istanbul and Izmir, worked on the land—Caucasian Armenians formed a substantial segment of the working class in the urban centers of Tiflis/Tbilisi (which was also a critically important intellectual center), Baku, and Batumi. Even Caucasian Armenian peasants had better access to all the advantages and drawbacks of urban life as these cities became the destination for those seeking work in factories. At the turn of the century, Caucasian cities grew and became transformed by market economies and industrialization, as well as railroads, telegraphy, and improvement of roads, forces of turn-of-the-century globalization to which we will return below. In turn, the growth of the Armenian bourgeoisie in the South Caucasian cities of Tiflis, Baku, and Batumi reflected a disparity between population size and dominant economic position, thus raising tensions between the Armenian bourgeoisie and the larger population of Georgians and especially Muslims, as manifested in the bloody clashes between Armenians and Azeris in 1905–6.¹⁵ These developments paralleled the enactment of Russification policies in the late nineteenth century and increasing Russian concerns about separatist movements in the provinces. The policies enacted under Tsar Alexander III (r. 1881–94) and Tsar Nicholas II (r. 1894–1917) led to restrictions on Armenian cultural, philanthropic, and political institutions as well as schools, and they culminated in the 1903 seizure of Armenian Church properties. The Russification policies and closure of schools also affected Armenian schools such as the Nersisian, Gevorgian, and Lazarian Academies, which had served the Caucasian Armenian community and contributed to producing Armenian literati as well as activists and revolutionaries, some of whom continued their education in Germany and Russia.¹⁶ Like their counterparts

in the Ottoman Empire, Caucasian Armenians returned from their European sojourns strongly influenced by German and Russian intellectual trends and took leadership of the South Caucasian Armenian communities and, more important for us, the revolutionary movements.

It is within this Ottoman and Russian context that the Armenian revolutionary movement emerged, as some Armenian youth, disillusioned with failed legal appeals and inspired by Bulgarian and Greek movements, began in the 1870s to form small and secret local groups in the eastern provinces of Anatolia to protect unarmed Armenians from acts of violence and extortion by fellow Ottoman subjects, Turks and Kurds. Two such groups were the Black Cross Organization (Sev Khach' Kazmakerput'iwn), formed in Van in 1878, and the Protectors of the Fatherland (Pashtpan Hayreneats'), formed in Erzurum in 1881.¹⁷ Other active "small clandestine groups" that "aimed at national and cultural revival" included Miut'iwn ew P'rkut'iwn (Unity and Salvation) and Bardzr Hayots' Gaghtni Ĕnkerut'iwn (Secret Society of Upper Armenia), both formed in Erzurum in 1872 and 1882 respectively, and P'ok'r Hayk'i Kazmakerput'iwn (Armenia Minor Organization), formed in Marsovan/Merzifon in 1885.¹⁸ These organizations were soon followed by much larger and transimperial revolutionary parties, represented most visibly by the Hnchakian Revolutionary Party, founded in Geneva in 1887 (known as Sots'eal Demokrat Hnch'akean Kusakts'ut'iwn/Social Democratic Hnchakian Party, or SDHP, following its Sixth Congress in 1909), and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or ARF (Hay Heghap'okhakan Dashnakts'ut'iwn), established in Tiflis in 1890. The ARF emerged, at first, as an unsuccessful attempt to organize the rather divergent members of the SDHP, the Russian populist Narodnaya Volya (People's Will), and liberal nationalists.¹⁹ As chapter 4 discusses in detail, both parties attempted to combine the national question and socialism and sought solidarity and collaboration outside Armenian circles. Unlike the SDHP, however, the ARF did not advocate independence or separation from the Ottoman Empire. The SDHP, as its name reflects, leaned toward social democracy, although it never gave up national aspirations. As a socialist party, it had joined the Second Socialist International (1886–1914) by 1904 (perhaps earlier) and participated in its congress in Amsterdam, where it was represented by Marxist theoretician and founder of the Russian social democratic movement, Georgi Plekhanov.²⁰ The debate over the national question—that is, the idea of the nation-state, national or cultural autonomy, and self-determination, and especially the way the last two played out in

multiethnic or multinational empires—continued to be discussed in the Second International. The ARF espoused a socialism that most closely resembled moderate European reformist socialism, although it borrowed and appropriated quite broadly from a wider array of West and Central European and Russian intellectual and political currents. Although the ARF participated for the first time in the Congress of the Second International in London (21 July and 1 August 1896) and its delegate presented a report of party activities, the issue of membership came up only in 1905, after the party committed itself to opposition to tsarism, solidarity with Russian socialist parties, and renewed commitment to socialism.²¹ Membership came in 1907, although the Socialist International Bureau recognized the party's operations only in the Caucasus and as part of the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries. The ARF's demand to create an Ottoman section was accepted after some deliberation and appeals by the ARF in December 1908, and the party went to the 1910 Copenhagen congress with two delegations representing Caucasian and Ottoman branches.²² Perhaps taking into account the SDHP's reluctance to carry out socialist activity in the Ottoman Empire, the ARF argued that it was the only socialist organization in Anatolia.²³ In addition to these revolutionary parties, there existed also a number of smaller organizations of Armenian leftists of varying degrees of commitment to orthodox Marxism, social democrats, socialist revolutionaries, internationalists, and others who were not aligned with the two parties. They either acted under an Armenian social democratic banner or joined larger parties such as the Russian Social Democratic Party. Unlike the ARF, which operated in three revolutions, and the SDHP, which operated in two (Russian and Iranian), very few of these smaller organizations operated in more than one or in all of the revolutionary movements. They contributed, however, to the intellectual and ideological milieu of the revolutionary period and, therefore, appear in relevant discussions in the following chapters.

Both the SDHP and the ARF spread their influence by establishing cells throughout the South Caucasus, the Ottoman Empire, and even Iran, whose Armenian community began to experience an increase in the number of schools in urban and rural areas starting in the 1870s.²⁴ This development, especially in northwestern Iran, was quickly followed by politicization, in large part because of Caucasian Armenian influence with the influx of teachers and political activists. Northwestern Iran, bordering Anatolia and the South Caucasus, served as a point of passage or layover for militants, arms, and print crossing imperial

(Russian to Ottoman) frontiers. Just as northwestern Iran, the South Caucasus, and the Ottoman Empire were all linked in the Armenian revolutionary struggle, they continued to act as interlocked loops in the same revolutionary chain during the Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian revolutionary movements. Armenian revolutionaries, therefore, struggled on multiple fronts and brought their expertise and broader vision of the future of the empires into the service of the three revolutions.

The ARF takes center stage in this study for three key reasons: first, it was the leading Armenian party in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in the Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian states and even in Europe; second, it was the only organization that took part in one degree or another in all three revolutions; and third, it is the only party that has maintained a very rich private archive. The SDHP is second in importance, followed by Armenian Socialist Revolutionaries and Social Democrats affiliated with the larger Caucasian and Russian Socialist Revolutionary and Social Democratic movements. However, the others pale in comparison to the ARF when it comes to revolutionary participation, sheer numbers and strength, and sources. After all, as the Polish socialist paper *Naprzód* (Forward) in Krakow remarked, the ARF was a “tough walnut”—that is, difficult to rein in.²⁵ Nevertheless, all play an important role in the history of this period and therefore help us understand the variety of ideas and ideologies that Armenian revolutionaries espoused.

Momentous changes in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries not only shaped the making of these revolutions but also contributed to creating the subjectivities of the revolutionaries who connected all three. Drawing on a large arsenal of internal and external political, social, and economic developments and “pull and push” factors, Armenian revolutionaries and intellectuals took part in the Russian and Young Turk Revolutions and were instrumental in the Iranian Revolution. Key among the factors driving Armenian participation was the revolutionaries’ conviction that the fate of the Armenian populations living in all three empires would benefit from the victory, the establishment of a constitution that promised the end of autocracy and arbitrary rule, and the realization of representative government, social and economic justice, harmonious coexistence, and equality of all citizens regardless of religious and ethnic differences. Therefore, the wider participation and collaboration in these revolutionary and constitutional movements must also be seen as part and parcel of the more limited Armenian struggle in the Ottoman and Russian Empires, as the campaigns and their participants were intertwined and informed by each other. As this study shows, revo-

lutionary participation became possible only because of the ground that had already been set—that is, the transport of arms, circulation of activists, and dissemination of newspapers, all of which served both the larger (Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian) revolutionary goals and methods as well as the kindred Armenian revolutionary movement. Our revolutionaries saw the movements as connected and part of the same fight.

THE CASE FOR CONNECTED HISTORIES

In recent historiography, comparative history has faced a formidable challenge for a number of reasons and from a number of academic quarters, especially from those advocating transnational, entangled, *histoire croisée*, or connected histories.²⁶ What is the relationship of these approaches to each other and to world history, and what case can be made for adopting a connected histories approach in this study?

Historians' views on comparative history, although often cautious and sometimes critical or even censorious, have progressed significantly from those expressed by Raymond Grew in a 1980 essay. Grew opines, "Not only is comparison not a method, but 'comparative history' is a term better avoided . . ." ²⁷ Writing during a time when he believed that the term had been overused and therefore "compromised," Grew wittily cautions, "for many professional historians comparative study evokes the ambivalence of a good bourgeois toward the best wines: to appreciate them is a sign of good taste, but indulgence seems a little loose and wasteful."²⁸ Writing twenty-five years later, Micol Seigel wonders whether the time has come for a "moratorium." Writing in an exceedingly globalized world, Seigel explains, "It is the charge to illuminate the complex, global network of power-inflected relations that enmesh our world, including those connections generated by academic engagement and observation. For scholars committed to this radical legacy, comparison serves as a better subject than method."²⁹ Contemporary historians of comparative history advocate a particular and systematic methodology and one that emphasizes complementarity to other approaches—such as transnational, world, and connected—but attempts to avoid the common tendency to conflate them.³⁰

Critics challenge a number of additional issues often associated with the comparative approach, ranging from its close attachment to the nation-state and national histories and its universalist or presentist tendencies to its reliance on secondary sources.³¹ While herself cognizant and critical of these attributes, Philippa Levine advocates for comparative studies and

criticizes entangled and connected histories, using examples from Eliga Gould and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, respectively, precisely because they seek to sever their ties to the comparative. As Levine points out, for Gould, the main issue with comparative history is its reliance on the necessity to have two distinct and “geographically and temporally remote” wholes.³² In his study of the English- and Spanish-speaking Atlantic worlds, Gould argues that far from being separate, it is “an interconnected yet porous and open-ended whole,” and its “intertwined” history, therefore, must be studied not comparatively but as entangled.³³ When discussing Subrahmanyam’s plea for connected histories, Levine does not seem to do it justice. What distinguishes Subrahmanyam’s connected histories approach is not some obscure “connectedness” that explores “common salient elements” but a systematic exploration of the circulation of ideas, individuals, and objects. It goes beyond “entangled” by offering circulation as a mode for understanding entanglements. Therefore, comparison may be insufficient compared to the more direct and dynamic circulation as a way to explore and understand connection.³⁴ While Levine sees these methods as belonging within the larger framework of comparative history, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt argues that transnational history, connected histories, or *histoire croisée* are substantially different from comparative history. He fairly concludes, “Those approaches . . . choose circulation of models, the appropriation of transfers, and hybrid structures more than they choose comparative history.” For Haupt, they are a welcome intervention, even a “provocation,” to comparative scholarship.³⁵ While recognizing the promise that studies of “transnational entanglements”—including entangled history and *histoire croisée*—hold, Jürgen Kocka seems rather dismissive in his final assessment, warning that the absence of “rigorous comparison” may lead to “speculative or feuilletonistic” studies, an indictment that, one can argue, equally applies to any scholarship that lacks rigor.³⁶ Levine argues for a “remak[ing of] comparative history through an attentiveness to the interplay of local and global, to the meaning of rupture as well as commonality, and always with an eye to the teleologies of essentialism that plague not just comparative but all forms of historical endeavor.”³⁷ Much like Jerry Bentley in his explication of world history, she calls for a comparative method that explores and explains “interactions” that make history, thus “comparing ‘across’ and ‘in spite of.’”³⁸

This brings us to the question of the relationship of world history, comparative history, and other approaches like *histoire croisée* or connected histories. In several of his essays on the significance and contributions of the world-historical approach to our historical understanding, Bentley

addresses comparative history and world history in the same breath, as world history clarifies relationships between societies “by placing them in comparative perspective.”³⁹ The approaches have much in common, including an effort to think beyond the nation-state and to reject Eurocentrism.⁴⁰ Similar to the aims of contemporary historians practicing a form of comparative history or, even more so, connected histories and transnational history, world history emphasizes encounters, interactions, and “large-scale processes that transcend national, political, geographical, and cultural boundary lines.”⁴¹ For Bentley, the commonalities of connected, transnational, and entangled histories with world history warrant treating them as approaches that “overlap.”⁴²

Much of world history and comparative history methods, perhaps until recently, have suffered from the same drawback: a reliance on secondary sources in place of rigorous primary source investigation.⁴³ This drawback is also the case, more specifically, with comparative studies of revolution, which are characterized by yet another trait: social scientists—not historians—dominate comparative studies of revolutions. This may be partly because, on the one hand, social scientists, particularly sociologists or historical sociologists, have been the initiators of the comparative approach, and, on the other hand, because much of the comparative revolution scholarship concerns itself with creating somewhat all-embracing theoretical models to explain revolutionary causes, processes, and outcomes—a methodology that unnerves historians.⁴⁴ Whether we see entangled and connected histories as “shar[ing] some of the characteristics of historical comparison,” as does Haupt; as “forms of comparative history,” as does Levine; in combination, as does Kocka; or “overlap[ping]” with world history, as does Bentley, it is crucial to distinguish more explicitly the unique contribution of the connected histories approach and acknowledge its departure from comparative history.⁴⁵

REVOLUTIONS: A BRIEF DISCUSSION

In this section, I provide a brief overview of some of the debates in the scholarship on revolution and comparative revolutions, especially on what Jack Goldstone calls comparative historical analysis (CHA) of revolutions, as a necessary theoretical backdrop that will lead to considering a connected histories approach to revolutions.

