CHAPTER NINE

THE COUP D’ÉTAT OF 1912

The Parliament convened on April 18 as scheduled. If somewhat vague on matters of internal policy, the Speech from the Throne was clear enough with regard to the continuation of the war with Italy and the Sublime Porte’s absolute refusal to surrender one bit of its sovereignty in Turkish Africa, much less the whole of Tripoli as the Italians had demanded. The news of the attack on the Dardanelles reached Parliament at the outset of the opening ceremony, reportedly causing no alarm.

As expected, the elections had not been totally completed, and without a majority of its deputies in attendance, the Chamber could not begin conducting business. Up until mid-April, about one hundred and sixty-seven deputies had been elected. In mid-May, some one hundred and eighty deputies had arrived at Istanbul, many of whom were members of the Committee of Union and Progress.

With the election nonetheless effectively over, the Committee’s leadership returned to the modification of Article 35 of the Constitution. By early May, the cabinet had approved

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1 II/1/1, April 5, 1328/April 18, 1912, Meclis-i Mebusan Zabt Coridesi, 1, pp.2-3; “Meclis-i Mebusan’ın Resmi Küşadi,” İktiham, April 5, 1328/April 18, 1912, p.1; “Opening of the Turkish Parliament,” The Times, April 19, 1912, p.8; Hüseyin Cahid [Yalçın], “Meclis-i Mebusan’ın Küşadi,” Tanin, April 6, 1328/April 19, 1912, p.1; “Yeni Meclis-i Mebusan’ın Küşadı Münasebetiyle,” İktiham, April 6, 1328/April 19, 1912, p.1; Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, “Meşrutiyet Haturaları, 1908-1918,” Fikir Hareketleri, 7 (October 24, 1936-April 17, 1937), p.165; and, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnşilâbi Tarihi, 2/1, p.244.

2 “Meclis-i Mebusan’ın Resmi Küşadi: Nutk-u İftitahi,” Tanin April 6, 1328/April 19, 1912, p.1; “Nutk-u İftitahi,” İktiham, April 6, 1328/April 19, 1912, p.2; “Opening of the Turkish Parliament,” The Times, April 19, 1912, p.8; and, “Constantinople Letter,” The Near East, April 26, 1912, p.815.


the proposed modifications which then had to be submitted to
the Parliament. The leadership of the Committee of Union
and Progress was confident that it would obtain the necessary
two-thirds majority in the Chamber of Deputies.\textsuperscript{6} With Article
35 passed, the Chamber would then pass the Budget, discuss,
and perhaps pass, certain demands for extra-ordinary credits,
and then be prorogued.\textsuperscript{7} A meeting was held on June 5 at
Cavid Bey’s house to discuss the proposed amendment to the
Constitution. Said Pasha, and a group of the leaders of the
Committee of Union and Progress—Talât Bey, Emrullah Bey,
Midhat Şükrü [Bleda], Ahmed Nesimi [Sayman], Ziya Bey,
Ürgüplü Mustafa Hayri Bey, and Dr. Nâzım Bey—were all
present. Both Said Pasha and Talât Bey had serious reserva-
tions concerning the cooperation of the Chamber. Yet, the
decision taken by the leaders of the Committee of Union and
Progress was to push for the amendment.\textsuperscript{8}

The Chamber, as Said Pasha and Talât Bey had feared, re-
fused to cooperate. A majority of the deputies decided that the
article in question should be modified so as to give the Sultan,
in the case of the Chamber’s repeated refusal to accept a pro-
sal supported by the cabinet and acting on the advice of the
government, the power to dissolve Parliament and order new
elections to be held. The proposal also stipulated that if after the
elections, the Chamber persisted in its point of view the gov-
ernment would have to give way. In response, the govern-
tment attempted to further modify the article, in a proposal
which would give the government freedom to disregard the
decisions of a newly elected Parliament. This latest proposal
encountered so much opposition that it was quickly with-
drawn.\textsuperscript{9}

On June 22, after some discussion on the floor, the Cham-
ber modified, by a vote of two hundred and five votes to fifteen,

\textsuperscript{6} “Kanun-u Esasi’nin Tadili,” \textit{Tanin}, May 9, 1328/May 22, 1912, pp.1-2; and,
\textsuperscript{8} Mehmed Cavid, “Meşrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavid Bey’in Huralarını: 121,” \textit{Ta-
nin}, January 2, 1944, p.2.
\textsuperscript{9} “Kanun-u Esasi Tadilatı,” \textit{Tanin}, May 30, 1328/June 12, 1912, p.1; “Kanun-u
Esasi: Tadilatın Esbabı Mucibesi,” \textit{Tanin}, June 5, 1328/June 18, 1912, pp.3-4; “Ka-
nun-u Esasi: Tadilatın Esbabı Mucibesi,” \textit{Tanin}, June 6, 1328/June 19, 1912, pp.3-4;
Article 7. On June 24, the Chamber voted by one hundred and ninety-nine to fifteen Article 35 of the Constitution in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee for the Revision of the Constitution, which had not gone so far as the Government wished.

Meanwhile, the Unionist leadership had also encountered difficulty in selecting an acceptable candidate for the Presidency of the Chamber. Its first choice had been Hacı Adil [Arda], then on an inspection tour in Macedonia. His nomination, however, had met with strong opposition in the Chamber, and was dropped. Consequently, Halil [Menteşe], a former Minister of the Interior, and leader of the parliamentary group of the Committee, was nominated.

On May 15 Halil [Menteşe] was elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. The First Vice-President was Muhammed Fawzi Pasha al-'Azm, deputy for Damascus, the Second, Bedros Haladjian, deputy for Istanbul and former Minister of Public Works. All three were the nominees of the Committee of Union and Progress.

Rumours of cabinet instability persisted, though it seemed premature to predict any immediate change. Most felt that the Unionists would continue to make use of Said Pasha for just as long as needed, and that when he retired on account of old age, ill health, or under pressure he would probably be succeeded by another ‘elder statesman,’ meaning, another non-Unionist pasha.