Debates regarding the definition of revolution, the role of structures and ideas, the question of why individuals take part, outcomes, and even theories to predict revolutions still continue, largely among social scientists

but also among historians of revolutions.⁴⁶ No single definition applies to all types and cases of revolution.⁴⁷ Social scientists' dizzying array of definitions range from narrower ones that insist on regime change accompanied by mass mobilization to more open-ended ones whose focus lies in the *attempt* to overthrow or transform a regime rather than the actual realization of those goals.⁴⁸ In the latter case, one could argue that the process is just as important as the outcome, thus opening the way for a more inclusive definition that emphasizes not merely successful social revolutions that completely transform states and social structures in the short and long term but also others that initiate significant changes that affect the future course of society. Ultimately, however, as Eric Selbin notes, "While definitions and explorations of revolution come and go, decades of social science research have done little to bring us closer to understanding why revolutions happen here and not there, now and not then, among these people and not those."⁴⁹ A rather limited definition that insists on a complete and enduring political and social transformation may exclude one or more of the revolutions in this study. However, on the whole, current scholarship treats all of them—Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian—as revolutions. Our revolutions have not been complete successes; however, it would be just as imprudent to dismiss revolutions because they do not measure up to the few classic social revolutions such as the French (1789) and the Russian (1917) as to dismiss twentieth-century genocides because they do not meet the criteria of the Holocaust. Are the revolutions we are looking at successful? What is a successful revolution? Can a failed revolution still be a revolution if one considers process and effort as important as outcome? Should the focus be on process? All are noteworthy questions, but they are not necessarily crucial to our understanding of how these struggles are connected by a larger global context and regional and local circulation of transimperial revolutionaries and global ideologies.

The role of revolutionaries and ideas brings us to the question of the degree of importance of agency and structure in comparative analyses of revolution, a debate inspired by Theda Skocpol's work in the 1970s. The debate over structure versus agency has been a central part of the scholarship on the comparative aspects of revolutions in the early modern and modern periods, whether in Europe or Eurasia. Jack Goldstone's essay on CHA of revolutions provides an insightful examination of CHA methods as practiced by social scientists and some historians. What is clear from his study is CHA's privileging of patterns of events—and, even more so, causal relationships—in most studies but especially in the influential and hotly debated work of Skocpol.⁵⁰

In the 1920s and 1930s, studies on revolutions (mainly by Crane Brinton, Lyford Edwards, and George Pettee) focused on similarities in patterns of events and contributed little to our understanding of causes.⁵¹ That focus began to change in the 1950s, and the change intensified throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as scholars sought causal explanations in the uneven relationship between traditional and modernizing elements within society. They were quickly critiqued by the giants in the field of revolution studies, Charles Tilly and Barrington Moore, who challenged the very foundation of modernization theory, which attributed the occurrence of revolutions to society's modernization.⁵² Skocpol's intervention, as Goldstone explains, moved modernization from the national to the global level.⁵³ Although Skocpol's conclusions were, in turn, challenged by new revolutions in places such as Nicaragua, Iran, and Eastern Europe and by scholars who reminded us of the significant role of actors and ideology, nevertheless they left a lasting impression on the scholarship on revolution.⁵⁴ Goldstone succinctly describes Skocpol's structural theory as one that insists on three conditions that affect the social and political structures of society and that are necessary for revolution: "international pressure from a more advanced state or states; economic or political elites who had the power to resist state-led reforms and create a political crisis; and organizations (whether village or party) that were capable of mobilizing peasants for popular uprisings against local authorities."⁵⁵ As the numerous CHA-inspired studies of revolutions have also clearly proven, there is neither a single cause nor a combination of causes that guarantee the occurrence of revolutions. A number of interrelated and sometimes seemingly unrelated factors on the global, regional, and local level combine to cause revolutions to flare up.⁵⁶ For example, in his study on third-world social revolutions, John Foran, who adopts Skocpol's definition of a social revolution—that is, "rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures"—points to five factors, which, occurring in conjunction, result in successful revolutions in the third world.⁵⁷ They are "1) dependent development; 2) a repressive, exclusionary, personalist state; 3) the elaboration of effective and powerful political cultures of resistance; and a revolutionary crisis consisting of 4) an economic downturn; and 5) a world-systemic opening (a let-up of external controls)."⁵⁸ Foran brings in agency and ideology—in the form of a culture of resistance—to supplement an otherwise structural approach.

Therefore, some scholars have attempted to consider agency—the role of individuals and ideas—in combination with structure to

understand revolutions, whereas others have given agency priority. Many scholars have questioned, to one degree or another, Skocpol's and other structuralists' insistence on the primacy of structure as the key component of revolutionary action and their downplaying of agency and ideology; instead, these scholars have allotted individuals and ideas formidable influence on revolutionary mobilization.⁵⁹ For example, in his comparative study of the Iranian, Nicaraguan, and Philippine Revolutions, Misagh Parsa extensively analyzes the collective actions, interests, and ideologies of major social groups, classes, and individuals; he shows that they are "at the heart of revolutionary struggles but are given short shrift" in the scholarship.⁶⁰ In a more recent and provocative analysis that offers an antidote to the privileging of structural theories, Eric Selbin calls for "bringing story back in" by delving into the role and power of myth, memory, mimesis, "stories and narratives of popular resistance, rebellion, and revolution which have animated and emboldened generations of revolutionaries."⁶¹ Selbin has long been a strong critic of structuralism, arguing that the role of individuals cannot be excluded from explanations of why revolutions take place and that indeed individuals are central to why revolutions emerge and how they proceed. He emphatically contends that revolutions are "created by people, led by people, fought and died for by people, consciously and intentionally constructed by people."⁶² To this, he adds individuals' stories and how the stories contribute to the making of revolution. This aspect of Selbin's analysis relates to the aim and approach of this study, which focuses on the stories of roving revolutionaries and circulating material and ideas and their contribution to connecting revolutions.

The question of agency and the contribution of ideas and individuals to creating revolutions ties in very closely to the reasons that actors participate in revolution. Theories about what propels individuals and groups include, for example, "relative deprivation," when expectations go unmet and people instead encounter deprivation; rational choice theory, when self-interest dictates the decision to become active, and its opposite, when group interests override individual ones; and even "bandwagoning," whereby people join because they see others taking up arms or taking to the streets.⁶³ In the case of this study of circulating Armenian revolutionaries, the matter of agency and the reasons individuals chose to venture into three simultaneously and/or consecutively occurring and bordering revolutions is particularly important. What ideas and promises drove these actors? What practical circumstances on the ground contributed to action? How did the regional, political scene and global transformations in tech-

nology and ideology encourage and make possible the choices they made regarding collaborative struggle with other revolutionaries? It is these kinds of questions that drive this study. While the debates on revolutionary theory, definition, and other related matters remain admittedly important and may provide breadth and backdrop, a primary-source-driven and historically grounded treatment of the three revolutions that goes beyond comparison and instead highlights connections through circulation and context—local, regional, and global—takes precedence here. Thus, this study departs from earlier comparative approaches and brings a fresh perspective to the scholarship on revolutions. From where does such an approach draw inspiration? What are its foundations and rationale?

CONNECTED HISTORIES APPROACH AND ITS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF REVOLUTIONS

Unlike insular studies of revolution, and unlike comparative scholarship, which compares the common historical traits of revolutions, a third approach occupies itself with revolutions' "horizontal continuity," to use a term introduced by Joseph Fletcher. According to Fletcher, "horizontal continuities" are said to exist when an "economic, social, or cultural historical phenomenon experienced by two or more societies between which there is not necessarily any communication . . . result from the same ultimate source."⁶⁴ In our case, of course, there is indeed communication between societies; therefore, Fletcher's "interconnection"—that is, "historical phenomena in which there is contact linking two or more societies, as, for example, the spread of an idea, institution, or religion, or the carrying on of a significant amount of trade between societies"—becomes far more apt.⁶⁵ Whether one searches for horizontal continuities or interconnection, Fletcher makes a point similar to that of Bayly but much earlier and for an earlier period, recommending that we look for the larger patterns connecting disparate or related societies.⁶⁶ While Fletcher prefers comparative history to area studies or a "parochial outlook," he finds it lacking and inferior to integrative history that explores interrelated historical phenomena.⁶⁷ Like Fletcher, Bayly focuses on interconnections and globalization but in the nineteenth century. He observes, "As world events became more connected and interdependent, so forms of human action adjusted to each other and came to resemble each other across the world." These connections, in turn, "created many hybrid politics, mixed ideologies, and complex

forms of global economic activity” at the same time that they amplified areas of divergence as well as animosity.⁶⁸

What distinguishes this school of “integrated” histories of revolutions from comparative histories is its emphasis on integrating, as opposed to isolating or comparing, the study of different revolutions in relation to an underlying common causal mechanism, such as population growth (to name just one example). Fletcher’s integrative approach, in which he emphasizes searching for interrelated causes for “historical parallelisms (roughly contemporaneous similar developments in the world’s various societies),” is associated most with the work of Jack Goldstone on early modern revolutions and rebellions in Stuart England, Ming China, and the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁹ Goldstone studies early modern revolutions or rebellions in Stuart England, Ottoman Turkey, and Ming China in an integrated fashion by focusing on common demographic growth and its role in causing revolutionary breakdowns in these seemingly isolated places. He is particularly interested in exploring “a common causal framework rooted in a wide-ranging ecological crisis.” He shows how population growth in a period of stagnant agricultural growth led to a number of economic, social, and political problems—“decline of traditional systems of taxation, overloading of institutions of elite training and recruitment, and decay in popular living standards”—that culminated in revolution.⁷⁰

A related approach to Fletcher’s notion of interconnection is *histoire croisée*, promoted by Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann. For Werner and Zimmermann, “The notion of intersection is basic to the very principle of *histoire croisée*,” and “Accordingly, entities and objects of research are not merely considered in relation to one another but also *through* one another, in terms of relationships, interactions, and circulation.”⁷¹ This approach is similar to Fletcher’s concept of interconnection: linking societies through related phenomena. Benedict Anderson’s *Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination* is an important study of interconnection that focuses on the connections and coordination between subjects of the late nineteenth-century Spanish Empire (Cuban, Puerto Rican, Dominican, and Filipino anarchists) and the cross-pollination of anarchist and revolutionary ideas and ideologies in the last few decades of the nineteenth century.⁷² While Charles Kurzman presents a notable comparison of early twentieth-century democratic revolutions and their consequences in Russia, Iran, the Ottoman Empire, Portugal, Mexico, and China, his approach remains a comparative, not connected, history of the role of intellectuals.⁷³ Ilham Khuri-Makdisi’s

The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism demonstrates the connections between global transformations and radical networks in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly in Beirut, Alexandria, and Cairo between 1860 and 1914.⁷⁴ More recently, but for an earlier period, Janet Polasky's *Revolutions without Borders: The Call to Liberty in the Atlantic World* focuses on itinerant revolutionaries and ideas that traversed the Atlantic world before the advent of an international postal system or the technological transformations in transportation and communication.⁷⁵

My approach, which I call “connected revolutions,” owes its conceptual or theoretical debt to Fletcher’s interconnection and Werner and Zimmermann’s *histoire croisée*. In addition, the idea behind connected revolutions is inspired by Sanjay Subrahmanyam’s studies of early modern Indian Ocean and European history, where Subrahmanyam presents his approach as an alternative to historical writing inspired by either area studies, comparative, or nationalist approaches, all of which tend to *parochialize* the study of history by severing the rich and complex connections between historical developments occurring in seemingly dissimilar regions.⁷⁶ As Subrahmanyam points out, “Contrary to what ‘area studies’ implicitly presumes, a good part of the dynamic in early modern history was provided by the interface between the local and regional (which we may call the ‘micro’-level), and the supra-regional, at times even global (what we may term the ‘macro’-level).”⁷⁷ One way in which Subrahmanyam proposes to deparochialize or deprovincialize the study of the past is by focusing on real connections between regions that otherwise have been studied in isolation. He does this by highlighting the role of the circulation of cultural forms, ideas, capital/commodities, and elites. Similarly, one way of deprovincializing the study of the Ottoman, Iranian, and Russian Revolutions is to explore them through the circulation of Armenian revolutionaries who simultaneously operated in each of these political and social upheavals. The Armenian activists were some of the most active and dynamic of their kind to connect all three revolutions at the dawn of the twentieth century. They were themselves “connectors,” much like Malcolm Gladwell’s Paul Revere but perhaps much less dramatic and much more constant.⁷⁸ In studying the circulation of the Armenian revolutionaries and political activities in Russia, Iran, and the Ottoman Empire, this book contributes to the project of connected histories through the study of the connectedness of all three revolutions and, in doing so, sheds light on the tumultuous events at the beginning of the twentieth century that have helped shape the history

of the states and societies in which they occurred. It also seeks to contribute to the concerns of world historians, whose growing interest lies in border crossers. Therefore, what follows in this book both is informed by and aims to give back to world-historical and connected histories approaches and scholarship through the telling of the revolutionary drama that unfolded in the early twentieth century in the Middle East and the Caucasus, as transimperial subjects conceived, espoused, and spouted revolution in both words and deeds.

COMPARING THE RUSSIAN, IRANIAN, AND YOUNG TURK REVOLUTIONS

Having briefly touched upon some of the comparative historical analyses of revolutions, I now turn to the constitutional revolutions at the core of this study: the Russian, Iranian, and Ottoman. What common threads and aspirations did they share? How can we understand these revolutions beyond their particularities and in global perspective? How do they reflect not only the local and regional but the global context? How can we approach them in an area that triangulates three bordering empires? Why are they important in the larger scheme of world history?

At the risk of simplification, one can say that there have generally been three schools of thought on how the Russian, Iranian, and Young Turk Revolutions have been explored. The conventional school studied revolutions in a rather insular fashion, producing scholarship on each revolution and treating each in isolation from the others. To some extent, although not entirely, this approach may be seen as emanating from the conventional concerns of national historians and area studies specialists in each of these regions, who have privileged the study of the history of nation-states at the expense of exploring shared histories with other states or societies. Nevertheless, the important contributions and foundational knowledge produced by this kind of scholarship, which has been the dominant form until recently, must be acknowledged. Another approach to the study of revolutions in general has been the comparative scholarship that has set for itself the agenda of comparing the common historical traits of otherwise seemingly disparate revolutions.⁷⁹ Nader Sohrabi's study comparing the three revolutions is without doubt the only serious sociological and historical study on the subject.⁸⁰ Here, Sohrabi compares what he calls two successful constitutional revolutions, the Ottoman and the Iranian, with a failed one, the Russian, arguing that "the support of extraparliamentary resources, including

the military,” determined short- and long-term success.⁸¹ Sohrabi’s structural approach also takes into consideration ideology.⁸² His discussion of the impact of the dominant “revolutionary paradigm”—that is, the French Revolution of 1789—as the revolutionary and constitutional model points out France’s premier position in the minds of the revolutionaries of all three revolutions.⁸³

Sohrabi picks up on the theme of the revolutionary paradigm of the French Revolution in his recent valuable and lengthy study. Here, however, he is particularly interested in comparing the Ottoman and Iranian Revolutions “in the spirit of” Clifford Geertz’s “commentary on one another’s character.”⁸⁴ His study is an example of what Levine calls “comparison to,” which “sets up a hierarchy with the lead comparison as the normative entity [Ottoman] against which something else [Iran] will be compared.”⁸⁵ Sohrabi’s analysis serves the dual purpose of exploring why and how these revolutions took place and, therefore, what makes them constitutional, as well as historicizing the study of revolutions through a comparative examination of the ideologies and the revolutionaries that supported them.⁸⁶ One of the key aspects of Sohrabi’s study is the connection he makes among the global, regional, and local, solidly grounding the ideology of constitutionalism at all three levels.⁸⁷ As Sohrabi asserts, while constitutionalism was a global phenomenon, it took a different shape in the Ottoman and Iranian Revolutions because of negotiations with the regional and local and, therefore, what he finds in both cases is a specific “domesticated constitutionalism” rather than an abstract one.⁸⁸ His study benefits from a more inclusive methodological approach that takes into account structuralism, causal relations, and patterns of events, as well as agency and contingency, in order to provide the single most comprehensive comparison of the two revolutions.⁸⁹ Although Sohrabi’s study falls into the category of comparative history, his global framing of the revolutions makes it a vital and original contribution to that approach.

Sohrabi’s analysis of the local in relation to the regional and the global is evidence of Bayly’s observation about the impression made by Western ideologies on global communities. What Iranian and Ottoman communities did with these concepts, as Sohrabi demonstrates, however, was clearly dependent upon their own local conditions. As Bayly explains, “In the process, intellectuals and popular audiences the world over had rapidly transformed their meanings into a variety of doctrines, often very different from their exemplars.”⁹⁰ For example, constitutionalism—the concept that a state’s authority is limited by a set

of rules and regulations agreed upon by the populace through a constitution and, furthermore, that the state's authority is dependent upon its observation of those limitations—traveled from Europe east to the Middle East and Japan. In fact, constitutionalism made its way to Japan before it got to the Middle East and even to the Caucasus. For constitutionalists in the region, Japan's victory over Russia signified the perceived promise and strength of constitutionalism. After all, had not the only decaying nonconstitutional Western empire lost to the only constitutional power in Asia?⁹¹ Revolutionaries in all three cases, Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian, may have disagreed on the form of government or the economic stage of their societies in the evolutionary process or the way in which to reach their goals or even the contents of their constitutions, but what they all thought in unison was that constitution was the “secret of strength” of any society.⁹² In that sense, the revolutions shared much in common with each other and also with the world around them, which had, in the course of the late nineteenth century, seen constitutionalism succeed, in one degree or another, in Western Europe. In chapter 3, I discuss the complicated relationship that Armenian revolutionaries had with constitution as principle on the one hand and real constitutions in the Russian, the Iranian, and especially the Ottoman case on the other—in a sense, that is, the global and the local. Constitutionalism was only one of a myriad of ideas, including most importantly socialism and federalism, that inspired our revolutionaries, leading them to adopt and appropriate such global ideas through a number of means, including print in the original or translation and personal and professional encounters through imperial frontier crossings.

Revolutionaries and observers were very much aware of their own recent history, of the wave of revolutions from 1765 to 1830—the age of revolutions—and from 1847 to 1865, in particular, and they may have soon become deeply conscious of their role in the third wave, from 1905 to 1912. As Jürgen Osterhammel explains, unlike earlier revolutionary waves, “this time the mutual influences were more intense than in the mid-nineteenth century; the revolutionary events were expressions of a common background in the times.”⁹³ In all cases but in varying degrees, revolutionaries opposed autocratic, personalist rule, reforms kindled revolutionary potential and action, and intelligentsia drove the coalitions that brought about change, even if at times temporarily.⁹⁴ The revolutions all involved, to some extent, the collaboration of linguistically and ethnically diverse imperial subjects and adaptation of European Enlightenment ideas as well as socialism in its many vari-

ants. More importantly, however, the military and international setting, whether military defeats and setbacks or concessions and capitulations, permitted the revolutionary context.⁹⁵

All empires faced financial problems, although the Ottoman and Iranian Empires were much worse off than the Russian, which experienced economic development and modernization before the turn of the twentieth century. Most importantly, though, they all felt the heavy blow of the worldwide economic depression that began in 1873 and may have lasted until 1896. As James Gelvin succinctly explains, “In the Middle East, the collapse of international trade and commodity prices bred discontent among merchants and farmers. It also resulted in Ottoman and Egyptian bankruptcy and foreign supervision of the finances of each. Money that had gone into public works, military salaries, and the expansion of services vital to the functioning of modern states now went to repaying European creditors. Many in the region were resentful.”⁹⁶ That resentment intensified the already vulnerable situation to such an extent that popular uprisings erupted in the triangulating and frontier-sharing region.

The three revolutions were similar to earlier revolutionary waves in the Atlantic world before and after the French Revolution of 1789 and in Europe in 1848 and also coincided with revolutions in Portugal (1910), Mexico (1911), and China (1912).⁹⁷ The revolutions in the Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian states drew strength from each other’s successes and attempted to effect change in their own particular environments. Even as far away as Portugal, for example, Portuguese revolutionaries, inspired by the Young Turk Revolution, began to call themselves “Young Turks.”⁹⁸ Our three revolutions shared a great deal with the others and took markedly similar paths. Progressive movements toppled autocratic states and initiated the beginnings of popular sovereignty—constitutional rule, parliaments, and freedoms—but they did not successfully implement or guarantee them. All revolutions were followed by coups d’état initiated by more conservative forces.⁹⁹ While one may quibble about the degree of success of each revolution and the degree of political and social transformation, none reverted back to the old order.

Russian Revolution, 1905 (1904–1907)

The Russian Revolution was characterized by a series of protests, worker strikes, and mutinies in parts of the Russian Empire, including the Caucasus. It marked the culmination of decades of both liberal and

radical (and everything in between) opposition to the tsar's unchecked authority and attempts to limit the autocracy's powers through constitutional limitations. Tsar Nicholas's response to demands oscillated from inaction and empty promises or concessions to violent repression. The promise of reform and the concession to form a *duma* (parliament) did little to meet the demands of constitutionalists, who were disappointed by the limits placed on the electorate. The struggle continued between the oppositional forces and the tsar and among constitutionalists themselves until 1907, when the autocracy restored its authority, which it had conceded in 1906, in direct violation of the constitution. As the foremost scholar on the revolution, Abraham Ascher, concludes, the revolution left behind "an enduring legacy: it initiated a process of political, economic, and social change that even now still has not run its full course."¹⁰⁰ Moreover, the Russian Revolution had a tremendous intellectual, ideological, and political impact on the Ottoman and Iranian Revolutions, especially on the latter.

Ascher makes a case that the revolution actually began in late 1904, with liberal agitation against the autocracy aroused by Russian military defeats in war with Japan, and ended with the dissolution of the second *duma* in early June 1907.¹⁰¹ Scholars have disagreed on the key protagonists and the event that marks the start of revolution, many arguing that workers spearheaded the struggle and that it began with Bloody Sunday.¹⁰² Ascher, instead, supports what he calls the "liberal" view, which "depicts the revolution . . . as a critical juncture that opened up several alternative paths" and at first involved liberals from the nobility and professional classes with political demands and later "workers, peasants and national minorities—who were additionally interested in economic and social change. . . ."¹⁰³ While there have been some rumblings by Marxists and non-Marxists alike against labeling the Russian Revolution a revolution because it did not culminate in a complete social and political transformation, as did the later 1917 revolution, a number of factors—including large-scale popular protests, organized opposition, and broad-based coalitions, as well as new social and political institutions—warrant considering this movement as a revolution, one that stood on its own and was not merely, as Lenin claimed, a "dress rehearsal" for 1917.¹⁰⁴

A number of economic, political, and social factors acting in conjunction led to the Russian Revolution. Beryl Williams raises Alexis de Tocqueville's contention that revolutions occur not in times of impoverishment but during periods of accelerated economic and social develop-

ment that benefit some but not others. Just as the abolition of serfdom in the 1860s raised the hopes of peasants about land ownership and autonomy, industrial modernization raised the expectations of workers in the late nineteenth century.¹⁰⁵ These expectations and hopes then came face to face with an economic depression in 1900, which caused lower wages, higher prices, and increased unemployment and was exacerbated by the Russo-Japanese War only four years later. Franziska Schedewie argues that peasants tended not to be revolutionary and that when they were, they were not motivated by increasing poverty but were responding to the consequences of modernization.¹⁰⁶

The results of industrial growth and urbanization hastened by railways and telegraphy included horrid conditions for workers in towns and in workshops and factories, long hours, and arbitrary penalties and fees. Worker unrest began in a rather disorganized way, with limited demands, but later became more organized and espoused political objectives. This unrest was made possible by railways, “the motor of industrial development, not only creating a large new demand for coal, steel rails and rolling stock but also facilitating the movement of raw materials and finished goods. They accelerated urbanisation as expanding trade and new industries were supported by a flood of migrants from the countryside both into existing towns and into new urban settlements.”¹⁰⁷ In the countryside, although serfdom legally ended in the 1860s, emancipation was not fully realized. Peasants received some land, but they did so not individually but collectively; this system of land distribution was inefficient. Moreover, because of increased rural populations, land remained limited, and peasants had to pay for it by buying or leasing. Peasant disturbances began as early as 1902 in the provinces of Kharkov and Poltava (in today’s northeastern and central Ukraine, respectively).¹⁰⁸

Another aspect of modernization was the legal and social advances in the form of judicial (1864) and local government reforms, resulting in new elected *zemstvo* (local self-government) institutions, advances in education and public health, and a new class of lawyers and educated professionals interested in fighting injustice and arbitrary actions as well as advocating for political change. New professional groups with fresh visions and demands were joined by students and unions as growing radicalization altered the initial aspiration for a national consultative assembly to one that included a legislative consultative assembly elected by universal suffrage in 1905. A similar acceleration of demands took place in the Ottoman Empire and in Iran, as we shall see below.

The Russo-Japanese War may have been one of the straws that broke the camel's back, as defeat and disillusionment turned into discontent and disorder. As Russian losses intensified and over a million reservists were called to fight, the practical economic and political effects, as well as the psychological and social ones, became palpable and helped fuel the growing view that the nonconstitutional tsarist state had become vulnerable not only to constitutional Japan but to its own people, Russian and non-Russian. Russia's defeat by Japan struck a hard blow to the autocracy's legitimacy. The Russian Empire's linguistically and ethnically diverse non-Russian populace experienced the same situation as its Russian subjects, with an added twist. The vast and varied land empire required local, often ethnically and religiously non-Russian and non-Orthodox administration to function. Through the creation of local officials and functionaries—and challenged, as we shall see in the next chapter, by increasing Russian nationalism and Russification policies that imposed Russian culture, language, and religion in places like the Caucasus and elsewhere in the far-flung empire—an ethnic/national consciousness began to develop. This consciousness added not only to local rivalries with national and religious expressions among different groups (e.g., Armenians and Azeris in the Caspian oil-producing port city of Baku and surrounding areas) but also to the economic and political grievances that the ethnically diverse peoples of the empire shared with their fellow subjects.¹⁰⁹ Subjects' demands ranged from basic civil rights like freedom of assembly and press to a thorough constitutional system that would rein in the arbitrary powers of the tsar. As political consciousness grew, the dominant call became one for a constitutional system and assembly. Williams argues that what all groups in Russian and national minority areas shared was the desire and demand for a say. She writes, "In many ways this demand for autonomy, whether from national minority areas, or from individual towns and districts, was what characterised 1905 as a revolution." She quotes the workers joining the assembly organized by Father Georgy Gapon: "Russia is too great, its needs too varied and profuse, to be governed by bureaucrats alone. Popular representation is essential. The people must help themselves and govern themselves."¹¹⁰

Popular grievances found expression in protests, strikes, and mutinies starting in December 1904. The tsarist regime's response here and elsewhere oscillated between concession and repression. At first, in response to protests, the state made concessions through *zemstvo* congresses and meetings modeled after the private political meetings, *cam-*

pagne de banquets, of the French Revolution and set up to bypass laws against public assembly. However, people's demands by this point included a legislative assembly and constitutional regime. Concessions in many ways encouraged and stimulated continued or further opposition, but so did repression. In fact, the bloody crackdown on Father Gapon's peaceful march on 9 January 1905 to present a rather modest petition to the tsar took on immense significance, symbolic and real. Gapon and his followers had looked to the tsar to solve their problems. In some ways, as their view of the tsar as a benevolent father changed and their reverential relationship to the tsar broke down, the revolution began to radicalize. The realization of complete loss of face against Japan led to more popular protests—peaceful and otherwise—in May 1905, labor organization and strikes, and worker demands for better working conditions, better wages, an eight-hour day, and so forth, as well as assassinations of officials. Peasants demanded the right to the land on which they worked and expressed their grievances in ways available to them: for example, withholding rent, illegally gathering wood, and attacking the property of the gentry. Strikes by railway, telegraph, gas, electric, and postal workers paralyzed important sectors of the empire, and as soviets/councils began to rise and take over local leadership, they acted as a direct challenge to the tsarist state.¹¹¹ Both the demands and the activities crossed imperial boundaries as revolutionaries expressed parallel demands and acted out in similar ways in the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and beyond.