In late May, Nail Bey, Minister of Finance, resigned. He had been appointed to the Ministry in May of 1911, replacing Cavid Bey who had been forced to resign under monarchist attack. A strong advocate of economy, he had followed Cavid

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10 II/1/18, June 9, 1328/June 22, 1912, Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi, I, pp.435-465; and, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, 2/1, p.244.
13 II/1/5, May 2, 1328/May 15, 1912, Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi, I, pp.43-45; “Presidency of the Turkish Chamber,” The Times, May 16, 1912, p.5; and, “Constantinople Letter,” The Near East, May 24, 1912, p.71. See also, Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, Osmanlı Imperatorluğuunda İnkılab Hareketleri ve Milli Mücadele, p.555; and, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, 2/1, p.244.
Bey's policies and had the pleasure of seeing a distinct improvement in revenues, while his efforts to reduce expenditure, if not entirely successful, had none the less produced an improvement in the financial situation of the Government. Cavid Bey was appointed Acting-Minister of Finance, and would probably succeed him, in which case Bedros Haladjian would probably replace Cavid Bey as Minister of Public Works. There were rumours that Asım Bey, Minister for Foreign Affairs, would also resign shortly. As he was not on the best of terms with Said Pasha and some members of the Committee of Union and Progress, it was certain that such a move would not be entirely voluntary.\(^{15}\)

When it realised that it had no hope of capturing political power through constitutional means, the monarchist opposition decided to resort to a *coup d'état*, one which would center around the discontented Albanian elements in Macedonia.\(^{16}\) Dr. Riza Nur, one of the leaders of the Entente Libérale, held talks with Colonel Yakovalı Riza Bey who was, at the time, exiled to Sinob for his role in the counter-revolutionary *coup* attempt of April, 1909. They agreed to work together to provoke an Albanian rebellion which would ostensibly lead to the destabilisation and fall of the Unionist government. Just as Dr. Riza Nur was arranging for Yakovalı Riza Bey's escape from Sinob, the latter was pardoned. He then returned to Albania where he began organising, as had been planned, the rebellion.\(^{17}\)

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\(^{16}\) "Discontent in Albania: Hostile Attitude of the Tribes," *The Times*, May 9, 1912, p.5. For Şerif Pasha's letter supporting the Albanians in overthrowing the Committee of Union and Progress regime dated July 5, 1912 see, William W. Rockhill to Secretary of State, in *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey, 1910-1929*, Roll 4. See also, Stavro Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912*, p.450.

\(^{17}\) Riza Nur, *Hürriyet ve Itilâf Firkası Nasıl Doğdu, Nasıl Öldü?*, p.63; Peter Bartl, *Die albanischen Muslime zur Zeit der nationalen Unabhängigkeitsbewegung, 1878-1912*, p.180; Joseph Swire, *Albania: The Rise of a Kingdom*, p.120; and, Ahmet Turan Alkan, *İkinci Meşrutiyet Devrinde Ordunun Ordu ve Siyaset*, p.125. See also,
Dr. Riza Nur maintained contact with the Albanian rebels through such intermediaries as Celal Paşazade Emin Bey. This network also included Prince Sabahaddin, who was introduced by Dr. Riza Nur to Yakovali Riza Bey, and helped finance the clandestine operation.¹⁸ Hoca Said Efendi and Necib Draga, both ex-deputies for Üsküb, Volçetinli Hasan Bey, ex-deputy for Prishtnë, Mehmed Pasha Dralla, Receb Mitrovitsa, Bedri Bey of İpek, Salih Yuka, İdris Sefer, and Issa Bolatinatz were among the organisers of the conspiracy.¹⁹

While leaders of the Entente Libérale were busy coordinating and financially supporting the Albanian rebellion, however, monarchist supporters in the army started a rebellion in the Monastir area on May 6. Some officers left their garrisons and took to the mountains; some were captured and brought to İstanbul.²⁰ News of this military insurrection would not appear in Turkish newspapers for almost six weeks.

League of Saviour Officers—or, Halâskâr Zabitan Grubu—a secret military organisation, was to become theynch-pin of the monarchists’ plans.²¹ One of its leading members, Geli-

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¹⁹ Riza Nur, Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası Nasıl Doğdu, Nasıl Öldü?, p.64; Peter Bartl, Die albanischen Muslime zur Zeit der nationalen Unabhängigkeitsbewegung, 1878-1912, p.180; J. Swire, Albania: The Rise of a Kingdom, p.120; Şehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmed Hülimi, Muhalefetin İflası: İtilâf ve Hürriyet Fırkası, pp.46-47; and, Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdim, 2, p.500. Hasan Bey, ex-deputy for Prishtnë, and Isa Bolatinatz were identified as two of the most important rebel leaders by the Times correspondent (“The Albanian Outbreaks: A Serious Situation,” The Times, May 13, 1912, p.5; and, “The Albanian Rebels,” The Times, June 11, 1912, p.5. See also, Aram Andonyan, Balkan Savaşı, pp.173-175).

²⁰ “Plot Against the Turkish Commission,” The Times, May 9, 1912, p.5; J. Swire, Albania: The Rise of a Kingdom, p.119; Aram Andonyan, Balkan Savaşı, p.175; Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, Osmanlı Imparatorluğuunda İnkılap Hareketleri ve Millî Mücadele, pp.563-565; and, Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, İnkılap Tarihimi ve Yan Türklere, pp.302-303. One of the rebel officers, Tahsin Bey, was appointed as the Police Commissioner of İstanbul by the monarchist/collaborationist Damad Ferid Pasha Government during the Armistice after World War I. Nafiaz Bey, one of the officers who had been captured by the authorities, later became aide-de-camp to Nâzım Pasha who was appointed Minister of War after the coup d’état of July 1912 and was killed during the ‘Raid on the Sublime Porte’ of January 1913 (Gelal Bayar, Ben de Yazdim, 2, p.499).

bolulu Kemal [Şenkil] Bey, a staff officer, had contacted Prince Sabahaddin through Scalieri, a Greek politician. Prince Sabahaddin had then invited Dr. Riza Nur and several other opposition politicians to discuss the prospects of the Albanian rebellion. They agreed that, at this critical juncture, in order to effect the fall of the Said Pasha Cabinet, the Albanian rebellion could use the help of a general military upheaval. Following the meeting, Prince Sabahaddin added his own views to the League of Saviour Officers’ manifesto, and this revised version was secretly printed in large quantities in a print shop at Pera. Again, Prince Sabahaddin was responsible for financing.

Monarchists then set about diligently recruiting army officers. Acting as liaison between the officers on the one hand and Prince Sabahaddin, Kâmil Pasha, and Nâzım Pasha on the other, Dr. Riza Nur also used his residence as the headquarters for the preparation and distribution of counter-revolutionary propaganda. Nâzım Pasha, head of the Council of War, also served as intermediary between the leadership of the Entente Libérale and the secret military organisation, though most communication between the two groups was highly secret and, in general, the organisation was geared to disguise its political machinations as a purely military unrest.

In late June, newspapers finally printed news of the revolt at Monastir, though most downplayed its significance, por-

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traying it as the action of a few disgruntled officers and soldiers who were rebelling against their supervisors. But, the mutiny of troops at Monastir proved to be a more serious problem than was at first indicated. The Government soon realised that it was, in effect, a deliberate revolt against the Cabinet on the part of at least one organisation, ostensibly the League of Saviour Officers, which by itself represented an influential body of military opinion. Although local factors seemed to have caused a premature outbreak at Monastir, there was good reason to believe that the secret military organisation had for some time been contemplating open hostility against the Committee of Union and Progress and that it had only held back on account of the Tripolitan war. With the crisis past, however, the unrest in Albania and monarchist activity combined to strengthened the hands of the malcontents in Monastir.

On the night of June 22 and 23, Captain Tayyar Bey Tetova, an Albanian officer from Dibër and a member of the League of Saviour Officers, left the barracks at Bistritza, three miles from Monastir, with several other officers, some sixty men, several machine guns and 1,000 TLs. He was later joined by more officers and troops, mostly Albanians, though a few were Turks and Christians from Dibër and Perlepe. He then


29 “Monastir Mutiny: Political and Military Movement—Fighting with the Insurgents,” The Times, June 27, 1912, p.8; “Notes of the Week,” The Near East, July 5, 1912, p.261; and, Aram Andonyan, Balkan Savası, p.176. For the existence of seditious propaganda material—distributed by members of the League of Saviour Officers, and found on the captured mutineers—see, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkılapı Tarihi, 2/1, pp.255-256.

announced that he and his comrades, organised clandestinely under the name of Protection of the Fatherland—or, Hizî-i Vatan, or Muhafeza-i Vatan—supported the Albanian insurgents, and sent a telegram to the Government demanding the resignation of the existing Cabinet, the impeachment of Hakkî Pasha’s Cabinet for its lack of military preparations in Tripoli, as well as the trials of Talât Bey, Cavid Bey, Hüseyin Cahid [Yalcın], Ömer Naci Bey, Dr. Nâzım Bey, Babanzade Ismail Hakkî Bey, and Rahmi [Aslan]—all of whom were leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress. He also demanded that the Committee of Union and Progress be prohibited from any further political activity, that army officers’ grievances be addressed, that a General Staff at the Palace be created, and that new elections be held.31

The League of Saviour Officers addressed its demands to the Council of War, which was conveniently headed by one of its conspirators, Nâzım Pasha.32 Acting in his official capacity, Nâzım Pasha urged that the Cabinet give the matter immediate attention, suggesting that discontent was widespread enough to warrant its resignation.33 Although the League of Saviour Officers had demanded that the Sultan preside over the General Staff, apparently to correct certain ‘irregularities’ in the army’s advancement procedures, there could

June 28, 1912, p.3; and, “Constantinople Letter,” The Near East, July 5, 1912, p.263. See also, Peter Bartl, Die albanischen Muslime zur Zeit der nationalen Unabhängigkeitbewegung, 1878-1912, p.181; Süleyman Küççe, Osmanî Tarihinde Arnavutluk, p.410; Basil Kondis, Greece and Albania, 1908-1914, p.69; Stavro Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912, p.430; Ahmet Turan Alkan, İkinci Mesruyet Devrinde Ordunun ve Siyaset, p.125; Edwin Pears, Forty Years in Constantinople: The Recollections of Sir Edwin Pears, 1873-1913, p.325; and, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, 2/1, p.257.


be no doubt that its demands were primarily political.\textsuperscript{34} It had singled out Cavid and Talât Beys, two of the most prominent leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress and ministers in the cabinet, as well as Mahmud Şevket Pasha, the Minister of War; and called for the Committee’s dissolution, as well as the new parliament’s.\textsuperscript{35}

After the news of the outbreak at Monastir, the government summoned the Chamber for the special purpose of passing a bill introduced by Mahmud Şevket Pasha, Minister of War, which would prohibit political activity on the part of officers and troops.\textsuperscript{36} In the speech he delivered to the Chamber on July 1, Mahmud Şevket Pasha praised the alliance between officers and Unionists prior to and during the Revolution of 1908. Yet he went on to say that he was generally against the military’s involvement in politics and was proposing a bill to that effect.\textsuperscript{37} Apart from the Albanian and Entente Libérals deputies, a majority of the Chamber favoured the bill.\textsuperscript{38} Nonetheless, Ali Galib Bey, the opposition deputy for Kayseri, criticised the proposal as unconstitutional, adding that if the bill were passed, the fact that the officers and troops of Monastir would automatically be guilty might only provoke them further still.\textsuperscript{39} Vartkes Serengülyan, the socialist deputy

\textsuperscript{34}“Salonica Letter,” \textit{The Near East}, July 12, 1912, p.295.


\textsuperscript{39} II/1/23, June 18, 1328/July 1, 1912, \textit{Meclis-i Mebusan Zabti Ceresi}, I,
for Erzurum, responded to the monarchist rhetoric of Ali Galib Bey by denouncing any political party which leaned on military support. The bill, prohibiting all political meetings and demonstrations by the military, as well as its taking any part in any political struggle, passed that day.