The October Manifesto authored by the new prime minister (and former director of railway affairs and finance minister), Count Sergei Yulyevich Witte, which promised a constitution, basic freedoms such as freedom of expression and of the press, and legislative assembly (duma) with limited suffrage, as well as other concessions to peasants in the form of canceled redemption payments, succeeded sufficiently to satisfy a large segment of the opposition. Others continued protest and agitation and faced counterprotests and the state's repressive measures. Although the anti-autocratic struggle persisted until 1907, the strikes and uprisings had by that time lost their verve. Disunity within the duma between liberal and radical groups facilitated its dissolution in June 1907. On the left were the Marxist Social Democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries, who were very much influenced by the Russian populist movement of the late nineteenth century and had diverse approaches to workers, peasants, and class struggle, as well as diverse tactics. They remained most unsatisfied with the October Manifesto,

believing that it had not gone far enough. The liberal Kadets (Constitutional Democrats) and centrist Octobrists, especially, were most satisfied with the October Manifesto and occupied the political center. To their right were the conservative nobles and traditional elements who supported the tsar fully and—unlike the center, which considered the *duma* a positive step toward democracy—tolerated the *duma* only as a safeguard against further revolution. Minister of Internal Affairs Pyotr Stolypin (Witte’s replacement as prime minister in 1906) saw to the hunt for revolutionaries and the transformation of the *duma*’s composition from foe to collaborator through restrictions on the franchise.¹¹²

Tsar Nicholas II’s regime survived as a result of the subduing of the *duma* as well as a number of other reasons: on the whole, troops remained loyal (despite some mutinies) and restored order; the opposition, with differing visions and commitment to action, remained divided and became more so because of concessions to peasants and liberals, leaving the radicals to fight among themselves, with limited popular support. As Anthony Heywood explains, the alliance between liberals, workers, and peasants was key to their success and what the tsar feared most, but ultimately, they were unable to maintain it, as “class rivalry” based on very different worldviews won out.¹¹³

Despite its seemingly limited gains, the Russian Revolution of 1905 fundamentally altered Russian society and the Russian state, developed far more conscious classes at all levels, and brought forth a new Russian identity and relationship to the tsar, who was no longer viewed with fatherly reverence, as he had been before the revolution. This transformation in the relationship made possible revolutionary opposition by large portions of the Russian populace in this revolution and in the one that followed a little over a decade later.

Young Turk Revolution, 1908

The Young Turk Revolution shared some key elements with the Russian case discussed above, yet it differed in some critical ways. For example, the Young Turk Revolution did not have the intense popular participation of the Russian Revolution, nor was the Ottoman Empire as economically developed and modernized, with an industrial proletariat, as the Russian Empire. This is certainly not an exhaustive list; the discussion below should lay bare some critical differences as well as the particularities of the Ottoman case.

The Young Turk Revolution involved a coalition of forces—including the exile community in Geneva and Paris, discontented civil servants, students, nondominant ethnic and religious populations, and army officers—and was preceded by strikes and tax rebellions. Unlike the Iranian Revolution and especially the Russian Revolution, there was no perceptible organized socialist movement in the Anatolian heart of the Ottoman Empire, at least not at this early stage. There were, of course, socialist organizations among non-Muslim subjects of the empire, particularly Bulgarians who had achieved autonomy through the Berlin Congress in 1878 but remained formally within the Ottoman Empire. Although they varied in background, outlook, and demands, most oppositional groups agreed on the restoration of the 1876 Ottoman Constitution and parliament, both of which sought to limit the autocratic powers of the sultan. In the face of coordinated military campaigns by the Second (Thracian) and Third (Macedonian) Armies, demanding the restoration of the constitution, Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909) acquiesced. Multiethnic and multireligious celebrations in the streets greeted the news, followed by elections, assembly meetings, and numerous strikes in cities throughout the Ottoman Empire. The attempted coup in 1909 was opposed by the Third Army and resulted in the deposition of the sultan, but it laid bare the constitutional authority's tenuousness.¹¹⁴

A number of factors acting in conjunction led to revolution in the Ottoman Empire. The Tanzimat reforms (1839–1876), culminating in a short-lived constitution, provided vital impetus in two key ways. First, the Tanzimat decrees, which aimed to reform the Ottoman state in order to ensure its preservation and longevity as well as its diverse population's loyalty and further integration, not only targeted agriculture, manufacturing, transportation, and communication, as well as legal and educational sectors, but also guaranteed all subjects regardless of religion the same rights, opportunities, and obligations as Muslim subjects, thus ushering in a reordering of society that challenged the status quo and made inroads into institutional modernization. Young Ottomans (predecessors of the Young Turks) like Namık Kemal became the key critics of the reforms in the 1860s and 1870s (before the ratification of the constitution in 1876), believing them to be insufficient. They advocated, instead, for broader political participation and rule of law through constitution and parliament. For Sultan Abdülmecid I (r. 1839–1861), these changes were enacted with the purpose of consolidating his own

authority, preserving the Ottoman state under intense Great Power pressure as well as in response to internal liberalizing forces for reform. For the reformers, the Tanzimat—despite its imperfect implementation and even after Sultan Abdülhamid II’s dismissal of the constitution and parliament only two years after promulgation—held great promise. The reforms themselves also created a new class of Ottomans who continued to struggle against autocratic rule and for the realization of true constitutionalism and did so in an environment of increasing financial and territorial encroachment by European, especially British and Russian, powers.

The year of the dismissal of the constitution, 1878, was also the year of the Congress of Berlin, which met after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 and revised the San Stefano Treaty of a few months earlier. The Treaty of Berlin stacked the cards in favor of the Great Powers, particularly Britain and Austria-Hungary; saw to the independence or autonomy of a number of Balkan provinces; and reduced the territorial expanse of the Ottoman Empire, thus sowing the seeds, or fertilizing the seeds already sown, for further internal and external conflict within the Ottoman Empire. For instance, the Berlin Congress redrew the map created at San Stefano, reducing Bulgaria to less than half the size of the expansive Bulgarian state that had been established, and demoted Macedonia from autonomy, returning it to full Ottoman rule. Moreover, of especially central importance for non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, as Michael Reynolds notes, the Berlin Congress “acknowledged ethnicity as an attribute of human identity carrying distinct political claims.”¹¹⁵

Further military and territorial losses in Tunisia and Egypt in 1881 and 1882, the threat of losing Macedonia (confirmed by a meeting in 1908 between Russia and Britain on the Bay of Reval, on the Baltic Sea in today’s Tallinn, Estonia), and a brewing financial crisis acting in conjunction with other factors helped set the stage for revolution.¹¹⁶ The Ottoman Empire had procured its first loan during the Crimean War in 1854 and by 1875 had secured fifteen loans totaling a debt of 200,000,000 Ottoman lire. Inability to keep up with payments led the empire to declare insolvency in 1876, resulting in the surrender of Ottoman financial independence to European interests, as representatives of creditors in the Ottoman Public Debt Administration collected state revenue to pay off the debt. As losses hit the empire from many directions, Sultan Abdülhamid II, whose responsibility was to protect and preserve the integrity of the empire, began to lose support. His inefficient and incompetent rule, reflected in military and territorial forfeiture and financial

fiasco, further galvanized those who already found fault in his autocratic and repressive rule and drew the army and administration into the ranks of the discontented opposition at home and abroad. They called for constitutional monarchy and representative government; through these demands, they sought the preservation of the empire—and not only its survival but its flourishing.

Jürgen Osterhammel brings up the Ottoman example in passing when he discusses the complicated links between exile and revolution.¹¹⁷ The opposition that ultimately brought the 1876 constitution back and forced Sultan Abdülhamid II to acquiesce had its proponents in Geneva and Paris, where some Ottoman elites lived in exile. At two congresses in Paris in 1902 and 1907, Ottomans representing the diversity of the empire, including Armenians, met to consider their options and discuss their demands and ways in which to proceed. The program on which they settled called for the restoration of the constitution of 1876, which had been summarily shelved since 1878, in order to curb the power of the sultan and preserve the integrity of the empire. Furthermore, the participants promised to work together to bring down the sultan. According to the preeminent historian of the revolution, Şükrü Hanioglu, the opposition unanimously agreed to force the sultan's abdication, to transform the administration, and to put in place a consultative government and constitutional system and to do so by whatever means were deemed appropriate, not limited to armed and unarmed resistance (e.g., labor boycotts, strikes, nonpayment of taxes), propaganda within the army, and general rebellion. As evidence of the revolutionaries' awareness of regional movements, shared circumstances, and the now-ubiquitous telegraph system, "the congress sent a telegram of solidarity to the Iranian parliament expressing Ottoman opposition groups' desire for collaboration between the future Ottoman constitutional government and Iranian constitutionalists."¹¹⁸ While the congresses and the Paris-based Committee of Progress and Union (CPU) had very little authority, their demands signified the import of constitution, the commitment to preserve the empire, and the public identification with Ottomanism—that is, the view of "all Ottomans as equals . . . [although] CPU publications . . . attributed a dominant role to the Turkish element in the Ottoman empire by claiming that 'reform of the Ottoman administration depends on a rebellion by the Turks, the dominant element in the empire, and not on insurrections by a bunch of Armenians or Bulgarians.'"¹¹⁹

Much earlier and closer to home, within the empire itself, civil servants and students from the military and medical academy founded a

secret society in 1889 that came to be called the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The group was particularly strong in Salonika (present-day Thessaloníki) among the Third Army, which believed that the sultan's policies were undermining the military and the Ottoman Empire's security. The CUP came out of secrecy in 1908 after discussions between internal headquarters in Salonika and external headquarters in Paris and was quickly placed under surveillance by Ottoman authorities. The CUP extended its activities, forming groups of fighters all over Macedonia. By early July 1908, with support and numbers on the ground and facilitated by the empire's extensive telegraph system, CUP leaders made their intentions and demands to reinstate the constitution explicit and even offered an ultimatum at the end of July, threatening to march to Istanbul; they moved—without having received a response—to declare the restoration of the constitution on 23 July. The sultan's acquiescence and the reopening of parliament quickly followed. As newspapers and word of mouth spread the news on 24 July, the multilingual, multiethnic Ottoman populace spilled into the streets to celebrate.¹²⁰ Elections for parliamentary representatives, challenge to the status quo, and the promise of a new era did not sit well with all, culminating in 1909 in an attempted coup by common soldiers and theological students to restore the sultan's powers and authority, and the accompanying destruction of churches, schools, and “the entire Armenian residential quarter” and massacre of Adana's Armenians.¹²¹ The revolt did not fare well, as the Third Army quickly secured the survival of the new government and deposed the sultan in a manner that combined old and new forms of rule: the Shaykh al-Islam decreed the deposition and a four-member delegation, including an Armenian and a Jew, was dispatched to inform the sultan of his removal from the throne. The figurehead Sultan Mehmet V (1909–1918) replaced Sultan Abdülhamid during a period of power struggle but also an expansion of the educational system (particularly primary and secondary schools) and of civil liberties like freedom of press and assembly, improvement of the military, and a reduced bureaucracy. By 1913, however, the CUP was able to gain the upper hand and consolidate its rule. The coup carried out in January 1913 by a group of CUP members secured the party's grip on power, in particular that of the triumvirate (Enver, Talat, and Cemal Paşas).

For much of its history, the scholarship on the Young Turk Revolution has dealt with it as a coup rather than a revolution—or, at the most, as a kind of top-down revolution. To a great extent, the thrust behind the actual collapse of the sultan's autocracy came from the mili-

tary. However, the Ottoman case also had the components that we associate with revolution (including popular mobilization that predated the actual takeover in July 1908) and that prepared some elements of the populace for 1908. For example, as Hanioglu explains, political activity in eastern Anatolia from 1905 to 1907 “successfully turn[ed] dissatisfaction among various classes of people, which was rooted mainly in economic difficulties, into revolutionary movements demanding the reopening of the parliament and the restoration of the constitution.”¹²² The rebellion was fomented through an alliance between the ARF, the Young Turks, and the League of Private Initiative and Decentralization (LPID), led by Prince Sabaheddin Bey, which, unlike the Young Turks, sought European assistance to enact reforms in the empire and sought administrative decentralization.

Peasants’ dire economic situation reached the tipping point with the enactment of two new taxes. When their petition met with indifference, Muslim, Armenian, and Greek peasants resorted to demonstrations and even the occupation of the telegraph office in Kastamonu and Erzurum. They were joined and supported by shopkeepers, merchants, and even the mufti, who was called on to mollify the masses.¹²³ Tax revolts and unified Armenian and Young Turk action spread throughout eastern Anatolia in such places as Trabzon, Bitlis, Van, and many others; these actions turned, according to Aykut Kansu, from calls to repeal “unjust taxation without representation to an outright and widespread rejection of the existing regime.”¹²⁴ Moreover, while Hanioglu recognizes that the Russian and Iranian Revolutions had a role to play in motivating “dissidents in their attempts to stir up the masses,” he insists that the driving force that caused the “metamorphosis of these local disturbances into full-fledged political movements demanding the reopening of the parliaments” was the alliance of Young Turks, ARF, and LPID and not the other revolutions or revolutionaries.¹²⁵ Kansu also acknowledges the influence of the Russian and Iranian Revolutions on the participants in the March and October 1906 revolts in Erzurum and elsewhere, as they came across revolutionary pamphlets printed in Europe and discussed the possibility of revolution as a “remedy for the current situation in Turkey.”¹²⁶ For Kansu, the tax revolts of 1906–7 “involved such profound social, political and economic changes that . . . [they must] be considered as nothing less than a revolution.”¹²⁷

It would seem impossible to talk about the aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution without mentioning the Armenian Genocide (1915–18)—although some authors have managed. None of the revolutions or

their aftermaths were bloodless; however, neither the Russian nor the Iranian Revolution was followed only a few years later by such horrific violence, questioning the very principles and promise the revolution had held for many.¹²⁸ The revolution accomplished much, ultimately ending not only the Hamidian regime but monarchy itself, replacing old institutions with new ones, creating a new governing elite and new political organizations, laying the foundations for a modern state, breaking out of the shackles of imperialism, making strides toward greater gender equality, and so forth. Therefore, in some ways, genocide is even harder to comprehend if we are to accept Kansu's contention that "the Unionists' intention was the establishment of a *truly liberal democratic* regime."¹²⁹ Yet, if we adopt Hanioglu's argument that "they were not constitutionalists or advocates of the reinstatement of the constitutional regime for the sake of establishing a constitutional political system; rather they thought that having a constitution in effect would help them to overcome many of the internal and external problems of the empire," and that they leaned toward "authoritarian theories" and Turkism, then we get an important piece of the puzzle.¹³⁰ It would not be out of place to say that both tendencies and visions existed among Young Turk revolutionaries and their collaborators. However one looks at it, there is no question that the Young Turk Revolution was, as Hanioglu writes, "a watershed in the history of the late Ottoman Empire," but a watershed not only for its dominant Turkish citizenry but also for its diverse population of Kurds, Greeks, Assyrians, and Armenians, for whom the great potential and expectations of revolution were crushed by assimilationist policies, population transfers, and genocide.¹³¹

Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1905–1911

Much like the Russian and Ottoman cases, the Iranian Constitutional Revolution sought parliamentary representation, constitutional government, limits on the authority of the shah, and other reforms. In the Iranian case, however, and more like the Ottoman than the Russian, an increasingly threatening European imperialism also played a role in the unfolding of revolution and its consequences. Oppositional forces in the revolution ran the gamut from *ulama* (clerics) and *bazaaris* (merchants) to secular intellectuals, progressives, and even socialists, and they found strength in Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5), as well as in the Russian Revolution. Although the revolutionary struggle continued for several years, its initial success came in July 1906 when the

Qajar monarch Mozaffar al-Din Shah (r. 1896–1907) conceded to a *majles* (assembly) and constitution. His son, Mohammad ‘Ali Shah, attempted two coups, of which the one in June 1908 had a successful outcome. *Mojahedin* (popular troops), Bakhtiyari tribal forces, and Armenian revolutionaries joined in battles against royalist forces and restored the constitution in July 1909. Financial, factional, and other problems plagued the constitutional government, but ultimately Russian interference, supported by the British, led to the dissolving of parliament and the end of the revolution in December 1911.¹³²

A variety of developments in the nineteenth century led to the Iranian Revolution: military defeats by the Russian Empire, European economic penetration in the form of commercial capitulations and concessions to Russia and Great Britain, autocratic and incompetent rule leading to—among other things—loans to cover three extravagant voyages to Europe by Mozaffar al-Din Shah and his entourage, and subsequent social discontent. Loans became a particular thorn in the side of the Iranian economy. As James Gelvin explains, unlike the Ottoman Empire, which was equally affected by the global depression in the late nineteenth century, Iran experienced the added impact of a decline in the value of silver, along with China, Japan, and India, all of whose economies were bound with silver. Although brief, Gelvin’s integrative approach focuses on overriding causal mechanisms—that is, decline in the value of silver and stock market collapse—to explain similar consequences despite regional variations. Much like the devaluation of silver in the sixteenth century, the nineteenth century experienced the flooding of silver in large part because of the increase in the number of countries on the gold standard and “the discovery of new deposits of silver, such as the Comstock Lode in Nevada and the Albert Silver Mine in South Africa.” The flooding caused a rise in prices of basic commodities and inflation in Iran between 1850 and 1890, leading to loans to pay the debt acquired by earlier loans.¹³³ Moreover, the shah’s relationship to Britain and Russia, a relationship that many of his subjects viewed to be one of subservience, added to prior economic and political grievances and helped fuel opposition. Like the Ottoman Empire, Qajar Iran was deeply affected by its unequal relationship with Europe and semiperipheral integration into a European-dominated world economy, as local market economies that produced crops for local consumption were transformed into market economies producing cash crops. Thus, the Middle East entered the global economy as a dependent region, a supplier of raw materials (e.g., cotton, tobacco, opium, silk) to Europe and a consumer of goods manufactured in Europe.

European loans and concessions that became commonplace in nineteenth-century Iran, and to some extent in the Ottoman Empire, drew much critique. At first, the opposition made up of *ulama*, courtiers, and secular progressives targeted the shah's ministers—for example, his chief minister Mirza Ali Asghar Khan, known by his two titles Amin al-Soltan and Atabek—whom they blamed for the loans and concessions, which were viewed as leading to Russian control of Iran. As secret societies within Iran began to form and multiply, members of the opposition read and disseminated the writings of critical Iranians abroad in the Russian and Ottoman Empires as well as in Europe (for example, Malkom Khan, Mirza Fath-Ali Akhundzadeh, Mirza Agha Khan Kermani, and Seyyed Jamal-al-Din Afghani, among others) who were calling for reform and who included the shah among the targets of their criticisms. Concessions served as another focus for the opposition.

Two economic concessions stand out in the context of popular reaction and its significance for the constitutional revolution. Iran had been granting favorable commercial terms to Europeans since the sixteenth century; however, the nineteenth century witnessed the beginning of a number of agreements that had a profound effect on the Iranian economy, sovereignty, and therefore the populace's view of the monarchy. Following the 1828 Torkamanchay/Turkmenchai treaty, which settled a Russo-Persian war and resulted in the annexation of Caucasian provinces by Russia, both Russia and its main rival in Iran, Britain, began to extend and consolidate their grip over Iran's economy. Increasing European economic encroachment had a number of destructive consequences: agriculture was oriented toward export crops, domestic craft industry was hit hard by European imports, and prices of Iranian exports fell—all contributing to unemployment and insecurity for many, although some, of course, did profit. In the late nineteenth century, further agreements between the Iranian monarchy and Europeans led to a number of concessions for telegraph, banking, fishing, railway, as well as other resources and enterprises.¹³⁴ The Reuters concession of 1872 and the tobacco concession of 1890 garnered the most strident resistance. The first gave the founder of the Reuters news agency, Baron Julius de Reuter, an unprecedented grant of control over Iran's resources: the right to build a railway from Caspian ports to the south and exclusive rights to factories, irrigation, minerals (except those already being worked), and so forth. Iranian popular resistance as well as Russian opposition stopped the concession. The second concession, almost twenty years later, brought about even more opposition. In another ill-advised move, the

Qajar monarch granted a monopoly over the production, sale, and export of Iranian tobacco to a British subject, Major G. F. Talbot. Unlike the Reuters concession, which focused on previously untapped areas, this concession targeted a product extensively produced and exported by Iranians. An alliance of merchants, *ulama*, and intellectuals and popular protest in 1891 brought about a nationwide boycott of tobacco sales and use. This concession, too, failed because of its ardent rejection by the populace and its leadership, which emboldened those who made greater claims for justice a decade later.¹³⁵

Grievances and demands varied in the constitutional revolution but reflected some of the earlier concerns as well. Urban classes had important economic grievances ranging from merchant dislike of new customs administration and concern over loans and concessions to rising prices and taxes and continued undermining of all crafts, except carpets, which benefited from increasing European demand and a subsequent boom in the late nineteenth century. Some Iranians felt threatened by the growing presence and role of foreigners, whether through influence and encroachment on Iran's sovereignty or business, or the spread of missionary education. Unlike the Russian case and more like the Ottoman one, anti-imperialist sentiment became a critical force driving revolutionaries. Their awareness, however, that their much more powerful and close neighbor Russia could and would easily intervene to prevent serious reform and, of course, revolution kept them from taking action. Only after Russia's involvement and ultimate defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Revolution itself did decisive action become a possibility. The Russian Revolution and Japan's victory encouraged the shah's opposition, which saw the sole Asian constitutional power humiliate through military defeat the lone nonconstitutional European empire, giving hope to Iran as an Asian state and proving the virtues of constitution.¹³⁶

The opposition, which came to comprise intellectuals, clerics, and merchants, found an opportune moment in December 1905 when the governor of Tehran bastinadoed sugar merchants for not lowering their sugar prices, which had risen even further since the devaluation of silver by wartime conditions—that is, the Russo-Japanese War. Mullahs and merchants took sanctuary (*bast*) in the Royal Mosque of Tehran as a form of protest. These *basts* were followed by many more, attracting thousands of *ulama*, religious students, mullahs, merchants, and others. Demands quickly escalated from a vague house of justice to a constitution and a *majles*. The shah acquiesced, granting constitution and parliament in August 1906.

As was the case in the Russian and Ottoman Empires, constitutional monarchy as imagined by the constitutionalists was to be a radical break in Iranian governance. Their intention was to set up a true constitutional state with a strong position for the *majles*, giving it the authority to weigh in on all critical state matters—including, for example, foreign loans and treaties—in an attempt to create an independent state and rein in ministers and the shah. The constitution that resulted called for compulsory public education and a new legal system; it promised equality to all its citizens regardless of religion, and it promised civil liberties like freedom of speech at the same time that it made Islam the official religion of Iran and qualified freedoms of press and speech by barring statements deemed anti-Islamic. As in the Ottoman Empire, new freedoms of press and assembly brought about the sudden flourishing of newspapers and popular and revolutionary associations, *anjomans*.¹³⁷

The years that followed the institution of the new constitution were tumultuous and threatened the new constitutional regime. In 1907 the British and the Russians signed a treaty settling their differences in Tibet, Afghanistan, and Iran. The agreement divided Iran into spheres of influence, with northern and central Iran going to Russia and the southeastern region to Britain, in direct violation of Iranian sovereignty.¹³⁸ Early in the same year, Mohammad ‘Ali Shah (r. 1907–9) succeeded his father, Mozaffar al-Din Shah, and attempted to regain autocratic powers through two coups, the latter assisted by the Cossack Brigade in June 1908. Robust and consistent resistance came from Tabriz, in Iran’s northern Azerbaijan province. Constitutionalists received arms and fighters from the South Caucasus, as Azeris, Georgians, and Armenians collaborated and struggled against royalist forces and Russian troops and successfully reinstated the constitution in 1909. These Caucasian revolutionaries, along with Iranian workers returning from jobs in the oil refineries of Baku, also became important conduits in the transfer of socialist ideas and labor organization that influenced Iranian revolutionaries more than in the Ottoman case.¹³⁹

Constitutionalist *ulama* continued to offer their support for the constitution and *majles* while conservative *ulama* opposed both. For some conservative *ulama*, representative government—however limited—flew in the face of God’s sovereignty and the Quran and challenged their own position, or at the very least was superfluous. Progressive *ulama*, however, contended that the constitution was an acceptable—if not the only possible—means by which to rein in arbitrary rule in the absence of the Hidden Imam, who, according to Twelver Shi‘ism, was eleventh

in line to Imam Ali and the twelfth imam, and who had gone into hiding in the ninth century and would one day return as the Mahdi.¹⁴⁰ As the proconstitutionalists reasoned, after all, were not popular sovereignty and legal equality the foundations of government set up by Prophet Muhammad himself?

Division and conflict became further pronounced in 1910 among constitutionalists on different sides of the political spectrum; the more liberal Democrat Party (founded in 1909 and made up of liberal and social democratic elements) and the not so aptly named conservative Moderate Party fought it out in the *majles* and the streets. Financial troubles and insolvency added to the internal disunity and conflict, and the constitutional government brought in an American lawyer, William Morgan Shuster, to set Iran's finances in order as treasurer-general. His attempts encountered opposition, especially from Russia but also from Britain.¹⁴¹ In November 1911, Russia's ultimatum demanding Shuster's dismissal and the government's agreement to refrain from any deals with foreigners without British and Russian consent met with popular protests calling on the *majles* to stand firm against further violations of Iran's independence. The defiance of the *majles* led to its dissolution and Shuster's dismissal as Russian troops moved into Tabriz in December 1911, striking the final blow to the constitutional revolution already writhing with internal problems.

Although there were signs of popular revolt against concessions, particularly against the tobacco concession in the later nineteenth century, the Iranian Constitutional Revolution turned out to be the explicit expression of anti-autocratic and anti-imperialist movement—more so than anything else in its past and certainly in relation to either the Russian or the Young Turk Revolution. Despite its rather disappointing end, it left an enduring legacy. Revolutionaries sought representative government, resisted imperialism, attempted economic independence, made inroads into secularism, reformed education and the judiciary, and fostered popular activism through associations. The revolution held both the promise of inclusivity for its citizens and the strengthening of Iranian nationalism.

Revolutionaries in all three cases, much like their counterparts around the globe, sought the cure to what ailed their societies and governments in constitutionalism, parliament, and some degree of popular sovereignty. In one sense or another, all revolutions may be perceived as having failed, at least in the short term (some more palpably than others); however, they also have succeeded in many ways, leaving an important legacy of organized opposition, constitution, and (even more

important for us) a dynamic history of connections, which this study reveals. Equally critical to a meaningful understanding of these revolutions is an appreciation of the global context or conjuncture that allows us to see them beyond their regional setting and local particularities and in light of larger transformations, not only in terms of the worldwide dissemination of an ideology such as constitutionalism or, as Sohrabi characterizes, “ideological ‘world time’” but also in terms of radical and far-reaching advances in technologies of transportation and communication that effectively shrank time and space.¹⁴² In chapter 2, I explore the critical developments of technology in the form of steamships, railroads, and telegraphy, which noticeably facilitated the crisscrossing of revolutionaries and activists across imperial frontiers. They circulated throughout and across the Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian borders and beyond into Western and Central Europe during revolutionary upheavals. They also carried with them or saw to the transfer of weapons, explosive elements, and devices, as well as revolutionary print in the form of newspapers, pamphlets, and books in translation or in the original. These circulations in support of revolutionary movements are at the heart of their connectivity.