The government’s measures to deal with the revolt, however, provoked little more than its own embarrassment. After having announced that loyal troops at Monastir would pursue the deserters rigorously, the Cabinet was informed that the garrison could not be counted upon to take action against its comrades. The government then ordered Abdullah Pasha, its commander in İzmir, to send a detachment of his troops to the afflicted region. However, Abdullah Pasha was also actively working with the monarchists and the Albanian rebels; so he curtly replied that no Turkish officer would take the field against his brother officers. Troops, however, were eventually dispatched to Monastir. Nonetheless, the Government, now aware of the strength and extent of its opposition, was not prepared to risk civil war, and while some pushed for strong military action, others continued to support the ongoing negotiations with Tayyar Bey Tetova conducted through officers of the Monastir and Salonica garrisons who acted as the government’s representatives.

Unable to rely on other troops in Macedonia, the Government sent in an entire division from the Dardanelles. Though

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40 II/1/23, June 18, 1328/July 1, 1912, Meclis-i Mebusan Zabit Cерidesi, I, pp.555-557.
41 II/1/23, June 18, 1328/July 1, 1912, Meclis-i Mebusan Zabit Cерidesi, I, pp.570-578; “Troops Sent to Monastir: Officers and Politics,” The Times, July 2, 1912, p.5; and, “Salonika Letter,” The Near East, July 12, 1912, p.295. The bill, however, did not become law immediately. Before the other required procedures were carried out, Mahmud Sevket Pasha was forced to resign. After the coup d’état of July 1912, Nazım Pasha, the new monarchist Minister of War, deferring to the wishes of the monarchist deputies, delayed the carrying out of the remaining formalities for three months, and the bill was finally published in October 1912 (Takvim-i Vekayi, September 27, 1328/October 10, 1912, cited in Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdım, 2, p.516). See also, Ahmet Turan Alkan, İkinci Meşrûyet Devrinde Ordû ve Siyaset, p.146.
it contained elements which were decidedly hostile to the Committee of Union and Progress, the army was by no means unanimously anti-Unionist, and most officers wished to avoid a military conflagration at all costs. These supported a cover-up of the Monastir episode which involved letting the mutineers escape without much punishment. Mahmud Şevket Pasha and the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, however, declared that while those deserters who surrendered within a given period would be dealt with as mildly as possible, those who refused would be punished with the utmost severity. Yet, neither the Minister of War nor the Unionists could feel at all secure; they were relying largely on the patriotism of the officer class to prevent any extension of the movement.43

There was little doubt that there had been signs of disaffection among the troops at İzmir, Edirne, and to a certain extent Erzurum and Erzincan.44 At İzmir, the army, six divisions strong and under the command of the anti-Unionist Abdullah Pasha, demonstrated in sympathy with the mutineers.45 On July 6, the Commander of the Damascus Army Corps detained two officers for their involvement in political demonstrations. The officers of the garrison demanded their release, which was at first refused. The garrison then went on


The American Consul at İzmir filed this report on Abdullah Pasha's complicity in overthrowing the constitutional regime: "I am credibly informed that Abdullah, with various of his officers have been meeting in a house at Seydiköy, near Smyrna, where they have been receiving from forty to fifty cipher telegrams per day from the different military centers of the Empire. ... It is worthy of notice that many of the leading officers of the army are Albanians or Arabs, who have been disaffected by the policy which the Committee has been pursuing with reference to these two provinces. It is more than probable that the recent disturbances in Albania have been approved of if not actually connived at by army officers here and elsewhere" (Consul George Horton to Secretary of State, Smyrna, July 25, 1912, in Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey, 1910-1929, Roll 4).
strike, adopting such a hostile attitude that the commander was finally forced to release the officers. Additionally, the commanders of one or two isolated battalions on the Anatolian coastline reported that their officers had made the same demands as the Monastir mutineers.46

On the night of July 9, Mahmud Şevket Pasha resigned his portfolio, stating that it would be more fitting for someone else to enforce the new law concerning political activity within the military.47 As his resignation was the result of an League of Saviour Officers ultimatum, he was the first to be sacrificed to the exigencies of the situation.48

Mahmud Şevket Pasha’s resignation was followed by that of his cousin and brother-in-law, Hadi Pasha, Chief of the General Staff, who had replaced İzzet Pasha when the latter went to Yemen.49 Monarchists had been against his appointment to that post.50 Other high officers were also expected to resign, including Ismail Hakki Pasha, Chief of Provisions.51

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50 “Mahmud Şevket’s Fall: Feeling in the Army,” The Times, July 13, 1912, p.5.
Meanwhile, counter-revolutionaries sent a stream of threatening letters to leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, expressing their designs to assassinate certain Ministers and leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, and at the same time, spread rumours designed to destabilise the Government. In İzmir, hand bills printed by the League of Saviour Officers were distributed both among the troops and the civilian population. Müsavat, a monarchist paper there, also printed unfounded stories that several Cabinet members, including Mahmud Şevket Pasha, had been assassinated.52

Said Pasha asked the Minister of the Navy, Hurşid Pasha, to take over the Ministry of War as Acting Minister. The latter, however, was of the opinion that the whole Cabinet should resign. Under pressure from Said Pasha, he reluctantly accepted and was appointed pending the selection of a successor.53 Said Pasha then offered the job to Abdullah Pasha, Commander of the Army at İzmir, who declined the offer on the grounds of ‘competence.’54 Nâzım, Turgut Şevket, Abdullah, İbrahim, and Tatar Osman Pashas were all considered possible successors, and although Turgut and Nâzım Pashas had both refused, monarchist press hoped that Nâzım Pasha, who had been holding long talks with the Cabinet, might reconsider.55 Not wanting to further strain an already delicate situation, the Government clearly hoped to resolve the Ministry question as quickly as possible. There was, however, some hope that the


division between those officers who had strictly military grievances, and wanted no more than Mahmud Şevket Pasha’s resignation, and those who had a definite political programme, which included the resignation of the Cabinet, the overthrow of the Committee of Union and Progress, and the dissolution of the existing Chamber of Deputies, might bring about a compromise and save the country from a pronunciamento.56

When Said Pasha asked Nâzım Pasha to take the Ministry of War, the latter had made his acceptance conditional on several points. First, he stated that he would not vigorously pursue the Monastir rebels; second, he demanded that martial law be lifted and a general amnesty declared; third, he wanted the creation of a new office, Supreme Commander, the responsibilities of which would be given to the Minister of War. The Unionist leadership indicated that whereas they were willing to accept the first two conditions, they could not accept the third, pointing out that, as stipulated in the Constitution, only the Sultan himself could be considered Supreme Commander. Nâzım Pasha, however, insisted and was duly passed over as a candidate for the Ministry of War.57

Then, Said Pasha offered the position to Mahmud Muhtar Pasha. Made on July 16, this offer would be the Cabinet’s last chance to hold its ground.58 Mahmud Muhtar Pasha predicated his acceptance on conditions similar to the first two Nâzım Pasha had presented, and though the Committee of Union and Progress agreed, he eventually declined the of-


fer. Nonetheless, that day, the press announced that Mahmud Muhtar Pasha had been named to the post. The imperial decree confirming the appointment, however, was never issued.