“THE WORLD AS A CONTINUOUS BLUR”: THE GLOBAL CONTEXT AND TIME-SPACE COMPRESSION

The movement and participation of Armenians among others in these revolutions tells us a great deal about their particularities and also signals the global transformations that had begun to take shape in the last half of the nineteenth century, leading, as Bayly writes, to the emergence of “a kind of international class structure . . . [that at] the very least . . . could perceive and articulate common interests which breached the boundaries of the nation-state . . . ”¹⁴³ Easier and faster transportation and access to communication (through the telegraph, for example) and news from different parts of the world through the movement of people and print, especially in the form of periodicals, all helped produce, as Ilham Khuri-Makdisi argues in her book on Eastern Mediterranean radicalism, “local, internal reconfigurations triggered by both state and society . . . Dramatic changes, simmering discontent, and great expectations triggered contestation as well as the ‘experimentation with new forms and ideologies of collective action,’ both rural and urban, which historians have identified as a ‘key feature’ of the 1880–1925 period.”¹⁴⁴ These global developments had an unmistakable impact on the three empires bordering each

other and effecting revolutionary movements through the increased mobility of border-crossing activists as well as revolutionary accoutrements like arms, print, and concepts. The extent of circulation of roving Armenian activists, arms, and global ideas that we witness at the turn of the twentieth century only becomes possible when we consider the role of new technologies like railways and telegraph and the proliferation of periodicals and books, all of which had a powerful effect on revolutionaries taking part in multiple struggles against autocracy. The 1880s and 1890s were an especially critical period of globalization characterized by capitalist development, growing overseas markets, escalating industrialization and imperial expansion, and record use of fossil fuels, as well as the vastest surge in migration, unrest, and self-assertiveness by workers, women, and anticolonial groups.¹⁴⁵

The revolutions occurred at a time and in a world that may have seemed to be on speed—as in amphetamine sulfate—with all the implied effects associated with the high and with the risks, including the “come-down.” The revolutionary period itself produced a whirlwind of ideas and activities, exhilaration, and hope, as well as violence followed by anxiety, dejection, and disillusion. Historian Eric Hobsbawm has labeled the early twentieth century, which experienced all these revolutions, the “little age of revolutions.”¹⁴⁶ The century that preceded it and overlapped with it, the long nineteenth century (1750–1914)—a phrase also coined by Hobsbawm—seems to be the age of a number of phenomena: age of fossil fuel, age of uniform time, age of the speed revolution, age of migration, age of urbanization, age of revolution, age of the telegraph, and age of industry and empire.¹⁴⁷ The nineteenth century witnessed dramatic changes, but the turn of the century was an especially radical period that, as Osterhammel notes, “brought a surge in globalization that for the first time linked all continents into economic and communications networks.”¹⁴⁸

In his influential *The Condition of Postmodernity*, David Harvey notes that the period in which these revolutions took place, particularly from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, witnessed significant shifts in technologies of global communication and transportation, resulting in an important new round of “time-space compression” or the accelerated “shrinking” of the world.¹⁴⁹ By “time-space compression,” Harvey means “processes that so revolutionize the objective qualities of space and time that we are forced to alter, sometimes in quite radical ways, how we represent the world to ourselves.”¹⁵⁰ Processes refer to shifts in technologies of global communications and transportation that

began radically to transform people's lives beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century and accelerating thereafter. These shifts led to a shrinking or "compression" of both time and space, thus making the world smaller, time shorter, and life faster. Harvey explains, "The expansion of the railway network, accompanied by the advent of the telegraph, the growth of steam shipping, and the building of the Suez Canal, the beginnings of radio communication and bicycle and automobile travel at the end of the century, all changed the sense of time and space in radical ways. This period also saw the coming on stream of a whole series of technical innovations . . . new technologies of printing and mechanical reproduction allowed a dissemination of news, information, and cultural artefacts throughout ever broader swathes of the population."¹⁵¹

Focusing on space and mobility, Tim Cresswell notes that as people began to travel by train, the space they perceived was shaped by seeing it through a train window moving at relatively high speed. He writes, "For the first time it was possible to see the world as a continuous blur."¹⁵² In his recent study of the telegraph and globalization in the nineteenth century, Roland Wenzlhuemer agrees that something unique had taken place that altered the relationship between time and space; however, he cautions against contemporary views of those who interpreted their own period—whether in reference to the telegraph or capital—as one of "annihilation of time and space" or "space with time."¹⁵³ For Wenzlhuemer, time and space must be treated as separate units and not collapsed into one time-space.¹⁵⁴ He emphasizes the point that space "cannot be annihilated—neither together with time nor by time itself," that instead what has happened is that advances in technologies and capital have shaped a new space "that is entangled with other spaces through its actors and objects."¹⁵⁵ Wenzlhuemer explains that communication and transport technologies like railways and telegraph did indeed reduce communication time within geographic space; however, this reduction, rather than having the effect of annihilating time, actually made time essential: "The shorter communication times became, the more important even minor differences could be," thus making "the standardization of time a necessity."¹⁵⁶

Such time accelerations in communication affected some spaces but not all, thus excluding peripheral areas and even increasing communication times between them and hubs.¹⁵⁷ According to Wenzlhuemer, time-space compression applied only to certain parts of the globe and affected those people who were touched by the new technologies of the railway and the telegraph, as well as by the resulting increase in mobil-

ity and dissemination of print and ideas. Although not as advanced in communication and transportation as Europe, the regions that underwent revolution, especially the South Caucasus, Ottoman Anatolia, and Iran, and those in urban centers inhabited and traversed by activists and intellectuals did experience some form and varying degrees of “time-space” compression, as their worlds simultaneously shrank and expanded. Revolutions certainly had their local and regional causes, as we saw in the previous section on the particularities and similarities of the Russian, Iranian, and Young Turk Revolutions. They were also touched—often struck—by wider developments, such as global depression or silver devaluation, as we noted earlier. Global causal mechanisms, however, need not be catastrophic; turn-of-the-century technological advances in transportation and communication led to faster and therefore more frequent travel (by railway and steamship) and communication (by telegraph) across wider distances, thus shrinking the time it took to get to places near and far and giving the impression that the world had become smaller because it had become more easily accessible. At the same time, the world seemed to expand because these same technologies made available a range of ideas, encounters, and exchanges, thus magnifying the available and reachable horizons. This two-pronged consequence of time-space compression, shrinking and expanding, was instrumental in connecting our revolutions because it made possible the circulation of revolutionary operatives and intellectuals as well as the ideas and ideologies that fueled those revolutions.

ORGANIZATION

This book is divided into five chapters. It has begun with an introduction to the themes, argument, and conceptual framework of the study. Through a discussion of comparative, world, and related histories and of comparative revolutions specifically, it has made a case for a connected histories and connected revolutions approach and the appropriateness of its application to the study of the early twentieth-century Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian Revolutions. It then explored these revolutions in comparison and ended with a discussion of the turn-of-the-century global transformations that smoothed the road toward revolution. Chapter 2 focuses on the prevalent crisscrossing of revolutionaries, arms, and print through the South Caucasus, Anatolia, and Iran, as well as Europe, within the context of transformations in transportation and communication. It delves more deeply into the South Caucasus as an axis of cultural

and revolutionary diffusion. Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate the weight of ideas—like constitutionalism and federalism in chapter 3 and socialism in chapter 4—that filtered through the frontiers via revolutionaries and workers, as well as circulars and newspapers and the forms they took under local conditions. I conclude the study with some reflections on the incongruity of revolutionary ideals and struggles, on the one hand, and postrevolutionary aftershocks, on the other.

SOURCES

My study relies on the almost untapped Armenian-language unpublished and published documentation of the ARF, the dominant Armenian political party crossing the figurative and literal frontiers of the Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian states and revolutionary movements. The papers, which contain a much smaller number of documents in other languages (French, Persian, Russian, and Ottoman Turkish), include correspondence, minutes of meetings and congresses, circulars, details of debates and decisions, and other material. The archives have been in the midst of a rather slow process of digitization by the ARF Archives Institute. In the meantime, twelve volumes of documents have already been published.¹⁵⁸ Recently, the ARF Archives has taken the welcome step of opening its doors more widely to scholars in order to facilitate their work. The archives are housed in a seemingly unlikely place, Watertown, some six miles northwest of Boston, a town that once was—for a short period of time, from April 1775 to November 1776—the seat of government in Massachusetts. Watertown boasts one of the most important and oldest Armenian communities in the United States. The archival documents (and the published volumes) cover a wide global network from anywhere that the ARF has had a presence, including such seemingly unlikely places as Cuba and Central Asia, and contain documents not only by or about the ARF but also anyone or any other party/organization whose paths crossed with those of the ARF. They offer an immensely rich and wide-ranging wealth of archival sources for scholars on countless subjects of scholarly inquiry for local, regional, and global history. They are, as one of the former directors of the ARF Archives, Tatoul Sonentz-Papazian, phrased it, not a museum or a cemetery but a “living entity.”¹⁵⁹ I wish such a “living entity” existed for the SDHP.

I also utilize for the first time in a systematic way more than two dozen contemporary Armenian-language periodicals from major cities and centers of political activity in the South Caucasus, the Ottoman Empire, Iran,

and Europe. Many of these newspapers had short lives; often they were forced to shut down but reappeared under different names. For example, one paper in revolutionary Tiflis seems to have had more lives than a cat, appearing in fifteen reincarnations from 1906 to 1909.¹⁶⁰ These newspapers are available primarily through the National Library of Armenia, the Armenian Digital Library at the American University of Armenia, Bibliothèque Nubar (Nubarian Library) in Paris, and the Mkhitarist Congregation in Vienna. Furthermore, I take advantage of a number of important documents from the revolutionary period in archives in the British Library and the National Archives at Kew in England and the National Archives and the Archives of the Catholicosate at the Mashtots' Matenadaran in Armenia. A few select documents from Foreign Office correspondence at the British Library and War Office records at the National Archives (Kew) have been most useful. The National Archives of Armenia and the Catholicosate Archives in the Matenadaran, the latter perhaps not surprisingly, have not been as fruitful as the ARF Archives but nevertheless have supplemented the sources in important ways. Although the bulk of documentary evidence and newspapers are by or about the ARF, a significant percentage of the newspapers are by the SDHP as well as other Armenian Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries. Party newspapers and official organs in Tiflis, Baku, Istanbul, Tabriz, Geneva, and Paris provide rich material on the ideas with which Armenian revolutionaries engaged and that they shared with their readers. They were also a site of contention among various political factions with differing visions, all competing to inculcate readers with their own views and vying for leadership and representation of the Armenian communities in the South Caucasus, Anatolia, and Iran.

Newspapers were important throughout much of the world in this period, which saw a flourishing of print culture in many forms. Among them were revolutionary periodicals that spanned the globe, both figuratively and literally, in terms of the subjects and news they published as well as the long distances they traveled and the numbers of literate and even illiterate readers they reached. Illiterate readers benefited from literate family members and friends, acquaintances, and neighbors reading out loud in both public and private spaces. As the study makes clear, although we do not have direct evidence of their reach or subscription numbers, their dissemination beyond their origins and the energy and resources that went into their circulation throughout Eurasia provide us with indirect evidence of their impact on activists and readers. The archival documents, too, in the form of correspondence and meeting

minutes, testify to an increasing demand for existing newspapers and a growing interest in publishing new ones.

My use of the archives of a party whose members were expert circulators and cosmopolitan revolutionaries lays the foundation, along with contemporary Armenian-language periodicals and other sources, for a much-needed contribution to multiple fields of inquiry, including world history, the history of revolutions, Middle Eastern history, and Armenian history. With its global and connected histories approach and its focus on roving Armenian revolutionaries and their ideological and physical boundary crossings through the Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian revolutionary worlds, this study provides insight into how the revolutions are more than similar—how they are, at the core, connected.

Notes

CHAPTER I. CONNECTED REVOLUTIONS

1. Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century," *Past & Present* 26 (1959): 32.

2. C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 323.

3. The "Armenian question" refers to a diplomatic problem that emerged after the Congress of Berlin in 1878, as European powers involved themselves, for their own interests and with varying degrees of commitment, in the protection of Armenian subjects of the Ottoman Empire and the enactment of reforms. The Armenian question was part of the larger "Eastern question" of how to apportion the Ottoman Empire among European powers without triggering a massive and intense war among them. For a discussion of Ottoman and Patriarchate censuses before and after 1895 and the Armenian demographic issue, see Raymond Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History* (2006; London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), part 4, chap. 1. For the Armenian Patriarchate census, see the table in Kévorkian, *Armenian Genocide*, 272–78.

4. Armenians made up 20 percent (1.2 million) of the South Caucasian population of 6 million. See RUSSIA: Military Report. Trans-Caucasia. (W.O.) (1907), 98–104, National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom. The city of Elisavetpol has had several appellations: Elisabethpol, Kirovabad, and Ganja.

5. The Armenian population in Iran, which was much higher before the nineteenth century, decreased because of territorial losses to Russia with the Treaty of Torkamanchay/Turkmenchai, which ended the Russo-Persian War in 1828, and because of Armenian migration to the Russian Empire. Hourì Berberian, *Armenians and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911: "The Love for Freedom Has No Fatherland"* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 122–27.

6. For a summary of the awakening, see Razmik Panossian, *The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 128–87.

7. Houri Berberian, “Armenian Women in Turn-of-the-Century Iran: Education and Activism,” in *Iran and Beyond: Essays in Honor of Nikki R. Keddie*, ed. Rudi Matthee and Beth Baron (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2000), 78–79, 82–85.

8. Berberian, “Armenian Women,” 91; M.L. Adanalyan, “Azganuer Hayhuyats‘ Ėnkerut‘iwñè” [Patriotic Armenian women’s society], *Patma-banasirakan handes* [Historical-Philological Review] 4, no. 87 (1979): 255–59.

9. See Victoria Rowe, *A History of Armenian Women’s Writing 1880–1922* (Amersham, UK: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2003), chaps. 2–4. Although Zabel Yesayan has often been portrayed as a feminist, recently scholars have pointed to her own disavowal of feminism. See Marc Nichanian, “Zabel Yesayan, Woman and Witness, or the Truth of the Mask,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 42 (2010): 31–53.

10. Houri Berberian, “Armenian Women and Women in Armenian Religion,” in *Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures*, vol. 2, ed. Suad Joseph and Afsaneh Najmabadi (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2005): 13.

11. The Armenian Constitution was later revised and accepted by Sultan Abdülmecid I in March 1863. For a discussion of the constitution, see Aylin Koçunyan, “Long Live Sultan Abdulaziz, Long Live the Nation, Long Live the Constitution!,” in *Constitutionalism, Legitimacy and Power: Nineteenth-Century Experiences*, ed. Kelly Grotke and Markus Prutsch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 189–210; Vartan Artinian, *The Armenian Constitutional System in the Ottoman Empire, 1839–1863: A Study of Its Historical Development* (Istanbul, 1988). For a classic study on the *amira* class, see Hagop Barsoumian, *Armenian Amira Class of Istanbul* (1980; repr., Yerevan: American University of Armenia Press, 2007). See also Pascal Carmont, *The Amiras: Lords of Ottoman Armenia* (London: Gomidas Institute, 2012).

12. For a definitive study of the Tanzimat and the Ottoman Constitution, see Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963). For a more recent study on Armenian attitudes about the Tanzimat, see Masayuki Ueno, “‘For the Fatherland and the State’: Armenians Negotiate the Tanzimat Reforms,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 45 (2013): 93–109.

13. See contributions in the issue devoted to the massacres in *Armenian Review* 47, nos. 1–2 (Spring/Summer 2001).

14. See Richard G. Hovhannisian, “The Historical Dimension of the Armenian Question, 1878–1923,” in Richard G. Hovhannisian, ed., *The Armenian Genocide in Perspective* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1987), 18–41.

15. For a thought-provoking take on the conflict, see Leslie Sargent, “The ‘Armeno-Tatar War’ in the South Caucasus, 1905–1906: Multiple Causes, Interpreted Meanings,” *Ab Imperio* 4 (2010): 143–69.

16. For the 1903 confiscation, see Stephen B. Riegg, “Beyond the Caucasus: The Russian Empire and Armenians, 1801–1914” (unpublished manuscript, 2017), chap. 6; Onur Öñol, *The Tsar’s Armenians: A Minority in Late Imperial*

Russia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2017); Vartan Gregorian, “Impact of Russia on the Armenians and Armenia,” in *Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples*, ed. Wayne S. Vucinich (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), 167–218; Ronald Grigor Suny, *Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), chap. 1. For a focus on nineteenth-century Russian-Armenian intellectuals through an analysis of four leading Armenian-language journals, see Lisa Khachaturian, *Cultivating Nationhood in Imperial Russia: The Periodical Press and the Formation of a Modern Identity* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009).