The pashas had been acting in collusion all along, and their persistent refusals had left the Unionist-backed Said Pasha Cabinet in an extremely difficult position. And it was at this critical juncture that Hurşid Pasha, also involved in the League of Saviour Officers—fearing that if Mahmud Muhtar Pasha were forced to accept the post, the Cabinet might be saved and the coup crushed—resigned. His resignation had the intended effect: Despite the advice of Cavid and Talât Bey who had insistently refused to succumb to monarchist intimidation, Said Pasha resigned.

On July 17, the Said Pasha Cabinet resigned—just two days after it had been given an overwhelming one hundred ninety-four to four vote of confidence. That day both Said Pasha and Asım Bey, Minister for Foreign Affairs, had made well-received speeches in the Chamber of Deputies on both the domestic unrest and its effect on international relations.


60 "New Turkish War Minister: Mahmud Mukhtar's Career," The Times, July 17, 1912, p.5; and, "The Situation in Turkey," The Near East, July 19, 1912, p.334.


64 Mehmed Cavid, "Mesrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavid Bey'in Hattaları: 137," Tanin, January 18, 1944, p.2; Babanzade Ismail Hakkı, "Buhrandan Buhrana," Ta-
Although Asım Bey had tendered his resignation four times during the cabinet crisis, Talât Bey had consistently prevented it. When Hurşid Pasha finally resigned, leaving both the Ministry of the Navy and of War empty, Said Pasha had told the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress that it would be impossible to carry on. In order to gain time, however, Talât Bey urged Said Pasha to postpone his resignation, and Said Pasha acquiesced, waiting another day before submitting the cabinet's resignation to the Sultan.65

The previous Hakki Pasha Cabinet had been forced to resign, at the beginning of the war with Italy, owing to popular indignation over its failure to avoid the war or make adequate preparations for it. Said Pasha had filled the gap with a nominally non-party Cabinet, though before long the Committee of Union and Progress had seen fit to strengthen its position by placing some of its leaders in the cabinet. This process of consolidation was then applied to the Chamber, where the elections were carefully designed to secure parliamentary support for the Committee of Union and Progress. From that moment on, the fate of the cabinet was sealed. Internal dissensions within its ranks became acute; the monarchist opposition now had an invaluable rallying cry, while at the same time, dissatisfaction among the military could only grow, in-

separable as it was from the Unionist policy of consolidating its power.\footnote{66}

After Mahmud Şevket Pasha’s resignation, the League of Saviour Officers had prepared a proclamation in which they demanded the immediate resignation of the Said Pasha Cabinet, the dissolution of the Chamber, and appointment of Kâmil Pasha to the Grand Vezierate. On July 18, the League of Saviour Officers gave its proclamation to Hurşid Pasha and Nâzım Pasha.\footnote{67} Hurşid Pasha brought it to the attention of the Cabinet. The Cabinet members who were present during the ensuing discussion were Said Pasha, Hacı Âdil [Arda], Minister of the Interior, Talât Bey, Minister of Posts, Hayri Bey, Minister of Pious Foundations, and Asım Bey, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Hacı Âdil [Arda] and Talât Bey urged Hurşid Pasha to use force against the rebellious officers. Hurşid Pasha, however, rejected any such plan and recommended that the proclamation be presented to the Sultan.\footnote{68} The Cabinet was at an impasse. Said Pasha summoned Nâzım Pasha to the Sublime Porte, but Nâzım Pasha refused, agreeing with Hurşid Pasha that the ultimatum should be immediately referred to the Sultan, something he himself was prepared to do.\footnote{69} The Cabinet, however, decided that if the Sultan needed to be informed of the situation, Said Pasha should be the one to do it. Nonetheless, Hurşid Pasha took matters into his own hands and went to the Palace.\footnote{70} The Sultan then summoned Said Pasha and requested that the Cabinet draft a conciliatory

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proclamation, addressing the military’s grievances. The Cabinet then prepared its proclamation and submitted it for the Sultan’s approval. That night, however, Nâzım, Hürşid, and Hadi Pashas revised the proclamation, deleting, among other things, all references to the punishment of rebellious officers. Seeing the altered text in the newspapers the next day, the Cabinet met and declared that this constituted a serious breach of constitutional rules.71

On July 17, the Sultan again offered Tevfik Pasha, the monarchist pasha who had been appointed Grand Vezier during the April, 1909 coup, the helm of the government.72 In its response to the League of Saviour Officers, the government reprimanded the rebellious officers for having interfered in politics. The proclamation announced that the Sultan had consulted the Presidents of both the Chamber and the Senate, and with their consent, had invited Tevfik Pasha to take the post of Grand Vezier. The Sultan added that the new cabinet would be composed of those who had wide experience of matters of State, independent views, and that this cabinet would be free from all outside influences.73 In essence, this meant the establishment of a conservative government composed mostly of old regime pashas—most likely, under the grand vezairship of Kâmil Pasha—with the aim of keeping the Unionists out of


power.\textsuperscript{74} Tevfik Pasha’s conditions for accepting the Grand Veziership, however, were the lifting of the martial law, the proclamation of general amnesty, the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and the abolition of the ‘secret’ societies and political organisations—meaning, the closing down of the Committee of Union and Progress. Naturally, the Unionists rejected these demands, and Tevfik Pasha was passed over as a nominee for the Grand Veziership.\textsuperscript{75}

The situation was clearly deadlocked. As forces operating outside established parliamentary rules had forced the Said Pasha Cabinet to resign, it was clear that the monarchist opposition aspired to a totally anti-Unionist Grand Vezier and cabinet. This could only be thoroughly unacceptable to the Committee of Union and Progress and the predominantly anti-monarchist Chamber.\textsuperscript{76} The names of Ferid Pasha and Kâmil Pasha had also been circulated by the monarchists, but the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress had also successfully resisted their nominations.\textsuperscript{77} In the case of Kâmil Pasha, Talât Bey had even urged Halid Ziya [Uşaklıgil], Secretary to the Sultan, to use his influence with the Sultan to block the nomination, indicating that it might well lead to civil war.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{74} Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, \textit{Türk İnkılabı Tarihi}, 2/1, p.279.
Described by its adherents as the ‘Grand Cabinet,’ the new Cabinet was formed on July 21, under the presidency of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha. It included Gabriel Nouradunghian, the monarchist senator and now Minister for Foreign Affairs, Avlonyalı Mehmed Ferid Pasha, the deposed Grand Vezier of the absolutist regime and now Minister of the Interior, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, ex-Grand Vezier and now Minister of Justice, Nâzım Pasha, member of the Council of War and now Minister of War, Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, Minister of the Navy, Said Bey, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Education and now Minister of Education, Ziya Pasha as Minister of Finance, Damad Şerif Pasha, President of the Civil Bureaucracy Section of the Council of State and now Minister of Public Works, Reşid Pasha, ex-Ambassador to Vienna, now Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, and Muhammad Fawzi Pasha al-‘Azm, deputy for Damascus and Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies, now Minister of Pious Foundations. Kâmil Pasha was named President of the Council of State; Mehmed Cemaleddin Efendi was appointed Sheikh-ul-Islam. With his appointment as Sheikh-ul-Islam Cemaleddin Efendi, who was a member of the Entente Libérale, returned to an office which he had held for many years under the ancien régime.

Avlonyalı Mehmed Ferid Pasha, however, had been named to the Ministry of the Interior without either his prior

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knowledge or consent, and he immediately declined the position.\textsuperscript{82} Ziya Pasha, the new Minister of Finance, was named as his replacement; in turn, Abdurrahman Bey, a member of the Financial Reform Commission was appointed to the latter’s position.\textsuperscript{83} However, unable to ‘compromise,’ Ziya Pasha soon left the Cabinet altogether.\textsuperscript{84} Damad Serif Pasha, the Minister of Public Works, was then appointed in his place, but he too resigned shortly afterwards.\textsuperscript{85} The Ministry was then entrusted to Ali Danış Bey, an Albanian and former governor of Salonica who, after the Revolution, had been dismissed from office for incompetence.\textsuperscript{86} Reluctant to appoint such a dubious character, the Sultan had once again offered the post to Avlonyalı Mehmed Ferid Pasha, who had, once again, refused.\textsuperscript{87}

But by this time, it was clear that the constant ministerial shuffling was the result of concerted monarchist efforts to force Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha from office, in the hopes of replacing him with Kâmil Pasha. Ferid Pasha had suggested as much in his meetings with Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha.\textsuperscript{88}


\textsuperscript{83} “The Turkish Crisis: Cabinet Changes and Appointments,” The Times, July 29, 1912, p.5; Mehmed Cavid, “Meşrutiyet Devrine Ait Cavid Bey’in Hatıraları,” Tanin, January 21, 1944, p.2; Mustafa Ragib Esalı, İtihat ve Terakki Tarihinde Esrar Perdesi: Yakup Çemiç Niçin ve Nasıl Olduruldu? p.110; and, Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdım, 2, p.565.

\textsuperscript{84} Mustafa Ragib Esalı, İtihat ve Terakki Tarihinde Esrar Perdesi: Yakup Çemiç Niçin ve Nasıl Olduruldu? p.114; Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdım, 2, p.565; and, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi, 2/4, p.225.

\textsuperscript{85} “Dahiliye Nezareti,” Tanin, August 8, 1328/August 21, 1912, p.3; “Şerif Paşa’nın Sebei İstişası,” Tanin, August 9, 1328/August 22, 1912, p.3; “Boş Nezaretler,” Tanin, August 10, 1328/August 23, 1912, p.2; and, Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdım, 2, p.565.

\textsuperscript{86} “Dahiliye Nezareti,” Tanin, August 10, 1328/August 23, 1912, p.2; Mustafa Ragib Esalı, İtihat ve Terakki Tarihinde Esrar Perdesi: Yakup Çemiç Niçin ve Nasıl Olduruldu? p.115; and, Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdım, 2, p.565.


\textsuperscript{88} Celal Bayar, Ben de Yazdım, 2, pp.566-567. See also, Şehbenderzade Fili-beli Ahmed Hilmi, Muhalefetin İflası: İtilâf ve Hürriyet Fırkası, pp.55-56.
The move reportedly began with Hoca Said Efendi, the Entente Libérale’s ex-deputy for Üsküb, who, along with several other Albanian politicians, now openly petitioned to the Palace for these demands.89

The blatant instability of the new cabinet worried the Committee of Union and Progress. Whereas monarchists called it the ‘Grand Cabinet,’ Tanin described it as the ‘Cabinet of Revenge,’ and along with Hak, and, to a lesser degree, Le Jeune Turc, campaigned against it.90

On their part, the monarchists realised that the cabinet, which had come to power without the support either of a parliamentary majority or the Committee of Union and Progress, left the Entente Libérale vulnerable to retaliation—at least as long as it failed to dissolve the Parliament.91

The League of Saviour Officers—or, Halâskâr Zabitan Grubu—was a secret military organisation formed sometime in 1911.92 Its aim was not only the fall of the Said Pasha Cabinet, but the complete exclusion of the Committee of Union and Progress from political life. The organisation hoped to achieve its ends by threatening the Unionist leadership with nothing short of violence and death. Accordingly, in a letter dated July 24, Halid Ziya [Uşaklıgil], the Unionist Secretary to the Sultan, was told to resign within twenty-four hours and return to private life or lose his life.93 On the night of July 29, he, as well as Lütfi [Simavi], the First Chamberlain, were relieved of their duties and were replaced by Halid Hurşid Bey, First Secretary to the Turkish Embassy in Paris, and Rıfat Bey, Assistant Grand Referandary at the Sublime Porte.94

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89 Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, Görüp İşittiklerim, pp.69-70.
93 Halid Ziya Uşaklıgil, Saray ve Ötesi, 3, pp.40-41.
94 “The Turkish Crisis: The Cabinet and the Chamber,” The Times, July 31, 1912, p.5.
Halil [Menteşe], the Unionist President of the Chamber of Deputies received a similar letter, again, dated July 24. Here, the League of Saviour Officers expressed dissatisfaction with Halil [Menteşe] for having blocked Kâmil Pasha’s appointment to the Grand Vezierate, and demanded the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies. If its demands were not met within forty-eight hours, the League of Saviour Officers promised to assassinate Halil [Menteşe]. The latter immediately met with Talât Bey, leader of the Committee of Union and Progress; they decided to take the matter before the Chamber of Deputies.