17. Berberian, *Armenians and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*, 20.

18. Bedross Der Matossian, “Ottoman Armenian Kesaria/Kayseri in the Nineteenth Century,” in *Armenian Kesaria/Kayseri and Cappadocia*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2013), 203.

19. The Armenian revolutionary movement’s classic sources are the following: Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963); Anahide Ter Minassian, *Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement (1887–1912)* (Cambridge, MA: Zoryan Institute, 1984); Ronald Grigor Suny, “Marxism, Nationalism, and the Armenian Labor Movement in Transcaucasia, 1890–1903” and “Labor and Socialism among Armenians in Transcaucasia,” chaps. 4 and 5 in *Looking toward Ararat*. For an important discussion on Ottoman Armenian history and political parties, see Gerard J. Libaridian, “What Was Revolutionary about Armenian Political Parties in the Ottoman Empire?,” in *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Göçek, and Norman M. Naimark (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 82–112.

20. Nalbandian, *Armenian Revolutionary Movement*, 211n73. See also Arsen Kitur, *Patmut’iwn S. D. Kusakts’ut’ean* [History of the S. D. Hnch’akean Party] (Beirut: Shirak Press, 1962), 1:290.

21. “Sots’ialistakan Mijazgayin Biwroyi namakë” [The letter of the Socialist International Bureau], *Drōshak* [Banner] (Geneva) 6 (12 May 1905); “Mer pataskhanë” [Our response], to Socialist International Bureau from *Drōshak* editorship, 17 May 1905, in *Niwt’er H. H. Dashnaks’ut’ean patmut’ean hamar* [Materials for the history of the A. R. Federation], ed. Yervant Pambukian (Beirut: Hamazgayin Vahē Sēt’ean Tparan, 2010), 7:208; “Nakhagits kovkasean gortsunēut’ean” [Protocol for Caucasian activity], June 1905, in *Niwt’er H. H. Dashnaks’ut’ean patmut’ean hamar* [Materials for the history of the A. R. Federation], ed. Hrach Dasnabedian (Beirut: Hamazgayin Vahē Sēt’ean Tparan, 1973 and 1985), 2:232; see also the council’s resolution on the Caucasian issue, April 1905, in *Niwt’er*, 2:229–30.

22. The delegates were Mikayel Varandian, Martiros Harutiwnian, Armenak Barseghian, and Nikol Duman. “Voroshumner H. H. Dashnaks’ut’ean Ch’orrord Ēndhanur Zhoghovi, 1907” [Decisions of the Fourth General Congress of A. R. Federation, 1907] (Geneva: Dashnaks’ut’ean Tparan, 1907), in *Niwt’er H. H. Dashnaks’ut’ean patmut’ean hamar* [Materials for the history of

the A. R. Federation], ed. Hrach Dasnabedian (Beirut: Hamazgayin Vahē Sēt'ean Tparan, 1976 and 2007), 3:309; “H. H. D.-I pashtonakan dimumē” [ARF’s official application], Brussels, 23 July 1907, Geneva (doc. 50–87), in *Niwt'er*, 7:210. For sections of the ARF report in Stuttgart, see *Drōshak* 9 (1907), also in *Niwt'er*, 7:211–14. Regarding the Ottoman section, see Socialist International Bureau letter to ARF, 17 August 1907, Brussels (doc. 1675–1), in *Niwt'er*, 7:215. Regarding acceptance to the Socialist International, see Mikayel [Varandian] to Hamo Ohanianian, 29 August 1907, Stuttgart, in *Niwt'er*, 7:220. Regarding acceptance of the Ottoman branch, see Socialist International Bureau to ARF, 22 December 1908, doc 1676–79, in *Niwt'er*, 7:224; Rapport présenté au Congrès Socialiste International de Copenhague par le Parti Arménien “Daschnaktzoutioun” Turquie-Caucase-Perse [Report presented to Socialist International Congress of Copenhagen by the Armenian “Dashnakts'ut'iwn” Party—Turkey-Caucasus-Persia], Geneva 1910, in *Niwt'er*, 7:227–245.

23. *Drōshak* editorship to Socialist International Bureau, 14 September 1908, in *Niwt'er* 7:222. No Turkish socialist parties existed until the founding of *Osmanlı Sosyalist Firkası* (Ottoman Socialist Party) in 1910. Those that existed were outside Anatolia—for example, the Jewish Socialist Workers’ Federation (1909), as well as the Bulgarian and Macedonian socialist parties starting in the late nineteenth century. For a study on Ottoman socialism, see Meltem Toksöz, “‘Are They Not Our Workers?’: Socialist Hilmi and His Publication *İştirak*: An Appraisal of Ottoman Socialism,” in *The Young Turk Revolution and the Ottoman Empire: The Aftermath of 1908*, ed. Noémi Lévy and François Georgeon (London: I. B. Tauris, 2017), 286–317. Toksöz’s analysis of *İştirak*’s articles on socialism resemble in many ways some of the discussions in the Armenian newspapers on socialist issues, as discussed in chap. 4.

24. For a detailed discussion of this development, see Berberian, *Armenians and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*, chap. 2.

25. Cited in “Leh sots'ialistnerē ‘Dashnakts'ut'ean’ masin” [The Polish socialists regarding the Federation], *Drōshak* 7–9 (July–September 1910): 94–95 (95).

26. Transnational history focuses on the flows of peoples, ideas, objects, and so forth across national or imperial borders. For a discussion on transnational history, see “AHR Conversation: On Transnational History,” with C. A. Bayly et al., *American Historical Review* 111, no. 5 (December 2006): 1441–64. Jürgen Kocka defines an entangled history as one that is interested “in the processes of mutual influencing, in reciprocal or asymmetric perceptions, in entangled processes of constituting one another. In a way, the history of both sides is taken as one instead of being considered as two units for comparison.” Kocka, “Comparison and Beyond,” *History and Theory* 42 (February 2003): 42. Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann explain the intricacies of *histoire croisée*: briefly, “*Histoire croisée* focuses on empirical intercrossings consubstantial with the object of study, as well as on the operations by which researchers themselves cross scales, categories, and viewpoints.” See Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Beyond Comparison: *Histoire Croisée* and the Challenge of Reflexivity,” *History and Theory* 45 (February 2006): 30. I will delve more deeply into connected histories later in the chapter.

27. Raymond Grew, "The Case for Comparing Histories," *American Historical Review* 85, no. 4 (October 1980): 777.
28. Grew, "Case for Comparing Histories," 763, 764.
29. Micol Seigel, "Beyond Compare: Comparative Method after the Transnational Turn," *Radical History Review* 91 (Winter 2005): 78.
30. See, for example, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, "Comparative History—A Contested Method," *Historisk Tidskrift* 127, no. 4 (2007): 697–714.
31. Philippa Levine, "Is Comparative History Possible?," *History and Theory* 53 (October 2014): 331, 333, 334; Haupt, "Comparative History—A Contested Method," 697; Seigel, "Beyond Compare," 65.
32. Eliga H. Gould, "Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish Periphery," *American Historical Review* 112, no. 3 (June 2007): 766. See Levine's discussion of Gould in Levine, "Is Comparative History Possible?," 336.
33. Gould, "Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds," 785, 786. See also Kocka, "Comparison and Beyond," 43.
34. Levine, "Is Comparative History Possible?" 336, 337, 343. See Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia," *Modern Asian Studies* 31, no. 3 (July 1997): 735–62. See also Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Holding the World in Balance: The Connected Histories of the Iberian Overseas Empires, 1500–1640," *American Historical Review* 112, no. 5 (December 2007): 1359–85.
35. Haupt, "Comparative History—A Contested Method," 714.
36. Kocka, "Comparison and Beyond," 43–44.
37. Levine, "Is Comparative History Possible?," 347.
38. Levine, 343.
39. Jerry H. Bentley, "Why Study World History," *World History Connected* 5, no. 1 (2013): 4. See also Jerry H. Bentley, "The New World History," in *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*, ed. Lloyd Kramer and Sarah Maza (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 393.
40. Bentley, "New World History," 394–96, 403, 409–10; Jerry H. Bentley, "The Task of World History," in *The Oxford Handbook of World History*, ed. Jerry H. Bentley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 2–10.
41. Bentley, "New World History," 396, 405; Bentley, "Task of World History," 12.
42. Bentley, "Task of World History," 1.
43. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, "Comparative History: Methods, Aims, Problems," in *Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National Perspective*, ed. Deborah Cohen and Maura O'Connor (London: Routledge, 2004), 25.
44. Haupt and Kocka, "Comparative History," 25; Haupt, "Comparative History—A Contested Method," 698, 699.
45. Haupt, "Comparative History—A Contested Method," 714; Levine, "Is Comparative History Possible?," 337; Kocka, "Comparison and Beyond," 39; Haupt and Kocka, "Comparative History," 33; Bentley, "Task of World History," 1.
46. For an important and early collection on some of these debates, see Nikki R. Keddie, ed., *Debating Revolutions* (New York: New York University Press, 1995).

47. Influential definitions of revolutions include those of Charles Tilly, Jack Goldstone, Theda Skocpol, and others.

48. See, for example, Michael S. Kimmel, *Revolution: A Sociological Interpretation* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 6; Perez Zagorin, *Rebels and Rulers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 1:17.

49. Eric Selbin, *Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance: The Power of Story* (London: Zed Books, 2010), 3.

50. Jack A. Goldstone, “Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study of Revolutions,” in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 41–90. See also Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

51. Goldstone, “Comparative Historical Analysis,” 55–56. See Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: Norton, 1938); Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolutions* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1927); George S. Pettee, *The Process of Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1938).

52. Goldstone, “Comparative Historical Analysis,” 57–62. See Charles Tilly, “Does Modernization Breed Revolution?,” *Comparative Politics* 5 (1973): 425–47; Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978); Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

53. Goldstone, “Comparative Historical Analysis,” 63.

54. See, for example, William Sewell Jr., “Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case,” *Journal of Modern History* 57 (1985): 57–85, who begins his essay with “This article was inspired—perhaps I should say provoked—by Theda Skocpol’s *States and Social Revolutions*.”

55. Goldstone, “Comparative Historical Analysis,” 64. For a summary of these conditions, see the introduction to Skocpol, *States and Revolutions*, 3–43.

56. For an “anti-explanation” of the Iranian Revolution of 1978/1989, see Charles Kurzman, *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).

57. John Foran, *Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 6; Skocpol, *States and Revolutions*, 4.

58. Foran, *Taking Power*, 18.

59. Other examples include William Sewell Jr., “Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case,” *Journal of Modern History* 57 (1985): 57–85; Timothy Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Jack Goldstone, “Is Revolution Individually Rational? Groups and Individuals in Revolutionary Collective Action,” *Rationality and Society* 6, no. 1 (January 1994): 139–66.

60. Misagh Parsa, *States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5.

61. Selbin, *Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance*, 3, 4, 7, 9.

62. Eric Selbin, "Stories of Revolution in the Periphery," in *Revolution in the Making of the Modern World: Social Identities, Globalization, and Modernity*, ed. John Foran, David Lane, and Andreja Zivkovic (London: Routledge, 2008), 130.

63. For studies centered on why people participate in revolutions, see, for example, Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Will Moore, "Rational Rebels: Overcoming the Free-Rider Problem," *Political Research Quarterly* 48 (June 1995): 417–54; Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp, "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action," *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 2 (June 1986): 471–88; Timur Kuran, "Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989," *World Politics* 44, no. 1 (1991): 7–48.

64. Joseph Fletcher, "Integrative History: Parallels and Interconnections in the Early Modern Period, 1500–1800," in *Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia* (London: Variorum, 1995), 2.

65. Fletcher, 2.

66. Fletcher, 3.

67. Fletcher, 3–6.

68. Bayly, *Birth of the Modern World*, 1.

69. Fletcher, "Integrative History," 3–4.

70. Jack Goldstone, "East and West in the Seventeenth Century: Political Crises in Stuart England, Ottoman Turkey, and Ming China," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 30, no. 1 (January 1988): 104; Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 459.

71. Werner and Zimmermann, "Beyond Comparison," 37, 38.

72. Benedict Anderson, *Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination* (London: Verso, 2005).

73. Charles Kurzman, *Democracy Denied, 1905–1915: Intellectuals and the Fate of Democracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008).

74. Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, *The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860–1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).

75. Janet Polasky, *Revolutions without Borders: The Call to Liberty in the Atlantic World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015).

76. Subrahmanyam, "Connected Histories," 735–62. See also Subrahmanyam, "Holding the World in Balance," 1359–85; Serge Gruzinski, "Les mondes mêlés de la monarchie catholique et autre 'connected histories'" [The entangled worlds of the Catholic monarchy and other "connected histories"], *Annales* 56, no. 1 (January–February 2001): 85–117. For a historiographic treatment of connected histories, see Caroline Douki and Philippe Minard, "Histoire globale, histoires connectées: un changement d'échelle historiographique" [Global history, connected histories: A historiographic change of scale], *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 54, no. 4 (2007): 7–21.

77. Subrahmanyam, "Connected Histories," 745.

78. Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference* (New York: Back Bay Books/Little, Brown, 2000), 30–32;

Geoffrey Parker, *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), xxxi, 561.

79. For an important study on comparative historical analyses of revolutions, including the advantages of comparative analyses and a history of the literature on comparative revolutions, see Goldstone, “Comparative Historical Analysis.”

80. Nader Sohrabi, “Historicizing Revolutions: Constitutional Revolutions in the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Russia, 1905–1908,” *American Journal of Sociology* 100, no. 6 (May 1995): 1383–1447. Mangol Bayat’s study on the role of Caucasians in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution and Ivan Spector’s on the impact of the Russian Revolution on Asia are important early contributions, although both treatments focus on a unidirectional flow of influence from the Caucasus and Russia rather than on a model of circulation that avoids the pitfalls of ascribing agency to one party and rendering the other passive. Mangol Bayat, *Iran’s First Revolution: Shi’ism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1909* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Ivan Spector, *The First Russian Revolution: Its Impact on Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1962).

81. Sohrabi, “Historicizing Revolutions,” 1441–42.

82. Sohrabi, 1389.

83. Sohrabi, 1441.

84. Nader Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1. Clifford Geertz refers to an “instructive comparison” of Morocco and Indonesia: “At once very alike and very different, they form a kind of commentary on one another’s character.” See Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 4.

85. Levine, “Is Comparative History Possible?,” 340, 341.

86. Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism*, 1–2.

87. Sohrabi, 16.

88. Sohrabi, 21, 22–23.

89. Sohrabi, 28–29.

90. Bayly, *Birth of the Modern World*, 323.

91. For Japan as beacon of inspiration, see Rotem Kowner, ed., *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War* (London: Routledge, 2007), in particular Kowner’s introduction, “Between a Colonial Clash and World War Zero: The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War in a Global Perspective,” 1–26.

92. Nikki R. Keddie, “Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective,” *American Historical Review* 88, no. 3 (June 1983): 586; Nikki R. Keddie, “Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism,” in *Iran: Religion, Politics and Society*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (London: Frank Cass, 1980), 13–14.

93. Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*, trans. Patrick Camiller (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 522, 561.

94. Osterhammel, 561–65. For a discussion of personalist rule—meaning the concentration of power and personalization of political interactions—see Milan W. Svoblik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 30. Svoblik draws from Barbara Geddes’s classification of dictatorships.

Barbara Geddes, “Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, September 1999), http://eppam.weebly.com/uploads/5/5/6/2/5562069/authoritarianbreakdown_geddes.pdf.

95. Osterhammel also brings China into the discussion. Osterhammel, *Transformation of the World*, 568.

96. James Gelvin, *The Modern Middle East*, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 161.

97. Kurzman, *Democracy Denied*, 4, 5. For a detailed discussion of the Young Turks and the global wave, see Sohrabi, chap. 2, *Revolution and Constitutionalism*.

98. Kurzman, *Democracy Denied*, 4.

99. Kurzman, 5.

100. Abraham Ascher, *The Revolution of 1905: A Short History* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 217. See also Ascher’s more detailed and comprehensive two-volume work, *The Revolution of 1905*, vol. 1, *Russia in Disarray* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988) and *The Revolution of 1905*, vol. 2, *Authority Restored* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994). An earlier classic study of the revolution’s causes, development, and consequences is Sidney Harcave, *The Russian Revolution of 1905*, originally published as *First Blood* (London: Collier, 1964).

101. Abraham Ascher, introduction to *The Russian Revolution of 1905: Centenary Perspectives*, ed. Jonathan D. Smele and Anthony Heywood (London: Routledge, 2005), 1. According to Ascher, the revolution began in the last quarter of 1904. See Ascher, *Revolution of 1905*, 1:58.

102. Ascher, introduction to *Russian Revolution of 1905*, 2.

103. Ascher, 3.

104. Ascher, *Revolution of 1905*, 2:375.

105. Beryl Williams, “1905: The View from the Provinces,” in Smele and Heywood, *Russian Revolution*, 35.

106. Franziska Schedewie, “Peasant Protest and Peasant Violence in 1905: Voronezh Province, ostrogozhskii Uezd,” in Smele and Heywood, *Russian Revolution*, 138, 139.

107. John Morison, “Russia’s First Revolution,” *History Today* 38 (December 2000), <https://www.historytoday.com/john-morison/russias-first-revolution>.

108. For a discussion of peasants, see Teodor Shanin, *Russia, 1905–07: Revolution as a Moment of Truth*, vol 2., *The Roots of Otherness: Russia’s Turn of Century* (London: Macmillan, 1986), especially chaps. 3 and 4. For a regional focus on Kursk, see Burton Richard Miller, *Rural Unrest during the First Russian Revolution: Kursk Province, 1905–1906* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2013).

109. As Beryl Williams explains, “In towns like Tbilisi or Baku or Odessa racial conflict added to class conflict, and could be antisemitic or anti-Armenian or just anti-foreign, and workers organized on national rather than on class lines. The Caucasus was particularly volatile, with the government losing control of major cities and parts of the countryside by the autumn.” Beryl

Williams, "Russia 1905," *History Today* 55, no. 5 (May 2005), <https://www.historytoday.com/beryl-williams/russia-1905>.

110. Williams, "Russia 1905." See also Beryl Williams, "1905: The View from the Provinces," 50–51. For a detailed discussion on the planning of the march by Gapon and his followers, see also Harcave, *Russian Revolution of 1905*, chap. 3.

111. Ascher, *Russian Revolution of 1905*, vol. 2, chaps. 2 and 3.

112. Ascher, chaps. 8 and 9.

113. Anthony Heywood, "Socialists, Liberals and the Union of Unions in Kyiv during the 1905 Revolution: An Engineer's Perspective," in Smele and Heywood, *Russian Revolution*, 177–95.

114. See, for example, Şükrü Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). For a different approach, see Aykut Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey* (Leiden: Brill, 1997). See also Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Second Constitutional Period of the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). For strikes, see Donald Quataert, "Ottoman Workers and the State, 1826–1914," in *Workers and Working Classes in the Middle East: Struggles, Histories, Historiographies*, ed. Zachary Lockman (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 21–40. For a revealing study on the boycott movement in the late Ottoman period, see Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, *The Young Turks and the Boycott Movement: Nationalism, Protest and the Working Classes in the Formation of Modern Turkey* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013).

For a focus on minorities and interethnic relations, see Michelle Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011); Bedross Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams of Revolution: From Liberty to Violence in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014).

115. Michael A. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 14.

116. Erik J. Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 34.

117. Osterhammel, *Transformation of the World*, 137.

118. Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, 205.

119. Hanioglu, 296, 299.

120. For the best discussion to date on ethnic groups' relationship to the 1908 revolution, see Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams of Revolution*.

121. Bedross Der Matossian, "From Bloodless Revolution to Bloody Counterrevolution: The Adana Massacres of 1909," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 6, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 163.

122. Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, 95, 103, 123.

123. Kansu, *Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*, 33, 37. See also E. Attila Aytekin, "Tax Revolts during the Tanzimat Period (1839–1876) and before the Young Turk Revolution (1904–1908): Popular Protest and State Formation in the Late Ottoman Empire," *Journal of Policy History* 25, no. 3 (2013): 308–33.

124. Kansu, *Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*, 47.
125. Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, 121, 123–24. See also Kansu, who argues that it was the CUP that transformed “widespread dissatisfaction” to “distinctly revolutionary activity.” Kansu, chap. 2 in *Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*, 30.
126. Kansu, *Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*, 52.
127. Kansu, 29.
128. For an exploration of revolution and war in genocide, see Robert Melson, *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
129. Kansu, *Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*, 3 (emphasis mine).
130. Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, 313, 315–17.
131. Hanioglu, 312.
132. Janet Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911: Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy, and the Origins of Feminism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); for a more recent collection that has as one of its foci the transnational aspects of the Iranian revolution, see H.E. Chehabi and Vanessa Martin, eds., *Iran’s Constitutional Revolution: Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations and Transnational Connections* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), in particular Farzin Vejdani, “Crafting Constitutional Narratives: Iranian and Young Turk Solidarity, 1907–09,” 319–40. See also Mansour Bonakdarian, “Iranian Nationalism and Global Solidarity Networks 1906–1918: Internationalism, Transnationalism, Globalization, and Nationalist Cosmopolitanism,” in *Iran in the Middle East: Transnational Encounters and Social History*, ed. H.E. Chehabi, Peyman Jafari, and Maral Jefroudi (London: I. B. Tauris, 2015), 77–129. For a succinct discussion, see Ervand Abrahamian, *History of Modern Iran* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), chap. 2.
133. Gelvin, *Modern Middle East*, 162.
134. Nikki R. Keddie, *Iran: Religion, Politics and Society: Collected Essays* (New York: Frank Cass, 1980), chap. 5; Hooshang Amirahmadi, *The Political Economy of Iran Under the Qajars: Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations, 1799–1921* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012).
135. For a classic text on the tobacco protests, see Nikki Keddie, *Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891–92* (Frank Cass, 1966).
136. For a discussion of Japan in Iranian political discussion during the Constitutional Revolution, see Roxane Haag-Higuchi, “A Topos and Its Dissolution: Japan in Some 20th-Century Iranian Texts,” *Iranian Studies* 29, nos. 1/2 (Winter–Spring 1996): 71–83.
137. For a detailed discussion of the development of *anjomans* and their role throughout the revolution, see Afary, *Iranian Constitutional Revolution*, chaps. 4, 6, 7.
138. Firuz Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914: A Study in Imperialism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), chap. 7.
139. See, for example, Bayat, *Iran’s First Revolution*; Iago Gocheleishvili, “Introducing Georgian Sources for the Historiography of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911),” in Chehabi and Martin, *Iran’s Constitutional*

Revolution, 45–66; Moritz Deutschmann, “Cultures of Statehood, Cultures of Revolution: Caucasian Revolutionaries in the Iranian Constitutional Movement, 1906–1911,” *Ab Imperio: Studies of New Imperial History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space* 2 (2013): 165–90.

140. Keddie, *Iran: Religion, Politics and Society*, chaps. 1, 2.

141. For Shuster’s own narrative, see W. Morgan Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1913).

142. Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism*, 3.

143. Bayly, *Birth of the Modern World*, 21.

144. Khuri-Makdisi, *Eastern Mediterranean*, 3–4. Here, Khuri-Makdisi refers to the work of Edmund Burke III and others.

145. Osterhammel, *Transformation of the World*, 63–66.

146. Quoted in Khuri-Makdisi, *Eastern Mediterranean*, 27.

147. Osterhammel, *Transformation of the World*, 63, 69, 74, 154, 244, 514, 719. Bayly, *Birth of the Modern World*, 19.

148. Osterhammel, *Transformation of the World*, 64.

149. David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1989), 240.

150. Harvey, 240.

151. Harvey, 264.

152. Tim Cresswell, *On the Move: Mobility in the Modern Western World* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2006), 5.

153. Roland Wenzlhuemer, *Connecting the Nineteenth-Century World: The Telegraph and Globalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 38, 39. See also Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 33–44. Wenzlhuemer’s reference is to Karl Marx, who writes, “Thus, while capital must on one side strive to tear down every spatial barrier to intercourse, i.e. to exchange, and conquer the whole earth for its market, it strives on the other side to annihilate this space with time, i.e. to reduce to minimum the time spent in motion from one place to another.” From Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft)* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1973), 538–39.

154. Wenzlhuemer, *Connecting the Nineteenth-Century World*, 44. See also Doreen Massey, “Politics and Space-Time,” *New Left Review* 196 (1992): 80.

155. Wenzlhuemer, *Connecting the Nineteenth-Century World*, 45.

156. Wenzlhuemer, 46. See also Vanessa Ogle, *The Global Transformation of Time, 1870–1905* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).

157. Wenzlhuemer, *Connecting the Nineteenth-Century World*, 47. See also Jeremy Stein, “Reflections on Time, Time-Space Compression and Technology in the Nineteenth Century,” *TimeSpace: Geographies of Temporality* (London: Routledge, 2001), 108, 113. Regarding timekeeping systems, practices, and attitudes in the Balkans and Ottoman Empire, see the special issue of *Études balkaniques* 53, no. 2 (2017).

158. The first of twelve volumes of *Niw’t’er H.H. Dashnaks’ut’ean patmut’ean hamar* [Materials for the history of the A.R. Federation] was published in 1972, the most recent in 2017.

159. ARF Archives Institute DVD, 2009.

160. One ARF paper began as *Haraj* [Forward] (1906) and went through several incarnations as *Alik* [Wave] (1906), *Zang* [Bell] (1906), *Yerkir* [Country] (1906), *Zhamanak* [Time] (1906–7), *Arōr* [Plough] (1907), *Paylak* [Lightning] (1907), *Kovkasi Arawōt* [Caucasus's morning] (1907), *Khariskh* [Anchor] (1907), *Nor Alik* [New wave] (1907), *Zhayr* [Rock] (1907), *Vtak* [Brook/Stream] (1907), *Zangak* [Bell] (1908), *Gorts* [Work/Stream] (1908–9), and *Horizon* (1909).

CHAPTER 2. “ACTIVE AND MOVING SPIRITS OF DISTURBANCE”

1. “Vērkerov li chan fiday em/T'ap'arakan, tun ch'unem/Yaris p'okhan zēnk's em grkel/Mi tegh hangist k'un chunem” is the first verse of an Armenian revolutionary song written in memory of Petros Seremjian, who was killed along with Macedonian revolutionaries in an incursion into Ottoman territory in 1901. *Azgayin hayrenasirakan heghap'okhakan yergaran* [National patriotic revolutionary songbook] (Beirut: Hamazgayin Vahē Sēt'ean Tparan, 2004), 18. For a discussion of this Armenian-Macedonian collaborative operation and others, see Garabet K. Moundjian, “Rebels with a Cause: Armenian-Macedonian Relations and Their Bulgarian Connection, 1895–1913,” in *War and Nationalism: The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913, and Their Sociopolitical Implications*, ed. Hakan Yavuz and Isa Blumi (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2013). The term *fedayi* derives from the Arabic فداء (*fidā*'sacrifice) and means “the one who sacrifices himself”; in this case, the reference is to Armenian militants.

2. See discussion in Berberian, “Armenian Women in Turn-of-the-Century Iran,” 89–90. See also Sona Zeitlian, *Hay knoj derē hay heghap'okhakan sharzhman mēj* [The role of the Armenian woman in the Armenian revolutionary movement] (1968; Los Angeles: Hraztan Sarkis Zeitlian Publications, 1992). For photos of revolutionary women, see *Hushamatean Hay Heghap'okhakan Dashnakts'ut'ean albom-atlas*, vol. 1, *Diuts'aznamart* [Commemorative album-atlas of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, vol. 1, Heroic combat] (Glendale, CA: ARF Central Committee, 1992), 224–27. A notable example of a revolutionary woman is Rubina (Sofi Areshian, 1881–1971) who was instrumental in the planning of the attempted assassination of Sultan Abdülhamid II in 1905 as well as the actual assault. Areshian married Hamazasp Ohanjanian, prime minister in 1920 of the First Republic of Armenia. For more on Areshian, see Zeitlian, *Hay knoj derē*, 57–63; Gaidz Minassian, “The Armenian Revolutionary Federation and Operation ‘Nejuik,’” in Houssine Alloul, Edhem Eldem, and Hank de Smaele, eds., *To Kill a Sultan: A Transnational History of the Attempt on Abdülhamid II, 1905* (London: Palgrave, 2017), 35–66. Minassian refers to Areshian as Aghechyan.

3. Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850–1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 49.

4. Charles Issawi, “European Economic Penetration, 1872–1921,” in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, ed. Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly, and Charles Melville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 590, 593, 594.

5. Issawi, 591.

6. Issawi, 592, 595.