Halil [Menteşe] presented the letter that following day, and the Chamber reacted energetically. Talât Bey, Seyyid Bey, and Halil [Menteşe] declared that they were prepared to die for the Constitution. Ömer Naci Bey, deputy for Kırk Kilise and a prominent member of the Committee of Union and Progress, made a moving speech in which he denounced the League of Saviour Officers’ tactics and aims, and reiterated his and his party’s commitment to defend the Revolution and the new constitutional regime against military intervention.

But the most important speech came from Vartkes Seren-

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gûylan, the socialist Armenian deputy for Erzurum, who joined in the condemnation, adding that they had eliminated similar charlatans during the pre-revolutionary days and were prepared to do so again. He went on to say that the Chamber could not be dissolved through outside pressure, and he urged his colleagues to turn to the Government for an explanation, at the same time, inviting representatives of the Government to confess that they had gained power with the League of Saviour Officers' support. Finally, he ended his speech by stating that as long as strong adherents to a parliamentary regime remained, the country would never be ruled by a military dictatorship.101

The address was significant in so far as it gave voice to widespread Unionist dissatisfaction with the way the Said Pasha Cabinet had been forced to resign, and publicly raised the question of the current military-backed government's legitimacy. Nesim Masliyah, a prominent Unionist deputy for İzmir, along with the other Jewish and Armenian Unionist deputies condemned the ultimatum, and demanded that the Government come to the parliamentary regime's defence.102

Meanwhile, monarchist papers were in an unabashedly festive mood. Not only did they publish the ultimatum in its entirety, they openly gave the League of Saviour Officers and its demands their whole-hearted support, urging the Government to obey the rebel officers and dissolve the Chamber.103

Eventually, Nâzım Pasha, the monarchist Minister of War, appeared before the Chamber. He began by saying that the threatening letter was in all probability a bluff, nonetheless,
he assured the Chamber that the culprits would be pursued and punished.\textsuperscript{104} Seyyid Bey, deputy for İzmir and leader of the parliamentary group of the Committee of Union and Progress, asked Nâzım Pasha what steps he was prepared to take in regard to those newspapers which had publicly endorsed the military organisation's threats. Nâzım Pasha avoided the issue by blaming the press' behaviour on the public and its hunger for sensational news.\textsuperscript{105}

Dissatisfied with Nâzım Pasha's answers, the Unionist press attacked the monarchist opposition and took it upon itself to discredit the League of Saviour Officers.\textsuperscript{106} Despite threats against Unionist journalists, \textit{Hak} printed an editorial by Süleyman Nazif, entitled “Küçük Siyaset”—i.e., ‘Armed Politics,’—which ridiculed the army's motto, “The military is the defender of the Constitutional Regime.” The editorial went on to say that the army's sole and proper function was to defend the nation against foreign attack, that it had no place in domestic politics, and that the survival of a constitutional regime depended not on the sword, but on the conscience of the citizenry.\textsuperscript{107} The Unionist press also began printing letters which denounced the League of Saviour Officers and supported the constitutional regime, sent by loyal officers in such Macedonian towns as Salonica, İpek, and Senidje.\textsuperscript{108}

It became clear that the Committee of Union and Progress would do everything in its power, particularly in the Chamber, to resist the newly formed monarchist Cabinet and its wish to dissolve the Chamber.\textsuperscript{109} On their part, the monar-


\textsuperscript{105} II/1/40, July 12, 1328/July 25, 1912, Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Cерidesi, 2, p.449. See also, Yusufl Hikmet Bayur, \textit{Türk İnkılabı Tarihi}, 2/1, p.294.


\textsuperscript{109} Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, “Feshe Doğru İlk Teşebbüs,” \textit{Tanın}, July 19, 1928/
chists had already made up their mind and were looking for a seemingly ‘legal’ way to dissolve the Chamber.\textsuperscript{110} Lütfi Fikri Bey, an opposition ex-deputy for Dersim, who was known for his independent views, came up with one solution: “If each and every deputy were ‘persuaded’ to resign, then the Chamber would be automatically dissolved.”\textsuperscript{111} This was clearly impossible. On his part, Rıza Nur was publicly engaged in activities in discrediting the general elections and, therefore, the Chamber of Deputies.\textsuperscript{112}

Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha presented the new government’s programme on July 30. Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, the new Minister of Justice, asked the Chamber for its unconditional support. Under pressure, the deputies approved the government’s programme by a vote of one hundred and twelve to forty-four that same day.\textsuperscript{113}

Armed with an apparent mandate, the Government lost no time in replacing the Head of Police, as well as the Chief Military Commander in Istanbul, and state of emergency was promptly lifted. Military and provincial authorities in the


Macedonian provinces were also ordered to exercise leniency with regard to Albanian and other rebels still at large. Finally, those rebels currently in detention were amnestied and immediately set free.

The amnesty drew heavy criticism from the independent daily press in İstanbul, among them Arevelk and Jamanak, two Armenian newspapers. Both attacked the military Government, pointing out that, with few exceptions, it consisted of prominent figures from the old absolutist regime. Jamanak went on to say that if the new Government thought it could solve the current crisis by bringing in Hamidian reactionaries, it was dead wrong. Puzantion, another Armenian daily, denounced the amnesty, saying that it included not only Hamidian spies, conspirators, and other reactionaries who were involved in the uprising, but also corrupt Hamidian bureaucrats and ministers who had been exiled or imprisoned long before.

Dr. Riza Nur, one of the conspirators who had brought about the fall of the constitutional regime, remained in close contact with Albanian nationalist/separatist leaders. Towards the end of July, a telegram he had sent to Hoca Said Efendi, the monarchist ex-deputy for Üsküb who was organising the Albanian revolt in Prishtë, was intercepted. In it, he promised the hodja that the Chamber’s dissolution was only a matter of time.

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The text was printed in *Tanin*.\(^\text{118}\)

Local partisans of the Committee of Union and Progress sent telegram after telegram to the Grand Vezier, urging him not to dissolve the Parliament, and threatening to raise a force of ten thousand volunteers if any move were made in this direction.\(^\text{119}\) Countless letters and telegrams from concerned citizens of all political convictions throughout the country poured into the Chamber in support of the constitutional regime, denouncing the proclamations and threats of the secret military organisation.\(^\text{120}\)

The military Government, however, had found a ‘legal’ way to dissolve the Chamber by modifying Article 7 of the Constitution which defined the rights of the Sultan. The Cabinet proposed that the article be modified in such a way as to empower the Sultan to dissolve the Chamber under extraordinary circumstances after consultation with the Senate.\(^\text{121}\) After a stormy debate, the Chamber sent the Government’s proposal to the Commission for the Revision of the Constitution. Realising that the Commission would certainly reject its proposal after delaying its reply for as long as possible, the Government turned to the monarchist-dominated Senate, and a special sitting was scheduled for the morning on Sunday, August 4.\(^\text{122}\)

In response, and in order to test the Unionist strength in the Chamber, eight Unionist deputies—Ziya Bey, deputy for Rize, Hasan Fehmi [Tümerkan], deputy for Sinob, Osman Bey,
deputy for Serfudje, Bedros Haladjian, deputy for İstanbul, Mehmed Münir [ Çağil], deputy for Corum, Nuri Bey, deputy for Kerbela, İbrahim Fevzi Efendi, deputy for Mosul, and Talat Bey, deputy for Edirne—submitted a petition to the Chamber of Deputies on August 4 which criticised both the actions of the League of Saviour Officers and the laxity on the part of Nazım Pasha, Minister of War, and the Government towards the rebel officers. The deputies alleged that Nazım Pasha, far from opening an investigation into counter-revolutionary activity among his officers, had, in fact, invited the League of Saviour Officers members to the Sublime Porte, and congratulated them. The petition also criticised the fact that these officers had complete access to the Chamber without the proper authorities' knowledge or authorisation. The deputies demanded that the Ministry of War be held accountable.  

During the closed Senate session that same day, the Government gave its version of the events in Macedonia. Twenty out of sixty garrisons in Albania, it said, had revolted against government authority and joined the uprising, and coupled with the fact that the Committee of Union and Progress on the whole did not enjoy widespread military support, a resolution to the crisis in Albania clearly called for the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies.  

Mahmud Şevket Pasha, the ex-Minister of War who had been named senator immediately after his forced resignation, questioned the validity of these allegations as well as the government's logic. He pointed out that a majority of the garrisons in Macedonia had remained loyal and had sent telegrams supporting the constitutional regime—both to the Sublime Porte and to Parliament. These troops, he argued, were perfectly capable of maintaining order; the activities of a few mutinous garrisons were clearly no reason to dissolve the Chamber. The monarchist-dominated Senate, however, paid little attention to his arguments, and proceeded to

make legal arrangements for the Chamber’s dissolution.  

By a vote of twenty-eight to five, with one undecided, the Senate passed a modified version of Article 35. It then passed an amendment to Article 48 which shortened the parliamentary session to six months, though it could be prolonged for an additional period of time. Because the Senate declared that the present Parliament was a continuation of the Parliament of 1908, making the last elections null and void, and because this Parliament had been sitting for much more than the prescribed term, the Senate authorised the Government to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies.

That night, Halil [Menteşe] rushed to the Palace and implored the Sultan not to issue the decree of dissolution, but to no avail. The Imperial Decree was issued at midnight.

Hoping to mount a counter-attack, the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress decided to convene the Chamber before the official announcement was made. On the morning of August 5, Halil [Menteşe] did not relay the Imperial Decree to the Chamber. Instead, he simply confirmed that such a decree had been issued, allowing the session to continue as if nothing had happened. After several Albanian deputies had tried unsuccessfully to disrupt the proceedings, Cavid Bey took the floor and made a highly charged

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speech, in which he declared that more than the existence of the Chamber was at stake: the rights of the entire nation were under siege.\footnote{129} After fierce debate, the Chamber gave the Government a vote of no confidence, and adjourned “till summoned by its President.”\footnote{130}

Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha arrived at Parliament at 1 p.m. and read the decree of dissolution to a handful of Senators, a dozen monarchist Albanian deputies, as well as Seyyid Talib ibn Receb Bey, deputy for Basra, and Şeyhzade Zeynelabidin Efendi, deputy for Konya. He informed the deputies that the Government would not recognise the morning’s proceedings.\footnote{131} Halil [Menteşe] went to the Palace, where the Sultan refused to see him. Later, after a scene in the Speaker’s room, where Esad Pasha Toptan behaved with such violence that Halil [Menteşe] was forced to summon the police, the Chamber of Deputies was locked up by Ferid Pasha’s order and the Cabinet met to discuss the situation.\footnote{132}

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Throughout that day, about three hundred loyalist officers demonstrated in Hürriyet-i Ebediye Square. In a proclamation issued that day, they declared their allegiance to the constitutional regime, denounced the rebel officers, and asked for their immediate arrests. They further demanded that those rebel officers be tried and punished.\textsuperscript{133}

In a joint declaration, one hundred and sixteen junior officers belonging to the Third Army Corps stationed at Salonica expressed the hope that the Third Army Corps, which had played such a significant role in restoring the constitutional regime after the coup attempt of April 1909, would not remain silent in this event too. They especially deplored and denounced those army officers who had both joined the Albanian insurgents’ demands for independence and rebelled against the constitutional regime at a time when Turkey was at war with the Italians in Tripoli. They ended their declaration with a firm commitment to liberal democratic principles and the supremacy of parliamentary rule.\textsuperscript{134}

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